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Social Science Fictions: The Numeric Imaginary Of Cold War America
Abstract
“Social Science Fictions” examines the production of science as an aesthetic category in mid-twentieth
century America, identifying scale as its organizing logic and most persistent formal problem. By thinking
of science as an aesthetic category, not just an ideological or methodological one, this project reads the
scientism of the cold war era as the foundation for a set of literary experiments with scientific modes of
representation. As the human sciences of the period newly professionalized and proliferated, a reading
public was constituted around the ravenous consumption of scientific data about itself. The encounter
between mass readerships and expert knowledges produces a social science fictional discourse charged
with reconciling the representational protocols of literary characterization with the statistical aggregates
of social scientific quantification. I trace the emergence of an aesthetics of quantification across the
genres of science fiction, campus novel, gay pulp, b-movies, and contemporaneous sexology, sociology,
and anthropology by reading the print and visual culture that sutured these discourses to one another.
Chapter 1 reads responses to the Kinsey reports as indicative of a widespread cultural fascination with
quantitative modes of representing human behavior and the social world. I read expert critiques of the
reports, magazine reporting on their interview methods, pulp fictionalizations of sexological research, and
internal institutional documents of the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research along with a novel by Philip Wylie
written as an homage to Kinsey. Chapter 2 continues its investigation of the aesthetic imprint of Kinsey
specifically and quantitative social research generally by centering the history of the “gay novel” through
readings of pseudonymous detective fiction by Gore Vidal and best-selling hustler narratives by John
Rechy. Chapter 3 centers the problem space of the campus in the imaginary of postwar science fiction,
architecture, and student protest. Through readings of novels by Robert Silverberg and Ursula Le Guin, I
show how the university came to stand in for the universe itself in science fictional investigations of
utopian institutionality. Chapter 4 reads the convergence of population bomb and atomic bomb panics in
the crisis discourse of spaceship earth, centering a reading of The Incredible Shrinking Man.
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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL SCIENCE FICTIONS:
THE NUMERIC IMAGINARY OF COLD WAR AMERICA
Joan Lubin
Heather Love
“Social Science Fictions” examines the production of science as an aesthetic category in
mid-twentieth century America, identifying scale as its organizing logic and most
persistent formal problem. By thinking of science as an aesthetic category, not just an
ideological or methodological one, this project reads the scientism of the cold war era as
the foundation for a set of literary experiments with scientific modes of representation.
As the human sciences of the period newly professionalized and proliferated, a reading
public was constituted around the ravenous consumption of scientific data about itself.
The encounter between mass readerships and expert knowledges produces a social
science fictional discourse charged with reconciling the representational protocols of
literary characterization with the statistical aggregates of social scientific quantification. I
trace the emergence of an aesthetics of quantification across the genres of science fiction,
campus novel, gay pulp, b-movies, and contemporaneous sexology, sociology, and
anthropology by reading the print and visual culture that sutured these discourses to one
another. Chapter 1 reads responses to the Kinsey reports as indicative of a widespread
cultural fascination with quantitative modes of representing human behavior and the
social world. I read expert critiques of the reports, magazine reporting on their interview
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methods, pulp fictionalizations of sexological research, and internal institutional
documents of the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research along with a novel by Philip Wylie
written as an homage to Kinsey. Chapter 2 continues its investigation of the aesthetic
imprint of Kinsey specifically and quantitative social research generally by centering the
history of the “gay novel” through readings of pseudonymous detective fiction by Gore
Vidal and best-selling hustler narratives by John Rechy. Chapter 3 centers the problem
space of the campus in the imaginary of postwar science fiction, architecture, and student
protest. Through readings of novels by Robert Silverberg and Ursula Le Guin, I show
how the university came to stand in for the universe itself in science fictional
investigations of utopian institutionality. Chapter 4 reads the convergence of population
bomb and atomic bomb panics in the crisis discourse of spaceship earth, centering a
reading of The Incredible Shrinking Man.
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INTRODUCTION
“Social Science Fictions” examines the production of science as an aesthetic
category in mid-twentieth century America. By thinking of science as an aesthetic
category, and not only an ideological or methodological one, this project reads the
scientism of the Cold War era as the foundation for a set of literary experiments with
scientific modes of representation. In 1953, Isaac Asimov coined the phrase “social
science fiction,” meant to describe the potential for a mutually transformative interaction
between science fiction and society. Herman Kahn, just a few years later and in a rather
different context, imagined himself to have coined the term as a name for the nuclear
simulations being carried out in the RAND Corporation laboratories under his direction.1
I set out from the co-emergence of this term in these two contemporary but disparate
arenas in order to parse the relationships of fiction and social science to one another, and
to the hybrid generic category that each conjures for their shared project. The
simultaneous emergence of “social science fiction” in the laboratory and in letters shows
the close links between fiction and simulation in the period, and how disciplinary
differences were mediated by genre. Each of the chapters hones in on one facet of this

1

Isaac Asimov, “Social Science Fiction,” Modern Science Fiction: Its Meaning and Its
Future, ed. Reginald Bretnor (Coward-McCann, 1953): 157-196. On the RAND
Corporation use of the phrase, see Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable:
Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30.2 (2000): 163223. Ghamari-Tabrizi develops her argument about what she terms the “irrationalist”
aesthetics of Cold War defense planning further in The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The
Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Harvard UP, 2005).
1

symbolic negotiation between the postwar genre system and professionalizing human
sciences.
Reeling from the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Hannah Arendt warned against what
she foresaw as the inevitable outcome of unchecked scientific advance: the degradation
of humans into rats in a behaviorist maze, and of language into the “meaningless
formalism of mathematical signs.”2 At the same time, novelists found in this state of
affairs not the death knell of human expression but a new frontier for its elaboration. Just
a few short years later, Gore Vidal was praising his own pseudonymously authored pulp
fiction as a masterful extension of a quantitative project: “The work that Dr. Kinsey
began with statistics, Edgar Box has completed with wit in the mystery novel.”
Throughout the project I trace the emergence of the motif of science across the genres of
science fiction, campus novel, gay pulp, b-movies, and contemporaneous sexology,
sociology, and anthropology by reading the print and visual culture that sutured these
discourses to one another. Each chapter does this work in a different way, taking for
example a set of key cultural texts ranging from Alfred Kinsey’s Reports on human
sexual behavior to Buckminster Fuller’s Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth, and
novels by Philip Wylie, Joseph Hilton Smyth, Ray Train, Ted Mark, Gore Vidal, John
Rechy, B. F. Skinner, Robert Silverberg, Ursula Le Guin, and Richard Matheson.

2

Hannah Arendt, “Man’s Conquest of Space,” The American Scholar 32.4 (1963): 527540.
2

Read together, these diverse sources show us the outlines of a numerical
imaginary animating postwar American literature. “Social Science Fictions” shows how
genre fiction took up mathematical formalism in the service of social realism and
developed modes of narrative representation for an age of statistical aggregation. The
cultural scene of cold war America has been understood as a battle of two cultures waged
on the domestic front between arts and sciences.3 I argue that the arts and sciences were
collaborators rather than combatants: together, they forged a new aesthetic paradigm that
allowed mass market genres to carry the mantle of literary value in an era when the
credibility of high literature was undermined by quantification. New computational
technologies and statistical methods developed in state-funded think tanks and
universities prompted a quantitative sea change in the midcentury social sciences, making
human behavior and social processes newly available to quantitative capture and numeric
description—to counting, in short. But this does not so much de-aestheticize the novel as
it does convert math and science into potential aesthetic categories. From that
perspective, the scientism of the cold war was not the enemy of literary humanism but
rather a spur to the reconfiguration of the literary protocols of the period. As Vidal put it,
assessing “The Novel in the Age of Science” in 1965, “This is scientism, a proper word,

3

On the “two cultures” see C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution
(1959); F. R. Leavis, Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow (1962); and Lionel
Trilling, “Science, Literature, and Culture: A Comment on the Leavis-Snow
Controversy,” Commentary 33 (1962): 461-477.
3

by the way, for those addicted to the manner rather than the spirit of science. Scientism
has been responsible for a century of deliberate experiment in all the arts.”4
The project is bookended by two supposed crises, or two discourses of crisis: the
death of the novel and the crisis of the humanities. It reads these two kinds of
“quantitative turn”—the first in representation, the second in method—into the long rise
of “social science fiction” after 1945. One impetus of the project is to articulate
genealogical relations between methods and the representational modes, styles, and
vocabularies that are their conditions of possibility. Focusing on the rise in cultural
prestige of scientific method is a naturally interdisciplinary project that finds its shape in
a constellation of fields concerned with the gray area between quantification and quality
of life, including literary studies and extending to history of sexuality, sociology, science
and technology studies, and media studies. Adopting the term “social science fiction”
from my archive, and leveraging it as a phrase situated between historical phenomenon
and analytic category, each chapter pursues a site of representational negotiation between
the postwar genre system and the professionalizing human sciences. Doing so enables me

4

Vidal’s assessment of the novel in the age of science concludes that “the state of fiction
reflects, as I said, the state of the society. And that is why the two principal trends in our
writing are the so-called novel of the absurd and the autobiography of the alienated, to
use a cant word of the 1940’s. Novels of deliberate mystification seem to me a natural
response to the world of statistics and applied science. Just as the psychologists are
‘perfecting’ a whole new series of tests which they are certain will reveal personality
once and for all and help the Government to anticipate security risks, the novelists are
showing us, through what only appear to be absurd narratives, the huge mystery of
human personality and the impossibility of measuring it statistically.” Gore Vidal, “The
Novel in the Age of Science,” The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress 22.4
(1965): 288-299.
4

to assess contemporary critical debates in light of a longer history of interdisciplinary
negotiation.
Recent work in the field of post-45 literary criticism has attempted to upend
literary historical accounts premised on assessments of cultural value and has undertaken
instead a redescription of the social field and institutional history of literary production
and reception. In kindred spirit to Merve Emre’s recent book Paraliterary: The Making of
Bad Readers in Postwar America, which centers “bad” readers to rethink the aesthetics
and politics of the postwar period, I center “bad” writers.5 This dissertation offers
readings of novels few scholars have read, and indeed in most cases I would not
recommend reading them. Centering texts little known or maligned has been a strategy to
evade assessing the relationship between the humanities and sciences on the premise that
the humanities offer beauty, complexity, and subtlety while the sciences dehumanize,
abstract, and quantify—a recapitulation of the “two cultures” discourse. The crisis
discourse of the contemporary humanities sees literary criticism embattled by the overfunded sciences from without and ascendant quantitative methods from within. Rather
than begin with this antagonism, I set out by centering literature that seems to have a
greater affinity with the sciences than the humanities, and a greater interest in numeracy
than literacy, in order to offer a history of the relation between the sciences and
humanities not as preternatural antagonists, but as polarizing discourses of normative

5

Merve Emre, Paraliterary: The Making of Bad Readers in Postwar America (Chicago
UP, 2017)
5

inquiry that between them constitute the field of postwar higher education, aesthetic
discourse, and social theory.
Rather than reading mass market literature as the enemy of high culture, I read
mass culture as a repository of minor aesthetics rightfully skeptical of the politics of
cultural value, laboring to generate a representational protocol adhering to the tenets and
utilizing the resources of the then ascendant master term of social discourse—
quantification. This project asks after the genres that jump ship from the aspirational
project of high literary value, articulating a different goal—to exploit the affordances of a
new regime of quantitative social description and iterative simulation.
These circumstances were understood at the time to be precipitating the “death of
the novel,” on the basis of its exhausted aesthetic possibilities, its marginalization by
mass culture, or the failure of a juvenile American culture pathologically obsessed with
death and incapable of mature sexuality to adequately translate the aesthetic project of
European realism to its new context.6 In light of the history adduced in this dissertation, I
suggest that the discourse prognosticating the death of the novel is best understood as a
reaction to the ascendancy of quantification in multiple domains of life and letters. In
Lionel Trilling’s assessment of the fate of the novel in the twentieth century, class society
has become mass society, “ideological organization has cut across class organization,
generating loyalties and animosities which are perhaps even more intense than those of

6

These perspectives were espoused, respectively, by John Barth, “The Literature of
Exhaustion”; Lionel Trilling, “Art and Fortune”; and Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in
the American Novel.
6

class,” and the novel in America is consequently a bourgeois form without a
bourgeoisie.7 In “Art and Fortune,” Trilling inquires whether the novel is “still a living
form,” and concludes that its fate, while not sealed, is hanging in the balance. The new
circumstance under which “ideological organization” has supplanted “class organization”
interferes with the artist’s ability to maintain a healthy ambivalence towards his own
society, eroding “the will” with “the rule.” In Trilling’s estimation, “now politics, and not
only politics but the requirements of a whole culture, make verbal and articulate the
motive of every human act: we eat by reason, copulate by statistics, rear children by
rule.” The predominance of “reason,” “statistics” and “rule” is inimical to the novel, as
“the increase of conscious formulation, the increase of a certain kind of consciousness by
formulation, makes a fact of modern life which is never sufficiently estimated.” Of
course the class system persisted and still does, but as an ideology it squared poorly with
the postwar meritocratic fantasy that everyone in America is middle-class. The
emergence of the masses as a demographic abstraction is an ideological transformation—
“a certain kind of consciousness by formulation”—underwritten by statistical metrics that
make groups and aggregates newly available to analysis and consolidation, and those
statistical metrics have their own aesthetic imprint that proceeds in part by subjecting the
novel to the same forces of disaggregation, specialization, and permutated recombination
as everything else.

7

Lionel Trilling, “Art and Fortune,” The Liberal Imagination (MacMillan, 1948): 256280.
7

Aggregation presents a problem for the novel. As Alex Woloch has shown, the
strategies of novelistic realism for representing collectivity are many but finite,
constrained by the “character-space” of the novel and the logics of proportion and
representativeness that center individuals as drivers of narrative development and
guarantors of verisimilitude.8 As Ursula Le Guin put it, “herds of bad guys are the death
of a novel. Whether they’re labelled politically, racially, sexually, by creed, species, or
whatever, they just don’t work” (vi).9 Put another way, social problems demographically
rendered present an obstacle to novelistic representation, confounding the character
system with masses and groups. As we will see in the chapters that follow, representing
groups requires strategies and tools like seriality, cliché, scale shifts and scale collapse,
and recourse to genre conventions. I center literature that embraces these principles to
innovate aesthetic strategies made to the measure of a quantified world. I am guided by
Joanna Russ’s proposition that science fiction, “despite superficial similarities to…
modern fiction,” always has a collective protagonist, and Steven Marcus’s suggestion that
“a pornographic novel might be written by a computer. If one feeds in the variables out
will come the combinations” (271).10 Marcus notes that “the prose of a typical

8

Alex Woloch, The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the
Protagonist in the Novel (Princeton UP, 2003).
9
Ursula Le Guin, “Introduction,” City of Illusions (Harper & Row, 1978).
10
Joanna Russ, “Towards an Aesthetic of Science Fiction,” Science Fiction Studies 2.2
(1975): 112-119. Steven Marcus, “Pornotopia,” The Other Victorians: A Study of
Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England (Basic Books, 1964). In
the interest of thickening the literary history of sexology, it is worth noting that Marcus’s
8

pornographic novel consists almost entirely of cliches, dead and dying phrases, and
stereotypical formulas… [which are] interchangeable without any loss of meaning. They
tend to function as non-specific abstractions, and can all be filled with the same general
content” (279). He finds in this special case the possibility of insight into contemporary
literature more generally, noting that, “inexorably trapped in words, pornography, like
certain kinds of contemporary literature, tries desperately to go beneath and behind
language; it vainly tries to reach what language cannot directly express but can only point
toward” (279-280).
Novels that attempt to develop collective protagonists, or center groups rather
than individuals, veer uncomfortably close to leaving the realm of the literary
altogether—and becoming sociology. In his review of Mary McCarthy’s The Group
(1963), Norman Mailer assesses that in the last analysis, “her book fails as a novel… but
it is enormously successful as sociology.”11 Mailer derogates the novel’s literary merits
by associating it with sociology, but recognizes at the same time that sociology is itself an
ascendant metric of cultural relevancy, suspecting that The Group “will continue to exist
as a classic in sociology long after it is dim and dull as a novel, it will survive in Soc Sci I
at every university and junior college.” With this assessment Mailer voiced a common
backhanded compliment of the era, which Chapter 2 will explore in more detail with

influential study of pornography was composed while he was in residence at the Kinsey
Institute for Sex Research in Bloomington, Indiana.
11
Norman Mailer, “The Mary McCarthy Case,” New York Review of Books, October 17,
1963.
9

respect to the supposedly sociological merits of John Rechy’s hustler novels. Mailer
argues that The Group fails as a novel to the extent that the characters in the group are not
“made sufficiently eccentric to separate clearly from one another,” making it a “collective
novel” in the worst sense—a novel depicting an undifferentiated mass, rather than a
character network. Mailer writes of The Group that it is “a collective novel in which the
most interesting character is missing, a collective novel in which none of the characters
have sufficient passion to be interesting in themselves.”
Mailer reads the failure of McCarthy’s novel as of a piece with the failure of
realism to be translated into the postwar period, speculating that “the work of realism was
done for the nineteenth century, but whether it can be done for the middle of the
twentieth century we shall indeed not know unless the attempt is made. So may have
reasoned McCarthy,” whose efforts amounted to taking “a little still-water of society and
captur[ing] it in its proportions.” Mailer not only derides McCarthy’s novel as
“sociology” but he likewise criticizes it as a kind of ploddingly materialist construction
project. He sees McCarthy as “an engineer manqué in literature,” whose “long unbroken
paragraphs settle in like bricks. They are all too equal to one another.” He describes a
“mild physical boredom in the act of reading as if one were watching a wall being
stacked up rather than seeing the metamorphosis of a creature.” Mailer reads McCarthy
as an engineer and her novel as a kind of masonry, forecasting a conflation of words and
things that will be of interest especially in Chapter 3’s investigation of the convergence of
science fiction and campus novel, which aims to recast the theory of the campus novel

10

that takes McCarthy’s earlier effort, The Groves of Academe (1952), as exemplary of the
genre.
In Mailer’s estimation, McCarthy’s novel takes a stab at articulating a postwar
realism that falls short of literary excellence and lands it in the domain of sociology, but
it will be the argument of this dissertation that this is the sign of precisely McCarthy’s
success. Critiques of literature that bears an uncomfortable resemblance to sociology or
brick-laying suggest an affinity between novelistic forms, social forms, and institutional
forms, and they point to the history of this concern as imbricated with debates about
cultural value, literary aesthetics and politics, and new social movements. This history
helps us shed new light on a question that remains pressing today: what does literary
form offer to an analysis of social form? Rather than approach this question through
readings of exemplary canonical texts, instead I want to provisionally take seriously the
critiques of literary novels like McCarthy’s that see “collective novels” as slumming in
the social sciences, and ask: what are the literatures that, rather than running from this
critique, avowed their affinity with the sciences proudly?
I am guided by Samuel Delany’s warning against reading science fiction for its
sociological content. Delany argues that “the SF series” is a “specific form” and should
be read as such. The reason we fail to read this way Delany attributes to a misplaced
“nostalgia for sociological density,” by which he means that the desire to dignify science
fiction motivates critics to wrongly impute to its historical development the qualities of
the high realist novel, when in fact it uses serial form to very different ends—not density,

11

but “plurality” and “recursivity.” He writes (specifically of Asimov, but with general
applicability): “the basic strategy of the series seems to be: the solution of the problem in
story N becomes the problem to be dealt with—either directly or in principle—in story
N+ 1.” According to Delany’s account, that is, science fiction is formally bound by the
principles of mathematical series, rather than serial literature.12
As the project develops, it could benefit from developing the readings of littleknown literatures adduced in the chapters that follow in order to cast a new light on
canonical texts flirting with the same thematics, like Nabokov’s sexological novel Lolita
(1955) and his academic novels Bend Sinister (1947), Pnin (1957), and Pale Fire (1962),
or Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) which fuses mathematical formalism
and sexuality into a quantitative erotics of war. But for now, an emphasis on the cultural
field of mass market and minor literatures was necessary to establish the literary
historical circumstance that might enable new readings of canonical works, and new
canons.
I want to suggest that the “death of the novel” discourse, while a rhetorical
formation more than an empirical description, nonetheless captures a historical
phenomenon of much broader scope. That is, not the death of the novel so much as the
disaggregation of its functions. The novel’s social functions have always been on the one
hand, entertainment, and on the other, education, a form enabling private distraction and

12

Samuel Delany, “Reflections on Historical Models in Modern English Language
Science Fiction,” Science Fiction Studies 7.2 (1980): 135-149.
12

fantasy as well as a vessel for encoding and disseminating norms and knowledge. Science
fiction and erotic fiction both recombine these elements in new and different ways. Pulp
erotica pitches sexological knowledge for entertainment and titillation. Science fiction
rejects its own juvenile entertainment imperatives of the early twentieth century as
“escape literature” of the space-opera variety in favor of the knowledge-encoding
function of “new wave” social science fiction committed to the extrapolation of social
problems and speculative solutions. If the novel has been theorized by Mikhail Bakhtin
and others as the great absorber of competing forms and genres, I want to suggest that in
the postwar period what it might once have absorbed into its proper literary purview it
now must give way to as the lines of flight of specialist discourse and atomization endow
the partiality of genre with unprecedented representational purchase.
Hugo Gernsback was the founding editor of the first magazine devoted entirely to
science fiction stories, the pulp periodical Amazing Stories, which began publication in
1926. Through the magazine, Gernsback named a genre, popularizing “scientifiction” and
later “science fiction,” earning him the title “father of science fiction” in fan lore and
histories of the genre, and precipitating the naming of the top award in the science fiction
field “the Hugo.”13 But Amazing Stories was far from Gernsback’s only publishing
venture. His Experimenter Publishing Company printed and distributed many gadgetry

13

Gernsback’s legacy was first and lastingly enshrined in the field of modern science
fiction by Sam Moskowitz, Hugo Gernsback: Father of Science Fiction (Criterion
Linotyping & Printing Co., 1959).
13

and radio magazines, as well as Sexology: Sex Science Magazine.14 As Gernsback’s
various radio and technology themed magazines lost traction in the lean years of the
depression, he set out to publish more profitable titles. It was under these conditions that
Gernsback founded Sexology in 1933, on the premise that prospective readers with the
disposable funds to sustain their subscriptions during the depression would be seriousminded professionals more interested in scientific information than escapist science
fiction. Gernsback’s prediction proved profitable, and the financial success of Sexology
effectively subsidized Gernsback’s science fiction and technology publications for much
of the 1930s and ‘40s.15 Amazing Stories and Sexology magazines shared staff, including
illustrator Frank R. Paul, who brought his signature style to drawings of interplanetary
travel and medical diagrams of genitalia alike.

14

Sexology magazine was variously subtitled Sex Science Illustrated and Sex Science
Magazine: An Authoritative Guide to Sex Education, and much later it was re-titled
Sexology Together and Sexology Today, before ceasing publication altogether after its
final issue in December 1983. In its heyday, Sexology had a circulation of approximately
200,000 readers. It was published for fifty years, at which point it was effectively
superseded by Playboy and the like.
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Mike Ashley, “Science Fiction Depression,” The Gernsback Days (Wildside Press,
2004): 202-213. Ashley’s study is exceptional in its integration of Sexology into the
discussion of Gernsback’s professional trajectory; most studies of Gernsback tend to
emphasize his contributions to science fiction without in some cases even mentioning his
interest in sexology. More expansively defined histories of Gernsback as publisher tend
to take a broader view of his publishing interests in radio and hobbyist technologies as
significant context for his science fiction publishing, but again make scant mention of
Sexology. There is evidence to suggest that Sexology was not merely an opportunistic
publishing venture for Gernsback, but an area of genuine interest to him. Gernsback had
an extensive correspondence with Alfred Kinsey, numbering more than 200 letters
between them. Kinsey was very aware of and interested in Gernsback’s popularization of
sexology through his magazine. There is much research still to be done on this
confluence of actors, interests, and publications.
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Gernsback’s interest in the print culture of tinkering extended to sexual science.
Chuck Rowland, a co-founder of the early homophile organization the Mattachine
society, recounts the transformative effect of encountering Sexology magazine as a ten
year old, crediting his later political activity with the consciousness raising effect of
discovering his sexuality in print:
I came across a series of articles on homosexuals in a magazine called Sexology,
which I found in my father’s drugstore. His drugstore had the only newsstand in
town, a little rural village called Gary, South Dakota, population 535 at that time.
I remember very distinctly snatching a copy as soon as it came in and reading that
if one was homosexual, he shouldn’t feel strange or odd, that there were millions
of us, that there was nothing wrong with it. As soon as I read that there were
millions of us, I said to myself, Well, it’s perfectly obvious that what we have to
do is organize, and why don’t we identify with other minorities… we would wield
tremendous strength.16
In a “little rural village” with a population of 535, Rowland read that there were
“millions” of homosexuals—literally thousands of times more people than there were in
his hometown, and all of them gay. Sexology spurred the political consciousness of
Rowland and presaged the organization he would go on to co-found. Gernsback, often
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referred to as the “father of science fiction,” is in Rowland’s account recast as the
unwitting grandfather of gay liberation.
The symbiotic material conditions of the production of a popular print discourse
of sexology and of science fiction recommends a methodology attuned to the at once
more capacious and more grounded history of social science fiction, an attunement to the
aesthetics of scientism. Grant Wythoff has compellingly presented Hugo Gernsback as a
“pulp media” theorist who anticipated the field of media studies with his attention to the
cultural impact of emergent media and technology.17 Adding to this sensibility an
attention to what John Rieder calls the “mass cultural genre system” enables us to see
sexology among the technologies organizing the new media of postwar print culture.18
The popular culture of science fiction is most often described in terms of fandom, and the
popular culture of sexology, to the extent that it registers as having one at all, is registered
mostly in terms of moral panic, but it is the premise of this project that these two
dispositions may not be so distinct. Thus the chapters that follow are about the
entanglement of erotica and science (Chapters 1 & 2), and of science fiction and
education (Chapters 3 & 4). Chapters 1 and 2 establish the relationship between
quantitative social science and group identity, and Chapters 3 and 4 ask after utopian
speculation in a postwar culture suffused by a logic of quantification.
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In its attention to the interactions between social scientific and prose fiction
discourses of the postwar period, this project is informed by Lennard Davis’s idea of the
“news/novels matrix.”19 Davis’s account of the origins of the novel finds that, “rather
than a series of genres displacing each other, we are looking at a discourse [of ‘prose
narrative in print’] that is forced to subdivide” (44). Davis’s account of the history of the
novel is underwritten by a shift from considering the novel in terms of genre and instead
analyzing it in terms of discourse, reconceiving of its logics of historical transformation
according to a principle of discursive subdivision rather than generic displacement. While
Davis marshals this analytical framework towards an account of the origins of the novel,
I find it equally illuminating for the moment of the novel’s purported demise at the hands
of mass culture, under which conditions the novel appeared to be reabsorbed into a field
of generic possibilities (the creative writing program’s short stories, popular genre
fictions, pop-sociology and pop-psychology, etc.) where it ceased for a moment to be the
master term.
Repurposing Davis’s account for the postwar period, we find Bakhtin’s account of
the novel cannibalizing adjacent genres encountering Lyotard’s account of the
atomization of knowledge domains in post-modernity, such that the authority of the
discourse long organized by the novel is subdivided into popular and mass-market genre
fictions on the basis of their differentiated knowledge-functions as much as their
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divergent aesthetic practices. Rather than aesthetic displacement, we find cognitive
specialization and generic consolidation made in the image of inward-facing expert
discourse. This is not to imply any clean alignment between the mass cultural genre
system and the professionalizing human sciences, but rather to recognize their shared
discursive matrix: prose narrative in print, in which not the printing press but the
paperback represented the major technological innovation constituting the material
substrate of production, circulation, and generic definition.20
The death of the novel imagines the history of the form in terms of displacement
and supersession—in short, sequence—as the novel is killed off by its unworthy
successors. But we might recast this sensibility in terms of a logic of discursive
subdivision, a matter of multiplication. A few decades after Trilling, on the far side of the
divide between late modernism and post-modern literature, John Barth’s “The Literature
of Exhaustion” (1967) describes the recently translated Jorge Luis Borges as a
mathematical formalist, nominating the permutational and probabilistic as the
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regenerative mechanisms of a revitalized postwar novel. Barth’s programmatic statement
for the post-modern avant-garde is that it must iteratively exhaust all possibilities in order
to formalize its relation to form, to make the novel a caricature of “Novel” by an author
only provisionally in the role of “Author.”21 This is an irony reached through quantity.
Irony—that is, artistic self-reflexivity—is the goal, and permutation is the means. Barth
proposes that in a time of “ultimacies,” of which the novel at its end is but one, a renewed
literary project would take its own exhaustion as premise, and proceed from there to
make a literature of extinguished linguistic possibility.
The trajectory charted between Trilling’s assessment of statistical massification
undermining the novel’s relevance, and Barth’s proposition that a permutative aesthetics
of irony might reestablish it, tracks in lockstep with the developments in quantitative
social analysis over the course of the same decades. Statistics and aggregates give way to
permutation and probability as advances in sampling techniques and their analysis enable
increasing degrees of mathematical abstraction in numerical descriptions of the social
world. The chapters that follow investigate the literary consequences of these
developments in quantitative social scientific methods, from the aggregation techniques
of the 1940s (Chapters 1 & 2) to the multifactorial modeling techniques of the 1970s
(Chapter 3 & 4), mediated by the development in the 1950s of probability sampling and
other stepwise statistical innovations veering away from the empirical and into simulation
and modelling.
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In the present moment we are witnessing the literary novel referencing and
incorporating elements of genre fiction (for instance in the work of Kazuo Ishiguro,
Chang-rae Lee, Ruth Ozeki, Colson Whitehead, Karen Joy Fowler, Nathaniel Rich, and
Michael Chabon, just to name a few), reasserting the capacity of the novel to incorporate
heterogeneous forms and modes after a long interregnum of divergence between, on the
one hand, postmodern meta-fiction and global anglophone literary novels, and, on the
other, popular genre fictions of the sci-fi, horror, true crime, and romance varieties. This
dissertation is situated in the cleft between these two paths for the novel, and it seeks to
obliquely shed some light on the present moment of reconsolidation and generic
intermixing. The novel now is asking what work genre can do within it, and the question
of the aesthetic status of the extra-literary is once again being adjudicated within the
novel rather than around or against it.
The dissertation has four chapters. The first two inquire after the effects of the
conversion of sex into a quantifiable object of scientific scrutiny on novels’
representations of interiority, intimacy, development, and morality. What is the biography
of quantity? When the individual becomes a statistic, what vocabularies can be called
upon to describe the arc of her life? Chapter 1 considers the mutual implication of social
scientific and literary debates about how to adequately represent lived experience.
Drawing on archival research conducted at the Kinsey Institute, I read a range of popular
first-person accounts of the experience of being interviewed by sexologist Alfred Kinsey
in magazines like Ebony and The Woman that register fascination with the conversion of
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biography into quantum that the Kinsey Reports came to represent. The moral panic over
the Kinsey reports was not directed at its exposure of lurid sexual secrets but rather its
under-exposure of the meaning of sex, its mystification of human psychology by
quantification, and its acceleration of the extinction of narrative in the face of a mass
culture of numeration.
If the motto for Chapter 1 is the fascinated cry of the research subject—“I was
quantified,” that of Chapter 2 might be the shout of newly legible deviant collectivities—
“We were quantified.” Chapter 2 traces the drift of the trope of “number” from sexual
science into sexological aesthetic, reading Gore Vidal’s The City and the Pillar (1948)
with his pseudonymously authored “Edgar Box” erotic detective trilogy (1952-1954), and
John Rechy’s two best-sellers City of Night (1963) and Numbers (1967). I argue that gay
pulps offered a resolution to the antipathy of narrative and number that the popularity of
the Kinsey Reports made so salient, marrying the distribution logics of demography and
the humanist psychology of character in the literary form of serial sex.
The following two chapters take up these questions of number, narration, and
character to ask after the quantification of collectivity. When statistical persons
collectivize, do they multiply? What does reproduction mean in an arithmetic world?
Chapter 3 reads 1970s science fiction by Ursula Le Guin and Robert Silverberg that
reimagines the infrastructure of the city as a form for rescaling social transformation. I
situate these narrative investigations of urban planning and social reproduction in the
terms of contemporaneous social theory portending the coming of the “multiversity,”
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former University of California President Clark Kerr’s name for the administratively topheavy postwar college campus. Social science fiction of the postwar period turns to inner
space and asks after the relationship between interior spaces and psychological
interiority. If Kinsey embodied the authority of quantification to tell society what it is,
this chapter asks who has the authority to tell society what it should be.
The motto of Chapter 3 might be “I was multiplied,” pursuing the consequences
of social reproduction that adheres to a logic of self-similar replication. In Chapter 4,
“We were multiplied,” as the unchecked reproduction of the species spells planetary peril
in the form of population crisis. Chapter 4 puts the discourse of population explosion into
contact with contemporaneous space race anxiety to elaborate a genealogy of parametric
thinking that set the historical ground for our present discussions of planetarity and
climate change. Collating a diverse set of cultural texts, including ecological disaster
fiction, propaganda pamphlets, and the films The Incredible Shrinking Man (1957),
Fantastic Voyage (1966), Soylent Green (1973), and The Incredible Shrinking Woman
(1981) around their shared interest in describing the limits of the earth as a vessel for
containing human life, I show how a discourse of scale articulated the fates of humanism
and scientism with one another.
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CHAPTER 1: I WAS KINSEY-IZED: VITAL STATISTICS

“All this is going to be exceedingly important, the whole paraphernalia, tables and norms
and graphs.”
— Margaret Mead, “An Anthropologist Looks at the Report”22

I. The Kinsey Epoch
On May 14th of 1957 Wardell Pomeroy of the Kinsey Institute for Sex
Research wrote to Philip Wylie (novelist, journalist, polemicist) to thank him for the
invitation to go deep sea fishing—he was sorry he could not accept—and to report that
Alfred C. Kinsey was dead. Wylie’s correspondence with Kinsey had begun in May of
1949 when Kinsey wrote Wylie to thank him and his wife for contributing their sex
histories to his studies of Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948) and Female (1953),
collectively known as the Kinsey Reports. On May 15th of 1949 Wylie replied and
enclosed a copy of his recently published novel, Opus 21: Descriptive Music for the
Lower Kinsey Epoch of the Atomic Age, a Concerto for a One-Man Band, Six Arias for
Soap Operas, Fugues, Anthems, and Barrelhouse (1949). Wylie noted that he had
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“marked, underneath my signature in the book, a few page references to you and your
work as they are discussed here.”23
Kinsey and his work are discussed all over the novel, including in a scene of
reading the report itself—newlywed Yvonne covertly reads the volume on the male,
wrapped in the dust jacket of Aldous Huxley’s Ape and Essence as a decoy, looking for
insight into her botanist husband Rodney’s newly efflorescent homosexuality. But the
novel’s uptake of Kinsey is most evident in its style, a prose thick with winking half-puns
issuing from a substrate of pithy scientism and arrayed in the service of an aesthetics of
quantification. Upon reading the report Yvonne exclaims, “‘Men! Why should anyone
care what they feel?’” Her companion, Philip, is quick with an answer: “O-h-h-h,” he
sings, “because they’re so plentiful” (26). Affect vouchsafed by quantity: the feelings one
might have about the narrativized affective experience of another—“why should anyone
care?”—are underwritten by the quantifiable demographic presence of others like them in
one’s milieu—“they’re so plentiful.” Philip says this to Yvonne half-jokingly, but Opus
21 elaborates the idea with concerted seriousness.
Wylie’s Opus is less a novel than it is the program music that would conjure the
novel form in another register. Its subtitle, Descriptive Music for the Lower Kinsey Epoch
of the Atomic Age, a Concerto for a One-Man Band, Six Arias for Soap Operas, Fugues,
Anthems, and Barrelhouse, cites a motley crew of minor musical genres intermingling
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across spectrums of scale and taste. “A concerto for a one-man band” enfolds the
orchestra into the circus-trick soloist; “arias for soap operas” bring the virtuosic vocal
performance to the melodramatic small screen. The musical thematics of the subtitle do
not map in any straightforward way onto the novel—it neither consists in nor represents
any music, musicians, performance, or composition. Rather, it designates with its title an
effort to stretch literary modes of representation to capture worlds seemingly beyond their
ken, finding a model in “descriptive music,” a technical term for instrumentals designed
to musically render extra-musical narrative elements like bird calls, running water,
marching soldiers, and, perhaps, sexological research. Like Yvonne, who reads the
Kinsey Report wrapped in the jacket of a novel, Wylie offers a reading of Kinsey inside
of a literary framework, but one that itself dissimulates as music.24 Opus 21 performs a
concentric set of displacements of narrative function away from language, nominating
music as a tool for tuning in to the shared representational registers of literature and
quantification.
Unaffectionately but accurately described as a “portmanteau fantasy” by an early
reviewer, Wylie’s novel does not synthesize these seemingly divergent registers so much

24

It is worth noting that the dust jacket Yvonne selects as disguise is itself a literary
critical polemic in miniature. Aldous Huxley’s Ape and Essence (1948), published the
same year as the Kinsey Report on the male, is a formally experimental science fiction
novel that presents a screenplay dramatizing large scale destruction within a pseudoautobiographical frame story. Yvonne disguises the Kinsey Report as a near-future
dystopia of quantophrenic disaster for the human species, which in the end may be no
disguise at all. On “quantophrenia,” a mania for potentially meaningless quantification,
see Pitirim Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology (London: Mayflower, 1958).
25

as it abuts them to one another, and leaves the rest to the reader’s imagination.25 The
novel follows the character Philip Wylie—who shares the profession of writer and much
else besides with his creator—through a single weekend in New York City spent holed up
in a hotel room attempting to edit a serial he has written for a “slick magazine.” The
action of the novel thus unfolds in the interstices of the editing process for a magazine
serial, turning its form into the mirror-image of the magazine piece around which it takes
shape. Between his edits, Philip meets a rotating cast of characters in the hotel lobby,
which is where he finds Yvonne with her covert Kinsey Report.
Yvonne reads the Kinsey Report wrapped in the jacket of a novel, indexing her
shame at being caught reading a report on sexual behavior in plain sight, but at the same
time suggesting that the Report wrapped in a literary frame might yield new results, and
further that under its skin the novel may have always had something scientific in it, too.
Wylie’s novel is “a sample of the aggregate” set to a melody. In a parenthetical aside to
the reader, the narrator (the character Philip Wylie) asks “Do you imagine I tell you all
that happens, here?” and proceeds to explain that what he offers is neither comprehensive
nor exemplary: “I give you hardly the essence, my friend—but only a sample of the
aggregate—a biopsy of its own sort” (268-269). This play on the biopsy and the
aggregate—on the body and the social body—is the crux of the novel. Its characters
become instruments in the elaboration of its “descriptive music,” and they riff freely on
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their feeling for numbers. The novel positions female prostitutes and male homosexuals
as the new protagonists of a numeric social order, for they know what it means to be
counted, and to have your number counted against you.26 One character says to another,
“A man can get as intense feelings from statistical tables as a woman can from Sinatra’s
brow wave. Vital statistics give them to me. I had such sensations when, after the
publication of the Smythe Report, I pensively ran over the Periodic Table. Many other
charts and graphs deeply affect me” (22). “Vital statistics” is the novel’s organizing pun,
and I suggest that what it may lack in elegance as rhetorical play it recoups as historical
descriptor, capturing an animating tension between life and math that makes it an apt
mnemonic for the period the novel nominates the “Kinsey Epoch.”
Wylie’s novel thematizes an inquiry into the biography of quantity. Through his
novel we can see a question being newly posed: what if the ontology of the self is not
narration but rather numeration; and what if the elaboration of the self in number, rather
than evacuating its grounds for meaning, enriches it with new resources? By nominating
its moment the “Kinsey Epoch of the Atomic Age,” Wylie’s novel also gestures to a more
expansive context of significance for the Kinsey Reports—not merely a watershed text in
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With this uneasy coalition of the quantified, the novel anticipates subsequent
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the field of sexology, but a lightning rod for a larger cultural reordering around
quantitative social description. The “Kinsey Epoch” directs our attention to an intermedia network in which the novel constitutes but one technology and one discourse for
articulating the national-cultural meaning of sex. The novel is situated among the musical
arts, soap opera, memoir, journalism, the Smyth report, the Kinsey report, the census,
etc., constituting an interdisciplinary and multimedia effort to adjudicate the question of
national character on the basis of the narration/numeration of sexual practice. This
inquiry—into the narrative meaning of number and the cultural meaning of sex—is
pursued across an expansive array of cultural production and professional consideration.
Work in the history of the quantitative social sciences has described the way in
which the American public fell into the thrall of the quantitative in the mid-twentieth
century, making for what Sarah Igo has called a “cult of statistics,” for which the Kinsey
reports were a galvanizing object.27 They are documents of the fervor to “stand and be
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counted” that overtook the American public in this moment—the excitement and the
trepidation of embarking on a large scale social investment in the order of the numeric.28
Under these conditions, it was not entirely clear who among the humanistic and
qualitative fields was in a privileged position from which to critique the sweeping claims
of quantitative social studies; the rangy roster of intellectuals and disciplinary affiliations
marshalled to comment on the social significance of the Kinsey Reports in the ubiquitous
expert symposia convened upon their publication is illustrative in this regard.29 As Donna
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See for instance, About the Kinsey Report: Observations by 11 Experts on “Sexual
Behavior in the Human Male,” eds. Donald Porter Geddes and Enid Curie (The New
American Library of World Literature, 1948), which includes contributions from an
anthropologist, philosopher, psychologist, psychiatrist, medical clinician, anatomist,
lawyer, sociologist, economist, biologist, and expert on maternal health. Problems of
Sexual Behavior (American Social Hygiene Association, 1948) documents the
“proceedings of a symposium held by the American Social Hygiene Association during
its annual conference of Social Hygiene Executives, March 30-April 1, 1948, in New
York City, to consider the first published report of a series of studies of sex phenomena
by Professor Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, and its relation
to the social hygiene program.” It includes contributions from an embryologist,
anthropologist, sociologist, statistician, primary school educator, concerned parent,
psychiatrist, lawyer, public health expert, and two reverends. Many periodicals published
similar “expert panels” on the Reports, including “Kinsey’s Runaway Best-Seller and Its
Implications Discussed by 14 Experts,” PM Newspaper, May 2, 1948; Harriet Smith,
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Contributions to Related Fields,” The Scientific Monthly, May 1950; “A symposium on
one of the most vital question of our times: Must We Change Our Sex Standards?”
Readers Digest, June 1948; Kathryn Close, “Specialists and the Kinsey Report,” The
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Drucker notes, “Examining [the] criticism shows that Kinsey’s work was absorbed so
quickly and extensively across academe that it changed the dynamics of intra-disciplinary
conversations about sexuality even if it did not transcend disciplinary boundaries” (76).30
While the Kinsey reports famously incited a public outcry against their perceived
threat to moral propriety—most famously in the congressional pornography proceedings
that led to the research’s defunding by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1954—on the whole
the gripe with Kinsey was not about the lurid exposure of sexual secrets to an innocent
general public. Quite the contrary: the contemporary concern was that the report’s
account of American sexuality was drained of all the lurid details that would give it social
meaning. As Margaret Mead put it, “whenever you start talking about the meaning of sex,
you get into trouble. Dr. Kinsey doesn’t. Dr. Kinsey has limited himself to the description
of a non-inter-personal and meaningless act” (64)—and that was itself the problem.31 The
horror of the Kinsey research was that of watching one’s most privately held experiences
redacted into behavioral data that could be recorded on a single page, and encoded on a
single punch-card. As one anonymous woman put it, reporting in 1950 on her
unanticipated “emotional reaction” to seeing her sex history “Kinsey-ized,” “there, in
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code, on one sheet of paper lay my emotions, my dreams, my life” (109).32 George
Corner’s overview of the Kinsey research in the 1948 American Social Hygiene
Association symposium dedicated to the Reports notes that part of the disarming efficacy
of Kinsey’s interview method involved the interviewer sitting so as to reveal his scoresheet to the interviewee: a gestural performance of impersonality that is simultaneously a
burlesque of numeric redaction on full display to the interview subject who can watch her
autobiographical sentences transcribed into an uninterpretable grid of checked boxes and
single letters.33
At that same social hygiene symposium, Margaret Mead would claim that “it is
not daring in the United States to talk about copulation; it has been done for a long time.
The thing that is daring in the United States is to discuss the fact that sex has emotional
connotations and meaning to people” (64).34 She faulted not just the report for its singular
pursuit of the quantitative, but the cultural milieu that validated that investment, writing
that “we have here a document of great size, validated by the expenditure of a great lot of
money which is very important in America… It has every single requirement of
importance – size, numbers, money, meetings, publicity, and sales, all to reinforce the
major basic trends in our society that have made sex behavior dissociated, sinful and
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meaningless, because it has not been placed in an inter-personal context, it is not attached
to the most important values of the relations between people” (68).
Margaret Mead’s own contemporaneously published study of American sexuality,
Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World (1949) attempted to
describe the modes and meanings of sex roles and practices in, as its subtitle announces,
“a changing world”—the world at large. Kinsey rejected the comparative, noting in the
introduction to the report on the male that studies of sexual behavior undertaken in Soviet
Russia and elsewhere were of entirely indeterminate significance to the American public.
It is not “a changing world” that underwrites the study, but rather advances in statistical
sampling that would allow his team of researchers to quantitatively assess American
practices in totally immanent fashion. That is to say, the drift away from narrative
extends to an indifference to the historiographical, as well as the biographical: human
sexual behavior belongs not to a longer story about the development of civilizations, as it
did for Mead, so much as to the synchronic taxonomization of a national typology. In this
pursuit, and this framing—American exceptionalist in its very essence—Kinsey’s project
(however much it would ultimately come under fire for seeming to be just the opposite)
was of a piece with those of the cold warriors attempting to elaborate a theory and
typology of American national character that would hold together a social fabric under
threat of deterioration from within by deviant types—spies, communists, addicts,
homosexuals, rebels, mothers, others.
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II. How An Anthropologist Writes
Sexology: Sex Science Magazine reviewed Mead’s Male and Female: A Study of
the Sexes in a Changing World in its April 1950 issue, seizing the occasion to describe
the special character of anthropological “aims and methods,” for readers more familiar
with “the countless sex books which are physiological, psychological, medical or
technical.” That special character is a professional capacity for “seeing ourselves
objectively” (604, original emphasis):
The anthropologist is the one person who has devised a scientific method for
‘seeing ourselves as others see us.’ He uses as his laboratory primitive societies,
small isolated groups of people who because of their geographical or historical
isolation have remained outside of the main stream of history, and preserved
special practices of their own that contrast vividly with behavior in large
societies…. By immersing himself in many cultures of this foreign type, he
compares and contrasts them, and can finally come to recognize his native culture
from an ‘outside’ point of view. Dr. Mead has done just this in seven different
primitive cultures… An attentive reading of these descriptions gradually leads the
reader to an objective and critical point of view.35
But Mead’s own reflections on anthropological objectivity are not so sanguine. She sees
the “laboratory” conditions of “primitive societies, small isolated groups” that the
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“Book Reviews,” Sexology: Sex Science Magazine 16.9 (April 1950): 604. All
emphases quoted here are present in the original.
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reviewer names as the conditions of possibility for anthropological knowledge production
being dismantled by American imperialism and postwar geopolitical reordering.36
Margaret Mead’s Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World
(1949) repurposed anthropological insights for the American scene. Its introduction, “The
Significance of the Questions We Ask,” expresses ambivalence about the cultural value
of extant methods of social research, symptomatizing Mead’s concern that the “changing
world” is being reordered by the homogenization of prior cultural particularity at the
hands of an ascendant global hegemony of American culture. She sees these conditions as
upsetting the grounds of the comparative and microcosmic logics that underwrote her
work in the South Sea islands, and her earlier book, Coming of Age in Samoa (1928).
Male & Female will be about American sexuality and sex roles because she can no
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The perception that island cultures offered in situ “laboratory conditions” for American
experimentation and study underwrote much cold war research—not just anthropology—
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longer work out the analogical claims that her studies of island cultures as ready-made
laboratories seemed to enable.37
The contradictions in Mead’s introduction to Male & Female are symptomatic of
her manifest awareness of this problem but unwillingness to entertain it as a valorization
of methods she has historically scorned: the changing times she does not want to make
for a change of values, nor for the grounds upon which to recognize the new affordances
of old approaches for fear that their negative valences will persist (ahistorically) despite
their (historically) new purchase on social reality. Mead worries that the main thrust of
the quantitative is homogenization, making of the numerical “the background not for
using difference constructively, but for inventing some methods for equalizing the
differences so that they do not matter, or for pigeon-holing individuals in one job rather
than another” (14). That is to say, Mead worries that quantification will turn people into
data and/or economic instrumentalities, but her examples of the benign versions of such
conversion cast a strange light on this concern. As benign evidence on behalf of this
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It is important to note that the statistical innovation of Kinsey—midwifed by
statistician Raymond Pearl, who was also at work adapting mathematical models for
animal husbandry to human population control, as I explore in Chapter 4—was his use of
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domestic scene, where communities immanent to American national culture are
reimagined as islands unto themselves that can relate to one another and the nation writ
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thesis Mead adduces the examples of “eye-glasses and hearing devices,” which superimpose a homogenous perceptual experience on a naturally diverse human group. While
Mead’s aim in providing these as examples may have been to countermand the stigma
attached to deviations from the norm that are freighted with more social significance than
corrective lenses, it also operates to change the whole cast of her argument: the problem
with quantification is not, or not only, that it would identify deviance so as to eradicate it
or “equalize” it out of existence. What is at stake is not simply behavioral conformity
with statistical norms but also the homogenization of worldview born of the eradication
of the perspectival (even when some perspectives are compromised vision or hearing),
the attempt to convert “objective” research methods and metrics into the cultural value of
objectivity, the consolidation of a shared perspective. Mead wants objectivity to remain
the special professional skill of anthropologists, who know how to “use difference
constructively,” and she worries that quantitative social studies will de-specialize
objective scientific protocol into objectivity as a generalized cultural style, also known as
the culture of conformity.
These circumstances are dramatized in Theodore Sturgeon’s novel Venus Plus X
(1960), which extrapolates from them a future society that has so thoroughly lost its
capacity for objectivity that it must import it from the past. Sturgeon cites “various recent
magazine articles by Margaret Mead” (212) as well as books by Ruth Benedict, William
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Whyte, Erich Fromm, and Philip Wylie as inspirations for the novel.38 Venus Plus X
reestablishes the conditions for anthropological objectivity through time travel, setting
the novel in a future Earth populated by humans sufficiently evolved to seem nearly an
alien species. They call themselves the Ledom (“model,” backwards, as Sturgeon is sure
to point out) and the principal outcome of their evolutionary departure from the “homo
saps” of the twentieth century is a complete biological hermaphroditism and a total social
androgyny. Allegorizing the postwar culture of conformity as the supersession of sex
difference, the Ledom’s homogeneity portends a global monoculture consequently
incapable of anthropological insight. With no cultural contrasts to underwrite their selfinsight, the Ledom kidnap an unsuspecting earthling man from the 1950s to offer, by way
of his historical alterity, a precious quotient of “objectivity.” Objectivity must be
imported from the past, and the 1950s seem to be the last viable moment to capture one
of its native practitioners.39
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Theodore Sturgeon, “Postscript,” Venus Plus X (Vintage, 1988 [1960]): 211-213.
Venus Plus X is also of interest as a novel that nominates mathematics as the privileged
vocabulary of eroticism, and American institutions as the proper parents of a new
generation of social actors—in one of the interpolated chapters set in 1950s suburbia,
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The partial resolution to the contradictions Mead introduces in “The Significance
of the Question We Ask” is found in her derivation in the following chapter, “How An
Anthropologist Writes,” of something like standpoint epistemology redacted for the
professions as experiential identity categories: “In this book I want to do something
rather different. I do not want merely to document vividly […] I want to somehow give to
the reader the positive findings […] and yet keep the sense of how these findings have
been arrived at” (30-1) in order for the reader “to get some sense of the experience an
anthropologist brings to the consideration of a human problem” (35). This chapter is also
a crucial moment of self-reflection on the job of the anthropologist as professional writer,
as someone whose research puts them into relation not just with the culture under study
but with the culture in which her work will circulate. That is to say, this is a moment of
conceptual re-alignment of anthropologist from the researcher/researched relation into the
artist/audience and professional/amateur ones.
The turn to “home anthropology” in the United States, unlike the English
example, is not a consolidation of a retracting imperial culture into a potent national one,
but rather is necessitated by the shifting locus of exemplarity in a new world order of
American cultural hegemony that has infected would-be exemplary microcosms with
qualities of the culture to which they had been meant to be only abstractly related as
structural proxies or precursors. As payloads of extractive imperialism and human capital

Mars and Venus for male and female… What in hell would they use for these? Mars plus
y? Venus plus x? Saturn turned upside down?” (77).
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their status as representative cultures is questionable. This is not to say that American
nationalism is not distilled to new potency in the early cold war—for quite obviously it
is—but the self-reflexivity of the discourse of American national character, to the extent
that it is an anthropological one, is born as much of a methodological crisis as it is of a
cultural one—that is, of their imbrication.40
When canvassed for her expert opinion on the Kinsey Report “as an
anthropologist,” Mead, effacing the capacity of other cultures to produce anthropological
insights, postulated an expert from space, proposing that “any anthropologist from Mars,”
presented with Kinsey’s findings, would see that “sex in the United States… is an
impersonal, meaningless act” (65). Thus, she offered:
The anthropological comments I can make best on this material are, I think,
based on treating the Kinsey report as a cultural phenomenon, just as if I were to
go to a South Sea island and attend a cremation ceremony, or a cannibal feast, or a
puberty rite. I regard such phenomena as cultural, study them, and find out what I
can learn about the culture by examining events and data of this sort. The
principle things that make the Kinsey report a cultural phenomenon of sorts are
two: its scale and the amount of publicity it has received, not its findings.41
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The Kinsey report confounds anthropological interlocutors because its form and style
themselves constitute “a cultural phenomenon,” making it not a piece of interdisciplinary
knowledge available for anthropological use, but rather an object of anthropological
scrutiny, an event. It is hard not to hear in Mead’s comparison of the report to a
“cremation ceremony” or “cannibal feast” some figurative invocation of Kinsey’s
research as deadening, self-consuming, and depersonalizing, chiming with her earlier
critique of the Reports which, rather than arranging their data “culturally,” take “a large
amount of individual data about identified individuals, but then those identified
individuals have been de-identified, the data has been scattered, and separate correlations
have been worked out” (58). Comparing it likewise to a “puberty rite,” Mead sees the
report as a troubling coming of age in America. Reading the Kinsey report as a publicity
event that elevates decontextualized facts to the level of public sensation, Mead asserts
that “the most significant thing from this point of view is that the Kinsey report… has
upset the balance in our society between ignorance and knowledge, between the things
we don’t mention, and the things we do. And it may be expected to have considerable
effect in our society for that reason” (60). The problem of the Kinsey report according to
Mead is that it has unleashed the cultural unconscious from the recesses of deliberate
ignorance, setting the stage for a return of the repressed which would find its realization
in sexual liberation and the new social movements of the next decades, as I explore
further in the next chapter.
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III. Justification by Numbers
In the summer of 1948, in a review of Kinsey entitled “Justification by Numbers,”
anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer, Mead’s student, speculated that “people who are
disturbed about their ‘deviance’ will not get psychological comfort for more than a very
few days from the tabular demonstration that their deviations are more widespread than
they had suspected” (284).42 Gorer surely underestimated the power of numbers to
“comfort” those “disturbed about their ‘deviance,’” as the galvanizing uptake of social
statistics by a range of homophile groups in the period readily attests, and upon which I
will elaborate at length in Chapter 2. But his assessment quite aptly sums up a major
debate spurred by the Kinsey report about the relative abilities of qualitative versus
quantitative social science to capture lived experience. The Kinsey report marks a major
moment in the methodological negotiations of postwar social science, effectively
sounding the death knell of narrative case histories in favor of large-scale statistical
analyses.43 The report literally encodes the conversion of case histories into statistical
data by its own methods: interviewing research subjects about their narrative “sex
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histories” and converting them into tabulated and encrypted data primed for statistical
processing.
By far the most significant measure implemented to ensure the accuracy of the
data collected in the sex histories was the assurance of total anonymity for the
respondents. This assurance was vouchsafed in two major ways: by recording responses
in code, and by limiting the number of people who knew how to decode it to a very select
and stringently vetted few. Most of the employees of the Institute for Sex Research,
including all of the research assistants who processed the data and all of the statisticians
who conducted computational analysis of it, did not have any knowledge of the code.
Only Kinsey and his small team of interviewers knew the cipher. Interviewers were
vetted for their discretion, objectivity, indifference to the diversity of sexual experience,
and ability to adapt their interview style to respondents whose discourses of sex and
sexuality were differentially shaped by class, race, gender, religiosity, marital and sexual
status, legal standing, institutional affiliations, and so on. The select few interviewers
memorized the code of letters and check-marks to record sex history responses in a
penciled grid, which would subsequently be transferred to a punched card for statistical
processing by Hollerith machine.44
While the public and professional commentator class decried the Reports for their
statistical opacity, Kinsey had thought statistical matters were beside the point. By his
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lights, his work was in a sense even anti-statistical, precisely because it was so massively
quantitative. When he began his research in the 1930s, probability sampling methods
were in their infancy, and the study of a topic as alien to public discussion as personal sex
practices presented special obstacles to obtaining unbiased data. To obviate statistical
theory that would establish the significance of a given sample size relative to the
population it was taken to represent, and in an effort to cancel volunteer and memory
biases, Kinsey employed the unusual method of “total sampling,” in which he would take
the interviews of every member of a given group—most often groups constituted through
recreational clubs or institutions like schools, churches, and prisons. The research sample
incidentally over-represented college students and graduates and members of the
professional class because of the researchers’ own affiliations, and deliberately overrepresented sexual minorities like homosexuals and pedophiles about whom the
researchers wanted to be able to meaningfully generalize.45 In 1939, in the early days of
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These problems with the representativeness of the sample were much remarked upon at
the time of publication of the Reports, most caustically perhaps in an essay by disgruntled
ex-employee of the Kinsey Institute, Gershon Legman, who wrote an essay called
“Minority Report on Kinsey” detailing the misleading “megalomania” of the title “Sexual
Behavior in the Human Male” for a report that in fact represents little more than the
findings on approximately 5,000 mostly college-educated white men in America—far
from the “human male” as such. Legman’s essay was published as the preface to an
opportunistic Kinsey Report spin-off by Norman Lockridge, Sexual Conduct of Men and
Women, printed by Samuel Roth under the imprint Hogarth House in 1948, which came
under scrutiny for obscenity shortly thereafter. Legman and others point out that not only
is the title misleading on the count of representativeness, it also disguises the racial
politics of the research, which recorded sex history data from approximately 3,000
African American men and women but withheld that data from the final studies. For
contemporary reporting on the racial politics of the Reports, in addition to Legman and
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his sexual behavior research, Kinsey consulted with then-president of the American
Statistical Association, Raymond Pearl—to whom I will return in Chapter 4 in his
capacity as eugenic ecologist. Kinsey notes that “when I told [Pearl] that someone else
would have to handle the mathematics of the material, he told me that when one has such
quantities of material as I have it needs very little manipulation.” Pearl “point[ed] out
that statistical theory is largely a substitute for adequate data.”46 Kinsey mistakenly
assumed that the numbers would speak for themselves. But the problem he did not
anticipate was that while numbers may obviate “statistical theory,” they confronted a
public conditioned into a moral discourse of sex and thus beset by a deeply unsettling
need for an interpretive theory of numerical representation. His numbers may not have
needed a theory to describe their statistical significance, but they demanded a theory to
describe their social meaning.47
Cold war era cultural commentators and critics otherwise quite remote from
scientific discourse spilled much ink trying to account for its crux. Among them was,
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who found his total sampling techniques and statistical analyses suspect, and Kinsey
would substantially revise his statistical methods of analysis (but not his sampling
technique) for the volume on the female published five years later.
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perhaps most famously, Lionel Trilling, whose 1948 Partisan Review essay, “Sex and
Science,” was reprinted as “The Kinsey Report” in his best-selling essay collection The
Liberal Imagination, otherwise devoted to literary criticism of novels.48
Trilling was wary of the popular disposition towards scientific abstraction, and his
essay amounts to a strange rumination on the aesthetics of the scientific presentation of
data. Trilling is concerned that the report removes “sexual behavior” from the social
world, demarcating a realm of purely “physical fact” that is “not available to social
interpretation at all” and can have “no ascertainable personal or cultural meaning and no
possible consequences” (242). He worries that “the tendency to divorce sex from the
other manifestations of life is already a strong one. This truly absorbing study of sex in
charts and tables, in data and quantities, may have the effect of strengthening the
tendency still more with people who are by no means trained to invert the process of
abstraction and put the fact back into the general life from which it has been taken” (226).
It is along these lines that Trilling’s inclusion of this essay on Kinsey among his essays
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on the novel begins to make sense. Throughout the essays collected in The Liberal
Imagination, Trilling is describing the American cultural conditions presiding over the
purported “death of the novel.” This so-called death does not just portend the termination
of the lifespan of the novel’s cultural salience, but the death of the trope of the biological
lifespan itself as the guarantor of a social referent for narrative form: the coherence of
“the general life” was at stake not least because life itself appeared newly available to
capture by non-narrative representation.
Trilling was worried that the general readership of the Kinsey reports would not
be able to repair the social context to them that their methodology had taken such pains to
strip away. But he should not have been so concerned, it would seem, at least insofar as
the immediate proliferation of (re)narrativizations of the scene of Kinsey’s data
collection—in magazines, songs, raunchy fan fiction, novels, and the like—would
suggest that the urge he feared would be absent was in fact being readily felt and
fulfilled.

IV. The Incorporation of Sexology
Trilling thought sexology was removing sex from life in order to reconstitute it in
its own scientific domain as an object of empiricist scrutiny, implicitly conveying a sense
of sexology as an inward facing scientific discourse lumbering onto the cultural scene
rather than dialogically interacting with it. While the humanist wariness of a culture
infiltrated by “charts and tables” and “data and quantities” finds Kinsey representative of
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sexology operating monolithically as official discourse, the Institute for Sex Research’s
self-registration gives us a different picture of its relation to culture and society, and to
science. By self-registration, I mean the way the ISR turned its photographic lens on itself
and its day to day operations, its banality as workplace. But I also mean to indicate the
way the documents of incorporation that make the ISR independent from Indiana
University—on whose campus its facilities are located—create a preponderance of
“research assistants” that then register as official to the outside world in a way that
flattens the particulars of their actual work tasks, which may or may not have had much
to do with research. And finally, I also mean the way Kinsey tried to control the
journalistic, professional, and public discourses about his work under the guise of factchecking, all the while endorsing his staff photographer’s staged photographs of
interviews and other scientific procedures as publicity materials.
In the course of a 1971 oral history of the Institute for Sex Research, Kinsey
biographer James Jones interviewed Institute employees of the Kinsey era. In the
transcript of Jones’ interview with Dorothy Collins, he begins by introducing her to the
tape recorder: “Mrs. Collins is today secretary to Chancellor Herman B. Wells.” Mrs.
Collins replies: “No.”
Jones: “No?”
Collins: “Research and editorial associate.”
Jones: “Was formerly, however, secretary to Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey at the
Institute.”
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Collins: “No, no, I was a research assistant.”
Jones: “Were you?”
Collins: “Yes.”
Jones: “Well, I have not got any of it right. I thought that Paul Gebhard said that
you were really a private secretary. I guess you would not be.”
Collins: “No, I don’t type. I would’ve been rather miserable. I did most of the—I
worked with a calculator and did computing, but my main work was statistics
when I was there.”49
On April 8, 1947, Thomas E. Bath, Secretary of State of the State of Indiana, “by
virtue of the powers and duties vested in [him] by law,” certified that “the Institute for
Sex Research, Inc.” is “a body politic and corporate, authorized and empowered by the
laws of the State of Indiana to proceed to carry out the objects of its organization.” The
Kinsey Institute for Sex Research was recognized by the state as a “corporation not for
profit,” partitioning its research activities from Indiana University in order to evade the
oversight of the state through its school.50
The conditions of incorporation stipulated that the “Institute for Sex Research,
Inc.” as a “body politic” consist in at least three stake-holding members at any given
time, otherwise the corporation was subject to dissolution. As a preventative measure, on
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the eve of the 1947 incorporation, the staff became “research assistants” overnight.
Sexological incorporation turned everyone into research assistants, making their actual
labor, bureaucratic functions, and areas of expertise obscure, flattened into the gendered
division of labor in general: sexological company men and women assisting research.
Kinsey Report co-author Paul Gebhard had apparently described Dorothy Collins
to James Jones as “really a private secretary,” despite her insistence that she was and is a
research assistant, betraying a deeper logic of the Institute’s managerial strategy. Gebhard
cannot keep her title and function straight. Dorothy Collins was hired as a research
assistant at the Institute in part because she was functionally a secretary to her husband at
home; Ralph L. Collins was a Dean, a higher-up in university administration, making
Dorothy a strategic hire. She may have been a research assistant, but she wasn’t not a
secretary.
In 1966, a decade after Kinsey’s death, Gebhard, who had succeeded Kinsey as
the ISR director, produced an “Informational Memorandum.” Subtitled “The Institute for
Sex Research: Its structure and relationship with Indiana University,” the memo
describes, for the benefit of IU administrators, why Kinsey’s charismatic administrative
ethic cannot be maintained:
During the formative and early years of the Institute for Sex Research, the
University administration was kept advised of Institute matters in an almost
exclusively informal, verbal fashion. Dr. Kinsey frequently attended social
functions where President Wells and other University officials were present, and
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he often walked to work with Dean Briscoe. Mrs. Ralph Collins [i.e. Dorothy
Collins], employed for some years with the Institute, was often asked to transmit
information or questions to her husband, Dean Collins. [...] This informal system
of personal communication has become inadequate as a result of the great growth
of the University, the rise of a new group of administrative personnel who have
had less contact with and consequent knowledge of the Institute, and the
increasing complexity of the Institute itself. In response to the University selfsurvey and in recognition of the need to clarify the previous tacit and often vague
relationship between the Institute and the University, the following memorandum
for the information of the Indiana University administration has been prepared.51
Not only is there no longer a charismatic leader, but neither are there charismatic
administrators; their ranks have swelled and the sexological project must confront the
nature of its circumscription and the shape of its elaboration in the multiversity, former
University of California President Clark Kerr’s name for the administratively top-heavy
postwar university system in which students are an afterthought of a self-obsessed
bureaucratic machinery.52 Gebhard narrates the difficulty of water-cooler talk in a
university with no hallways; as architectural historian Mark Jarzombek notes, as the
twentieth century wore on, “the corridor came to be associated with the shallowness of
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modernity rather than its grandeur” (766).53 We can see the lineaments of the corporate
university being threaded through the Institute for Sex Research, Inc., in the protocols it
presages for authorizing minority knowledges and administering the dysfunction of their
interdisciplinary elaboration. In 2016 the Board of Directors of the Kinsey Institute voted
to dissolve the independent charter and hand over the Institute, its archive, and its
stewardship to Indiana University. This unity is perversely underwritten by the now
commonplace openness of the state university system to corporate interests but it does
not resolve the original problem motivating the ISR’s incorporation in the first instance:
its relatively miniscule operating budget nonetheless almost immediately became a point
of contention in the 2016 gubernatorial race in Indiana where politically expedient moral
panic over sex research remains nearly as intense as it was in 1947.
Jeannette Howard Foster, the Institute’s first and last librarian in Kinsey’s
lifetime, explained in her letter of resignation: “I can’t be a librarian” because “you don’t
want a librarian… You can get by with some sort of assistant.”54 Seated in a corner
alcove across from the duplicates (“DUPL”), Foster’s irrelevance as librarian was
embodied by the redundancy of her books.
The Kinsey Institute library was a prestige project. With the substantial royalties
from Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, Kinsey began spending liberally to enlarge the
library collections, and he sought a librarian to preside over them. Jeannette Howard
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Foster was working at the Drexel Institute Library School in Philadelphia when Kinsey
offered her a job in 1948. She left her position and its job security to work for Kinsey
because she saw an opportunity to advance her own research on lesbians in literature,
research she was hesitant to pursue openly at Drexel. Kinsey was pleased about her
research and about the lesbian contacts she promised to connect him with in New York
and Atlanta, but he was less pleased about the request she submitted to the housing office
of Indiana University requesting accommodations for her and her female companion. At
Drexel she could be a lesbian but could not study them; at the Institute she could research
lesbians but could not be one.55
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Donna Drucker’s detailed and illuminating book-length study of the Kinsey research,
The Classification of Sex: Alfred Kinsey and the Organization of Knowledge (University
of Pittsburgh Press, 2014) takes its title and methodology from a key work in the
informatic turn in library science of the 1960s, but curiously her book has very little to
say about the Kinsey library itself, mentioning Jeannette Howard Foster and Kinsey’s
New York book buyer Gershon Legman (a major enabler of Kinsey’s proliferation of
duplicates) only in passing. A further discussion of Legman’s relationship to the Kinsey
project and to the scene of McCarthyite obscenity adjudications would take us too far
afield here, but I am currently undertaking a separate study of Legman in his capacity as
a kind of connective tissue between sexologists like Alfred Kinsey and Robert Latou
Dickinson, homophiles like Samuel Steward and Thomas Painter, and the little magazine
distribution networks pursuant to the Beats, including relationships with publisher
Samuel Roth and with Jay Landesman, with whom Legman edited the short-lived but
influential magazine Neurotica (1948-1950)—the first publishing outlet for Allen
Ginsburg, which also printed Legman’s screeds against Kinsey and Marshall McLuhan’s
early speculative theories of the media history of human civilization. Legman was a
folklorist of the joke and of the vernaculars of sexual subcultures, and an auto-didactic
scholar of pornography and censorship generally. Historian Susan Davis is currently
writing a scholarly biography of Legman and her preliminary publications on his work
have been of immense utility in reconstructing his place in the literary and scientific
scenes of the 1940s and 50s.
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As her biographer Joanne Passet describes, Foster’s quarters at the Institute
initially consisted of a large room behind Kinsey’s office in Biology Hall outfitted with
cases of gall wasps, in addition to books, locating her between Kinsey’s early career as
zoologist and his unfolding archival legacy. In order for staff and visitors to see her, they
had to pass through Kinsey’s office, something, as Gebhard put it, “one did not do
lightly,” and thus, she was “sealed off for the workday,” functionally “a non-person”
because of her office location until the ISR moved to Wylie Hall in 1949 (161).
But even in these new offices, Foster was basically part of the ISR furniture rather
than its staff. If visitors unexpectedly came at night, “Kinsey wanted his librarian there to
show off his library” and to serve refreshments. It was not uncommon for Foster to be
working in her office “and all of a sudden the door would fly open and here would be
Kinsey with people peering over his shoulder as he announced: ‘This is Jeannette Foster,
our librarian, who is the first woman to get a PhD in library science’” (170). The fact that
his statement was factually inaccurate—there had been other women before her—did not
seem to matter to him.
“Kinsey had his own weird method of running a library” and in Foster’s
professional opinion, the result “was haphazard” (163). After buying or receiving books,
Kinsey would thumb through them and then toss them into one pile or another for filing
under a self-made pneumonic system of approximately 25 categories. Foster fought “to
persuade Kinsey to use either the LC [Library of Congress] system or the DDC [Dewey
Decimal Classification] system” but “he would not budge.” Foster’s ability to systematize
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the library holdings was further thwarted by Kinsey’s haphazard acquisitions. “Kinsey
was reckless about refusing to carry a list of ‘library has’ with him, and so acquired a
number of DUPS [duplicates]” (164). Kinsey’s will to a total archive—buying all
available books—while refusing to introduce heterogeneous classificatory schemas like
the Dewey Decimal into the sexological taxonomy project, created untenable working
conditions for his librarian, who must classify the books according to his logics rather
than her expertise. Jeannette Howard Foster’s 1952 resignation letter cited as cause
Kinsey’s unwillingness to let her use either Library of Congress or Dewey Decimal
Classification schemes to organize his library. But the redundancy in the sexological
project that enraged her as an expert librarian enabled her researches as a professional
lesbian. In 1956 Foster completed Sex Variant Women in Literature: A Historical and
Quantitative Survey, based largely on materials from the Kinsey library. The seeds of a
scholarly pursuit of lesbian literary history were sown in the Kinsey Institute, in spite of
itself.
In 1949 the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research added a new member to its staff,
former Kodak photographer William Dellenback, whose official title was “Research
Assistant” and whose sole responsibility was to take photographs. Dellenback
photographed sex acts, artifacts, and researchers; he photographed letters, diary entries,
and polaroids to make duplicates for the archive; he took portraits, snapshots, and staged
photographs of the scene of science; he was sent to take photographs on location, in the
laboratory, and among the daily operations of the Institute in Bloomington, Indiana. At a
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staff party held at the Institute in 1953, Dellenback took several photographs of the
Kinsey Report on the Female on display on a silver platter, the featured dish in a spread
of cold cuts and condiments, taking center stage at the party being held in its honor on the
occasion of its publication. The Kinsey Reports circulated in many forms that were not
books, and the books themselves circulated in various forms as well—in this instance, as
cake. The archive does not record who made this cake, who conceived of it, nor who ate
it, but one can nonetheless be certain that the answer to all of these questions is “research
assistant.”
There is an irony that the staff of the Institute eagerly relate to visitors of their
archive as if it were a joke, that the Kinsey Reports are the most famous American bestseller that no one has actually read. But having read a book is hardly prerequisite to
having thoughts and feelings about it. Books are not perfect metonyms for the ideas they
contain, and reading hardly captures the full range of practices and relations involved in
bringing the contents of books into cultural consequence. It is neither a paradox nor a
joke that the reports were much less read than they were talked about. In fact the
provocation to a certain kind of speculative para-scientific discourse was built into the
method of the reports, which were premised on anonymity, privacy, and nondisclosure.
Rather than resting with the trope of American philistinism played for laughs, we might
consider the various textures of the relation of nonexperts to the Reports—for instance, as
its actual or prospective subject matter, its characters and types, the fodder for its
representational schema, its content, its data, its blind spot, and as would-be readers who
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may or may not care to see themselves so written but whose registration of the feeling of
this ambivalence is itself the context into which the reports emerged and in which their
meaning was consolidated.
The most widely circulated image of Alfred Kinsey during his lifetime was not a
photograph, though it was based on one. The August 24, 1953, cover of Time magazine
featured a portrait of Kinsey by prolific midcentury engraver and illustrator Boris
Artzybasheff, based on a photograph by Time photographer Robert Lavelle.
Artzybasheff’s numerous magazine covers of the period feature the realistic heads of men
of note surrealistically embedded in fantastical landscapes populated with icons of their
achievements. Upon the publication of the issue bearing Kinsey’s visage as its cover,
Time editor Gilbert Cant wrote Kinsey to inquire about his impression of it, noting that
his curiosity on this point was piqued in part because “Your portrait attracted an unusual
amount of mail: almost 100 letters concentrated on that, to the exclusion of the story, and
most of these praised it, especially the motif in the bow tie.” The “motif in the bow tie,”
an interpretive departure from Lavelle’s reference photograph, consists in a pattern of
“female” symbols, the symbol of Venus, from which the piece also takes its title,
“Reflections in the Mirror of Venus.” In its depiction of Kinsey’s impassive face amongst
birds and bees, Artzybasheff’s image manages to cite at once sexologist Kinsey’s
precursive career as zoologist, and the most clichéd pictographic euphemism for the
science of sex. But it is evidently not the birds and the bees floating about Kinsey’s head
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that caught readers’ eyes “to the exclusion of the story,” but rather the “motif” of the
female sex that rings his neck.
Shortly after his appointment in 1949, Dellenback opens a letter to Kinsey by
admiring his prose style—“so pleasantly readable and alive and yet concise”—and
expresses a wish that “I can develop as excellent a style in time.”56 Dellenback’s letter
writing style remained a hopeless mess; his correspondence with Kinsey is a record of the
latter’s patience tried to the quick, prompting increasingly exasperated letters about
botched rendezvous, misread photograph dimensions, recklessly changed plans, and
belated missives. But Dellenback’s visual style became an essential feature of the
Institute’s operations, uniting its knowledge production protocols with its protocols for
the production of knowledge about itself. Magazine confessional is one form of Kinsey’s
incited discourse. Among the Institute’s own contributions to this discourse, an attempt to
shape it or control its framing, are its staged photos of the scene of the interview
exchange.
William Dellenback staged numerous photos of Kinsey and his research team
interviewing supposed research subjects, who were in fact typically other members of the
Institute’s staff—“research assistants.”57 In the most widely circulated of these images,
Wardell Pomeroy and Alfred Kinsey are represented as if taking the sex history of their
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June 18, 1949, letter Dellenback to Kinsey housed in the Institute’s correspondence
archive
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Giving one’s sex history was actually a prerequisite to being hired at the Institute in
any capacity, so Dellenback’s staged photographs have some of the quality of
reenactment.
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Institute colleague, library research assistant Jean Brown. Kinsey’s bowtie and Brown’s
dress conspicuously share a polka dot motif, calling upon both her anonymity and its
verso, her style, to index Kinsey’s science by referencing his signature professional
accoutrement. He wears her pattern about his neck as an accessory, a prelude to the motif
of the science of female sex that might just as well adorn a tie as a cake, or a book.
Sexual science becomes a cultural phenomenon not only by inciting moral
outrage or offering erotic provocation, but by converting scientific methods into motifs.
The name “Kinsey” becomes a synonym not just for sex but more specifically for
quantification. A whole cottage industry of narrating numeracy emerged to invest
quantification with both potent and unstable social significance. The Kinsey researchers
themselves were perhaps the first to recognize this. The ISR saw its publicity as an
integral part of its research, since the advancement of that research depended upon
creating the conditions of possibility for honest disclosure of sexual details to scientific
interviewers. Those conditions of possibility in turn were dependent on popular
expectations about the form and content of the legitimate discourse of sex, and those
expectations are shaped at least as much by popular culture as sexual science. Kinsey
thus set out to make a good showing in popular culture and to use it indirectly as an
instrument of sex education. Thus distinctions between genres, forms, and discourses on
the basis of their prestige or proximity to science lose their footing once they make
contact with the facts on the ground: the popular and expert discourses of sexual science
operated in sometimes symbiotic, sometimes antagonistic, and often instrumentalist
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relation to one another. Viewed synchronically, networked with other media systems and
institutions, the official reports are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of documenting the
social significance of the Kinsey research and the cultural diffusion of sexology.

V. I Was Kinsey-ized
We can think past the anxiety of experts about the popular interest in sexual
science by attending to the reception of the Kinsey Reports and the stories told around
them, about and out of their data—in particular the genre of the “I Was Interviewed by
Kinsey” popular magazine article. The lay mode of negotiation between the discourses of
the sciences and the humanities, and their differential apprehension of the social world,
unfolded in part through the ekphrastic description of autobiography’s conversion into
quantum—this is the “I was interviewed by Kinsey” genre’s signal feature. The
conversion of life history into the order of the numeric made available an experience of
oneself as an aesthetic object amenable to representation in the languages of narrative and
number alike. In this moment of tension between an ascendant descriptive vocabulary of
quantification and an increasingly dispersed repertoire of linguistic representational
modes, nonexpert accounts of scientific apprehension articulated a practice of
improvisation with expert knowledges and with the category of science itself. Scientism
is an aesthetic category as well as an ideological one, and attending to its cultural
operations as the former might tell us some more subtle things about its consolidation and
operation as the latter.
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The “I Was Interviewed by Kinsey” popular magazine article: rather than a
displacement of attention away from the proper object of investigation, this focus is a
matter of some historical fidelity. The roughly 18,000 interviews from which the Kinsey
Reports drew their data were conducted between1938 and 1963, but the (up to) 521
questions of which these interviews were composed were not made public until 1979,
which is to say a crucial element of their method remained the stuff of gossip for several
decades, glimpsed only in the reportage of those who had been interviewed. When
journalists wrote to the Institute requesting information about the research, the response
was always the same: if you want to know what the research is like, you may submit to
having your sex history taken by one of the researchers. Consequently, even the most
dispassionate journalistic accounts of Kinsey bore the trace of their origins in the
“Kinsey-izing” of their authors. As Wardell Pomeroy describes, the Kinsey team was
well aware that the public impact of their research would be measured not by their book,
but rather the press coverage of it: “the majority of people, unable to afford it or not
equipped to read it, would be getting their ideas about the work solely through the mass
media. In other words, their reactions would be based on press releases, not the book
itself” (341). So the Kinsey team made sure to keep a watchful eye over the press
releases, vetting them for “factual error” before publication as a condition of access to the
researchers.
The Institute installed itself as an experiential node in the network of the
circulation of its knowledge production. In order to obtain information about the
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scientific procedures being carried out there, knowledge seekers had to enter the scene as
research subjects. Upon their reemergence as reporters, their experience of the research
process was subject to correction by research assistants at the Institute, whose policy was
to make publication contingent upon submission to their review. The only way to acquire
expert knowledge was to submit to the role of research subject and access the research
process experientially, but thus locked into the position of the researched, one was barred
from the experience of unsullied expertise. The Institute positioned itself as the arbiter of
expertise while seeming to invite all and sundry behind the curtain of its scientific
protocols.
In the bevy of magazine articles such as the 1950 magazine piece “I Was
Interviewed by Dr. Kinsey” cited above, anonymous interviewees narrate the experience
of watching their stories transformed into data in notably consistent fashion: these
accounts are generic, and their signal feature is a formal tension between narrative and
number. As one woman put it, “I have become a statistic, number umpity-ump in the
record of 100,000 men and women that will make up Dr. A. C. Kinsey’s study of human
sex behavior.” She continues, “It gave me a strange feeling to look at that single piece of
paper. There lay my personality, my emotions, my dreams and frustrations – my life
itself. […] No longer was I an individual; only a statistic to form a pattern along with
thousands of other case histories. […] I hadn’t expected quite this emotional reaction.
[…] Statistics cut into memories like a knife.” She concludes, “The questions were done.
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I was now a statistic, to Dr. Kinsey, as two-dimensional as a paper doll. But there on that
single page […] was one human life. Mine. Kaleidoscope, by Kinsey.”58
In December of 1948 Ebony magazine ran a story called “What I Told Kinsey
About My Sex Life” by a sociologist pseudonymously named Mary X.59 Mary X writes
of being interviewed: “My academic training in sociology was of little consequence: I
was a woman now, reviewing for the first time her feelings, her reactions and her
experiences with the most powerful influence in human life – sex” (46). The image that
ran opposite the title captures Alfred Kinsey and Mary X, photographed by freelance
magazine photographer Griffith Davis: “Behind double doors of his office which insure
complete privacy, Dr. Kinsey interviews Mary X.” The opening sentence of her article
announces, “My sex life now belongs to science” (45). Although the Kinsey research
team conducted sex history interviews with approximately 3,000 African American men
and women in preparation for Sexual Behavior in the Human Male and Female, none of
that data was included in the final study, which cited lack of sufficient sample size as the
rationale for its exclusions. While the reports purported to document sexual behavior in
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Described as a “sociologist” in the article about her in Ebony, Mary X was the
pseudonym of the psychologist Winifred Ingram who would eventually become a liberal
arts professor at Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington. A psychology
doctoral student at the time of her Kinsey interview, she published her dissertation
“Prediction of Aggression from the Rorschach Test” in 1951. She aimed to solve a
problem: some psychiatric patients presented with a Rorschach inkblot persist in
interpreting not the amorphous black form on the page, but the negative space in its
interstices. She studied the possibility that over-attention to what is referred to as the
“white space” of the Rorschach might predict violent behavior in its readers.
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humans, generally, the researchers imported racial categories from segregated American
culture as a priori scientific premises. They named male and female as the master
categories organizing the research, but in practice imported social distinctions like gender
variance and racial identity into its parameters.60
After the Mary X piece ran in 1948, Ebony continued its coverage of the Kinsey
research, and in 1952 initiated a correspondence with Alfred Kinsey about a proposed
article entitled “What Negro College Girls Know About Sex,” the publication of which
was to be timed to coincide with the release of Sexual Behavior in the Human Female.61
Upon the publication of the report on the female in 1953, and the revelation of its
exclusive whiteness, the piece ran with a new title: “Why Negro Women Are Not in the
Kinsey Report.” This piece canvassed a range of experts for their opinion on the report’s
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The Kinsey Reports excluded from their analyses data collected from African
Americans, and from “transsexual” and “transvestite” respondents of all races. The
Reports assumed that homosexual behavior was part of the natural variation in human
sexual practice generally, but gender variance remained beyond the ken of its imaginary
of benign variation. Thus it was the case that the Kinsey research went some way toward
laying the groundwork for an increasingly divergent understanding of sex and gender in
research throughout the remainder of the century. Kinsey’s assumptions prefigured the
claim that gay men were well-adjusted and psychologically indistinguishable from their
heterosexual counterparts by which Evelyn Hooker would argue to depathologize
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1973, and they likewise
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exclusions. Answers included observations about the politics of sexual disclosure in a
segregated culture—“Some Say Kinsey Should Use Colored Interviewers”—as well as
speculations of research subject fatigue—“Sociologist Says Minorities Get ‘Tired of
being studied.’” The article also ran with a pair of comparative images: Dellenback’s
staged photo of Kinsey Report co-author Wardell Pomeroy posing as if interviewing
Institute research assistant Jean Brown; and, across the fold, Griffith Davis’s image of
Mary X. While the 1948 piece had presented an image of Mary X as evidence of her
exemplary willingness to participate in the research as subject, its repurposing for the
later 1953 article presents her as emblematic of the reluctance or fatigue of minorities,
“tired of being studied,” who prevent the production of sound science.
In the 1948 photo, Mary X is viewed, the caption tells us, through the “double
doors of [Dr. Kinsey’s] office which insure complete privacy.” The irony of the caption
amplifies the surveillance aesthetics of the image: as viewers of the photograph we are
aligned with the camera looking in from the hallway on the scene of her supposed
“privacy.” Davis produced a reading of Dellenback’s house style by inhabiting it,
drawing out the latent content of Dellenback’s institutional documentation and
foregrounding its surveillance aesthetics. An addendum typed into Griffith Davis’s
instance of the form letter that all prospective reporters on Kinsey were compelled to sign
notes that the agreement to forestall publication until such time as Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey
“has had an opportunity to correct factual errors in the manuscript” also “includes the use
of any photographs to be used for publication.” Vetted by Kinsey himself for “factual
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error” before publication, Davis’s photographs represent a deeper truth about the ISR’s
self-documentary aesthetic.
The “I Was Interviewed by Kinsey” genre did not go without notice in its own
time. Writing for the “These Women” column in 1950, in a snarky article titled “Haven’t
YOU Been Interviewed by Dr. Kinsey?” Cynthia Lowry notes that “One certainly hopes
the good doctor, seeking to pin down statistically the private life of the American woman,
has not already achieved figures to prove she writes articles for magazines. As far as I’ve
been able to figure out, 99 per cent of the Kinsey subjects run straight from the
questioning period to their typewriters. Scarcely a magazine issue goes by without one
piece by a lady with a title like ‘I was interviewed by Kinsey!”62 She continues, “Being
Kinseyized is to be chic comparable only to having a personal psychiatrist,” but evidently
more so, for “in droves the non-literary abandoned their favorite psychologist’s couches
and started looking for someone with an in with Kinsey who could fix them up.” What
Lowry registers here is not just the methodological shift wherein sexuality is counted
rather than narrated, but also the shifting cultural disposition towards the various selfrepresentations enabled by the human sciences—no longer content to narrate their cases
on couches, a newly “non-literary” public takes to the tabulator to see an image of itself.
Lowry also registers the gendering of this relation, noting that “When Dr. Kinsey
went to work on the American male, he took great pains to assure the statistical guinea
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pigs complete anonymity. My research indicates that not a single subject took quill in
hand to pen a document relating his pre-interview nerves, what he wore, how the doctor
looked, some of the more innocent questions and how he felt upon emerging from the
questioning.” But it would seem Lowry’s “research” was conducted in the wrong archive,
for there was no shortage of male commentary on being “Kinseyized,” it simply took
place in pulps, novels, scholarly journals, and expert symposia. As well as in at least one
newspaper—in a 1965 “Dear Helen” column of the Kokomo Morning Times called
“Unasked, Uncounted, He’s a Nonstatistic,” reader “Mr. J (NOT X)” writes in: “I have
been slighted, overlooked, ignored—in a word, unsurveyed! Thousands of men have been
‘Kinsey-ized.’ Not me! […] I read about what I’m like, what I prefer on TV, even how I
conduct my sex life. I’m the Great American Male and my every breath is recorded in
some survey or other. But what I want to know is WHY DON’T THEY ASK ME!”63
The genre reaches its apotheosis in the satirical inversion of its conventions. A
June 1954 article, “I Lied to Kinsey,” nominally by a one “Elmira Zilch,” is exemplary.64
The author introduces herself as “Elmira Zilch—a big, fat, lying statistic that keeps
turning up over and over again from cover to cover” in the Kinsey Reports. “I’m a
statistic, that’s what I am. An inaccurate statistic complete with decimal points,” and
indeed, equipped with a spurious autobiography and a bracing authorial voice all her
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own. Zilch speculates on the prospects for her own eradication by recourse to the material
text, puzzling that “they can’t just tear out Page 43, that’s for sure. Just try tearing Page
43 out of any book and then you won’t have Page 44 either. To make things worse, once
Page 43 is removed, there is nothing to hold Page 29 in the binding and it will simply fall
out and blow away.” Zilch spins the trope of statistical man on its head, neutralizing its
horrible novelty by expropriating its vision of human subjects as numeric mosaics into
the body of the scientific document responsible, in this case, not just for making people
feel statistical, but also for making statistical profiles seem like people. The trouble is not
that Zilch “lied to Kinsey,” but rather that the Kinsey Report conjured Zilch, decimal
points and all, and thus lied to itself, personifying a numerical specter and passing her off
as science with legs.
The conceit of the article is announced in the title, but its late-breaking punchline
arrives with the revelation that Zilch has misrepresented her behavior to a man likewise
misrepresenting himself as Alfred Kinsey—in fact a pervy salesman of radiator brushes
who speaks the sexological patois with enough gusto to dupe those nullities on behalf of
whom Zilch stands, token of the statistical fiction of the average woman. Zilch reports of
her encounter that “there stood this baldheaded man with a cute mustache, and he
honestly didn’t look like any of the pictures of Dr. Kinsey that I’ve seen in the papers
since, but then some people don’t photograph well.”
While Zilch and her statistical ilk may be fictions, her account of the Kinsey
poseur rings all too true. Reporting in the March 1950 issue of Sexology: Sex Science
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Magazine, its editor warns readers of “Fake Kinsey ‘Reporters,’” announcing that
“Evidence indicating widespread use of the telephone by individuals posing as Kinsey
Report ‘interviewers’ was disclosed in New York City recently by Edward L. Greene,
head of the National Better Business Bureau. Reports on what Mr. Greene termed ‘a
plague of spurious phone calls’ have come in from such distant points as Tacoma, Wash.
Other places from which local Better Business Bureaus or Chambers of Commerce have
passed on complaints, are Philadelphia, Harrisburg, Pa., and the Northern New Jersey
area. As far as the fake Kinsey calls are concerned, Mr. Greene emphasized that no
associate of Dr. Alfred C. Kinsey, author of ‘Sexual Behavior in the Human Male,’ ever
conducts interview by telephone. ‘Such phone calls,’ Mr. Greene declared, ‘could only
emanate from practical jokers, or from persons needing the watchful eye of a policeman
or a psychiatrist.’ … [A] number of housewives who were at least temporarily taken in by
the ruse reported they had been questioned for highly intimate information. The nature of
some questions was described as extremely offensive” (483).65
Fact, fiction, and fantasy proved highly malleable in the Kinsey report reception.
In fact, the “I Was Interviewed” genre somewhat overwrites subsequent historical
accounts of the interview process. For instance, when, in 1971, Kinsey biographer James
Jones conducted oral histories with Institute staff and affiliates, research assistant
Dorothy Collins answers the question “Could you comment on Dr. Kinsey as an
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interviewer?” by directing Jones to “Trial by Kinsey,” a 1950 article about being
interviewed. Referring to this article, Collins tells Jones, “I would say that I consider the
story by Cornelia Otis Skinner which appeared in the New Yorker, the account of her
being interviewed by Kinsey, was fairly accurate, fairly close to the experience I had.”
The enigmatic nature of this response becomes clear upon inspection of the Skinner
article, which is a three-page account of its author anxiously anticipating the interview—
and contains no account of the interview itself. Skinner ends her piece by quipping, “If
you think I’m going to tell you what he asked, you’re as crazy as you would be if you
thought I was going to tell you what I answered!”66

VI. O.R.G.Y.: Obtaining Research Grants for Yours-truly
The “I was Interviewed” magazine reports on being Kinsey-ized dramatized a
conversion at once delightful and disconcerting from narration to numeration, and erotic
paperbacks wasted little time seizing upon the excitement of this novel vocabulary for
sexuality and harnessing it toward their own ends. Kinsey Report co-author Wardell
Pomeroy, in his history of the Institute, notes “we were afflicted by a rash of fiction about
sex researchers, which only served to confirm bigotries and fears about what we were
doing. Needless to say, none of them bore the slightest resemblance to reality, and
fortunately for Kinsey most were published after his death. The Institute library has a
shelf full of them, fifteen all told, ranging from Irving Wallace’s The Chapman Report,
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which was a best seller, to such transparent deceptions as The Love Investigator, by
Ernest Gebler; Bucks County Report, by Stuart James; and The Sex Probers, by Hilton
Smyth” (340-341).67 My own research has turned up several more direct novelizations, as
well as a much broader network of citations, spurious prefaces, and dedications that
implicate Kinsey in the popular culture of erotic representation far into the 1970s, as I
explore further in the next chapter.68
The Sex Probers (1961) by Joseph Hilton Smythe tells the story of a sociologist
pressed into service as an ersatz Kinsey by a scheming paperback publisher. The author’s
name (across different editions of the novel also credited “Hilton Smith” or “Hilton
Smythe”—but not, to my knowledge, Pomeroy’s favored “Smyth”) is surely a
pseudonym, and one that, like Wylie’s novel quoted above, cites the Smyth report—
obliquely signaling its interest in transferring some of the new largesse of the quantitative
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Peerloin and Prof. Basil Woodcheck of the Venus Bio-Erotic Research Observatory in
The Square Root of Sex (1967).
68
What I call pulp sexology includes novels that thematize sexology or otherwise exploit
its popularity as erotic premise or marketing ploy, as well as nominally scholarly studies
that sensationalize their sexological topics under cover of professional scrutiny. I have
been maintaining a working bibliography of titles, included as an appendix at the end of
this chapter.
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project to the literary realm. The allusion may also double as a commentary on the
explosive quality of the Kinsey Report, which, like the Smyth Report on the atomic
bomb, set out to defuse a morally provocative subject with a deliberately dry quantitative
treatment.69 In The Sex Probers, assistant professor of sociology James Blakely angles to
jumpstart his career and secure tenure by writing Sexual Problems of Modern Women, an
ersatz Kinsey report on the female covering the sex lives of the women in his own
northeastern college town. He is prompted in this pursuit by Harris Ames, an enterprising
literary agent peddling salacious mass market paperbacks. Harris pitches the project to
Blakely:
“I have a publisher—a good one—hot after a sex survey book. One focused on
the women of a typical middle-income suburban town, just like the one where you
live. A sort of female Middletown, U.S.A., with the emphasis on sexual mores.”

69

The Smyth Report is the common name of an administrative history about
the Manhattan Project commissioned by the project director, Major General Leslie
Groves, Jr., and written by the physicist Henry DeWolf Smyth. It was the first official
American account of the development of the atomic bombs and represented the first
official public dispatch of declassified information about the Manhattan Project. To avoid
becoming a how-to manual, its content deliberately skewed toward the inertly
informational and flatly numerical. It was published with the formal title A General
Account of the Development of Methods of Using Atomic Energy for Military Purposes
on August 12, 1945, following immediately upon the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki on August 6 and 9. The journalistic titling convention in which stuffy scientific
publishing titles were forsaken in favor of the author’s surname—the Smyth Report, the
Kinsey Report—helped draw a common thread in the popular imagination between
otherwise quite divergent research programs. Thickening the superficial connection was
also the convention rampant among sensationalizing commentators referring to the
Kinsey Report as the “K-Bomb” and its publication date as “K-Day.”
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“But that’s been done,” Blakely protested. “Kinsey, and Hamilton before him, not
to mention a raft of others.”
With a quick wave of the hand Harris brushed aside all that had gone before.
“Kinsey just whetted the public’s appetite. We give them something more. We
humanize the book with a batch of case histories. We let the readers not only peer
into the bedroom—but get right into bed with our subjects.”
“But why me? I’m no expert on sex.”
“You’re a sociologist, and that’s even better.”70
From Harris’s perspective a sociologist may as well be a sex expert, since he is a
practiced hand in blending the genres of statistical generalization and humanizing case
history. But the sociological skill of observation that Blakely has cultivated in his
professional life has left him alienated from the primal energies in whose domain he
imagines sex to exclusively belong. Blakely is depressed because he feels himself to be
living a “second-hand life” (60), and the drama of his protagonism is his struggle to
access first-hand experience that would puncture his sociological remove from the world
around him. He tries to secure this for himself first by restoring biographies to the data of
his female research subjects. “Blakely found himself unable to regard the answers as
merely meat for objective statistical charts, merely data to be coldly evaluated with
scientific detachment,” and he feels himself compelled to humanize. “He selected an
interview folder at random, glanced at the code number on the cover. He hesitated before
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Joseph Hilton Smythe, The Sex Probers (Beacon Envoy, 1961), p. 19.
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reaching for the small memoranda book he kept locked in the bottom drawer of his work
desk. Here the code numbers ceased being mere statistical tabulations and became living
identities. For this book gave him the name of each woman who had made an answer”
(34).
This act of biographical restoration fails to solve Blakely’s problem. Correcting
sociological remove with novelistic intimacy, making “living identities” out of what had
been “merely meat for objective statistical charts,” proves to be an over-correction,
producing a false and potentially lascivious sense of intimacy with women who are
functionally strangers, despite being neighbors. This conversion produces second-order
trouble because Blakely feels too close to these women: “Undersexed. Aggressive.
Homosexual. In Blakely’s mind the labels found identities, became living persons
stripped of social pretenses, without the moral masks they wore in public. Emotionally
naked” (71). Blakely is plagued by a nightmare in which his “emotionally naked”
subjects are literally naked, wearing signs about their necks labeled with their sexological
category, and shouting at Blakely: “Give us back our clothes! Give us back our clothes!”
(68).
Once Blakely’s book is a success, the technocratic college president Wheaton
offers him a full professorship, and offers its readers the novel’s most soul-bearing
moment of self-reflexivity about its own aesthetic project: “Kinsey, you may remember,
was subjected to a vast amount of cheap and tawdry exploitation. It is the lot of every
serious scholar who explores new avenues” (146). Not least among Kinsey’s cheap and
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tawdry exploiters, The Sex Probers thus announces its own opportunistic uptake of
Kinsey as—far from exploitative—the surest sign of the seriousness of Kinsey’s
contribution to science. Talcott Parsons should perhaps likewise be flattered that
Wheaton sees the popular success of Blakely’s book as an occasion “to launch a
Department of Human Relations” that would “bring sociology out of the classroom
into”—Blakely finishes his sentence: “Into the bedroom, right?” (147). Wheaton becomes
an ersatz Talcott Parsons to Blakely’s Kinsey, riffing on the department of Social
Relations at Harvard that Parsons founded in 1946 and that Stanley Milgram, John
Money, Dick Price, and many other catalytic figures of interdisciplinary postwar social
theory later attended.
While the professional accolades are cheering to Blakely, they do not resolve his
feeling of living at “second-hand.” Blakely ultimately secures perfect middle-distance
social agency by transcending the loneliness of the writer and the alienation of the
sociologist and becoming, instead, a reader. Somewhere along the way his publisher has
secured an excerpt deal with “one of the women’s magazines” (89). Blakey achieves a
workable relation to his own life by transcending the sociological and novelistic regimes
of representing sexuality and entering into the magazine’s. Magazine journalism can
claim some of the empiricist immediacy of sociological analysis that nonetheless brings
along some of the biographical or psychological integrity of the novelistic narrator. But
magazines achieve what the novel cannot yet, by avowing the special character of
numeric representation, resolving the tension between narration and numeration with
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more ambivalent concessions to the beguiling novelty of the latter than the novel could
accommodate, even in its most Borgesian contortions. The Sex Probers concludes midsentence as Blakely begins reading his book aloud to an assembled audience of fawning
women from his town: his research subjects sit to hear a reading of statistical
generalization about themselves. The novel does not so much end as it breaks off, midsentence, where the magazine begins.
Novelizations and adaptations of the Kinsey research carried on for years,
sometimes across so many years indeed that their sexological premises come to seem but
a distant and distorted memory. Ted Mark’s The Man from O.R.G.Y. series (1965-1981)
chronicles the globe-trotting exploits of sex researcher turned secret agent, Steve
Victor.71 In a mash-up of spy thriller and erotic satire, and mobilizing plenty of
extraneous generic conventions besides, Steve Victor proclaims, “I see myself as carrying
on the traditions of Dr. Kinsey. The difference is that I’ve cut out the paperwork and
substituted a personalized methodology.”72 While explicitly announcing its relation to
sexology, the “personalized methodology” Steve Victor innovates seems derived as much
from James Bond as Alfred Kinsey, and invests little in the distinction between them.
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Ted Mark was one of several pseudonyms of Theodore Mark Gottfried (1928-2004),
who, under his given name, published numerous works of educational non-fiction about
historical events aimed at a student audience. Under another of his pseudonyms, Blakely
Saint James, Gottfried penned a series of erotic novels for the Playboy Paperbacks
imprint.
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Ted Mark, Here’s Your Orgy (Berkley Medallion, 1969).
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In another erotic novelization of the Kinsey research, Miss Kinsey’s Report (1967)
by Ray Train, the eponymous protagonist is compelled to conduct a sexological survey of
her home town by her recently deceased uncle’s will, as prerequisite to her inheritance.
This turns out to be an elaborate ploy, paving the road to marital bliss with pseudoscience, as Miss Kinsey’s participant-observer sexological methods bring her into
intimate contact with the homegrown suitor her uncle had secretly selected for her future
husband. Miss Kinsey stands to be rewarded with a loving husband and a family fortune
in return for her sexological labors. These are quaint compensations, literally avuncular,
and their perversion into exotic atavisms in the erotic novel in which they appear speaks
to the moment in which the institution charged with authorizing polite sexual discourse is
not the church or family but the academy. In The Sex Probers (1961), the Kinsey-esque
Blakely is offered tenure in exchange for sensationalizing his scientific research for a
mass readership. By the time of the Ted Mark series, this institutional aegis is even more
starkly drawn: the primary referent of “orgy” is not group sex but foundation funding.
The cover copy of the inaugural installment of the series, The Man from O.R.G.Y. (1965),
ventriloquizes its protagonist: “I’m a sex expert—among other things. If you’re
squeamish, I’d better not tell you what O.R.G.Y stands for…” The novel opens: “My
name is Steve Victor and sex is my profession. I have a Ph.D from a bona fide U.S.
college that labels me an expert in the field. I also have a juicy research grant from one of
those dollar-dripping American foundations. This means that I can play Kinsey, and
they’ll pick up the tab. The foundation doesn’t hand out research grants to individuals,
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naturally. To qualify for one, I had to set myself up as an organization. But the
organization is me, and I’m it” (5). The following pages reveal the titular joke: O.R.G.Y.
is an acronym for “Obtaining Research Grants for Yours-Truly,” spelling out the cynical
erotics of sex research in a foundation funded scene that valorizes wanton scientism.
“Group sex” is not about the orgy but rather about the O.R.G.Y.: the “group” in question
is the research team, and sex is not what they are having but what they are studying—
though in the end, these novels suggest, those may amount to the same activity.
This chapter has chronicled a newly numerate mainstream American public
attempting to grapple with the meaning of sex in the novel language of quantification in
the Kinsey epoch. In the following chapter, I turn to the “future of the gay novel,” as one
writer put it at the time, in the 1950s-70s, when possibilities for literary representation of
sexuality generally, and homosexuality in particular, were haltingly transformed under
changing obscenity law. While the erotic paperbacks discussed in this chapter spuriously
cite Kinsey as titillating conceit, the next chapter examines the legal expedience of
spurious sexological citation as means of evading censorship by asserting the redeeming
social value of the scientific study of sex. And, as obscenity laws relaxed, homophile
authors carried Kinsey’s project into the literary realm in earnest, reconciling the
demographic logics of quantifiable social actors with the humanist imperatives of literary
characterization to forge a forthrightly homosexual aesthetic. Exploiting the statistical
margin of error in enumerating the social world, the incipient homophile novel staked its
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future on an aesthetics of the indeterminate, trading in the counted world for an algebraic
formalism that enlivened the statistical imaginary with an attention to its numeric poetics.
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CHAPTER 2: PULP SEXOLOGY: SEX BY THE NUMBERS
I. Gay Science73
“The Dim Past,” the first chapter of Roger Austen’s Playing the Game: The
Homosexual Novel in America (1977), begins by recounting the advice Dr. William A.
Hammond gave to a patient who came to him looking for a cure for his homosexual
desires. The doctor prescribed the man “bromide of sodium, cold baths every morning, a
liberal diet and plenty of outdoor exercise,” as well as “the study of mathematics” (1).
This was in 1918; the dim past indeed, for by the time of Austen’s writing in 1977,
mathematics, far from being a prophylactic against unbidden homosexual urges, provided
the very impersonal form within which they could be imagined, if not enacted. In the
intervening decades between Hammond and Austen, sexology had emerged to offer a
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Walter Kaufmann’s “Translator’s Introduction” to Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Gay
Science (Vintage Books, 1974) notes that he first settled on this English translation of the
title in 1950; “Meanwhile, the word ‘gay’ has acquired a new meaning, and people are
beginning to assume that it has always suggested homosexuality. […] If homosexuality is
what now comes to mind first when the word ‘gay’ is heard or read, the decisive change
was brought about only in 1969 by the establishment of the ‘Gay Liberation Front.’ […]
It is no accident that the homosexuals as well as Nietzsche opted for ‘gay’ rather than
‘cheerful.’ ‘Gay science,’ unlike ‘cheerful science,’ has overtones of a light-hearted
defiance of convention” (4-5). He notes Nietzsche’s adoption of the term from the
Provençal gai saber: “the art of poetry” (6). The point of inflection between the literary
arts and the sciences of man that would produce a “gay science” that populates the (it
should be noted—manifestly American) catachresis of fröhlich and gay with concrete
content circa the 1969 establishment of the Gay Liberation Front is precisely the point of
entry for the present investigation.
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quantitative master discourse of homosexuality, and “the study of mathematics” passed
from the stuff of homophobic prescription to a form of homophilic expression.
This chapter traces a line from the death of the novel into the paperback
revolution by describing the way a shift from qualitative to quantitative methods in
midcentury American sexology played out in the literary aesthetics of the emergent
homophile collectivities that were the objects of study and interlocutors of that scientific
project.74 Austen’s 1977 study of the “homosexual novel” purports to be the first account
of homosexuality as genre, not just a sexual subculture but an aesthetic subculture with a
discrete literary history; but the eponymous “game” in question is one whose main
players are sexual scientists. As the incipient homophile movement cleaved
homosexuality from sexological pathologization and asserted its viability as social
identity, not just object of scientific scrutiny, the political utility narrative of
quantification was re-scripted. Quantification was a resource for disidentifying with the
scientific circumscription of the social meaning of sexuality for the emergent homophile
movement and, as I will show, continued to animate the counter-discourse of sexuality in
the moment when queerness itself became an analytic in the form of queer theory.
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The “death of the novel” was pronounced and prophesied repeatedly throughout the
twentieth century. Obviously this prognosis was overstated, and the form was and
remains far from dead. What was variously described as a “death” or an “exhaustion” of
the novel can be read rather as an elite discourse fearfully registering the transformation
of the novel into a popular form for general consumption, the aesthetics of which were
being rearticulated around an emergent postwar genre system and mass reading public.
Lionel Trilling’s “The Kinsey Report,” discussed in Chapter 1, addresses Kinsey’s hand
in this specifically.
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There are plenty of reasons to be wary of a proposal for number as an instrument
of sexual liberation, so often has it been deployed as a tool of empiricist capture and
wielded as a weapon of epistemological violence.75 In this chapter I adduce a history that
suggests that number is not (only) reductive, flattening out singularity and emptying out
the specificity of queer lives to tally up the quotient of deviance metastasizing in the
social body. We cannot know in advance that social transformation wrought in the
register of number will be for the worse. Deciding as much may, among other things,
blind us to a crucial moment of minoritarian sexual aesthetics and emergent queerness
articulated with respect to the quantitative constraints of sexual science. I trace the drift
of the trope of “number” from sexual science into sexological aesthetic, reading Gore
Vidal’s The City and the Pillar (1948) with his erotic murder mystery trilogy (19521954) pseudonymously authored as Edgar Box, and John Rechy’s two Grove Press bestsellers City of Night (1963) and Numbers (1967), in the context of the emergent
homophile movement’s discourse on the politics of literary representation. Through two
case-study careers—Vidal’s and Rechy’s—I show how number has proven not to have a
deterministic hold on gay aesthetics so much as it has provided a productive constraint on
their elaboration. The examples of Vidal and Rechy point to the ways queer writers and
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The literature documenting such abuses is vast. For a few key accounts, see for
instance Petra L. Doan, “To Count or Not to Count: Queering Measurement and the
Transgender Community,” WSQ 44.3-4 (2016): 89-110; C. Riley Snorton, Black on Both
Sides: A Racial History of Trans Identity (Minnesota UP, 2017); Jennifer Terry, An
American Obsession: Science, Medicine, and Homosexuality in Modern Society (Chicaco
UP, 1999); Siobhan Somerville, “Scientific Racism and the Emergence of the
Homosexual Body,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5.2 (1994): 243-266.
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readers imagined themselves as inhabiting a discourse of seriality and statistics, in
opposition to a popular, liberal, and implicitly heteronormative discourse of individuality
and anti-numeracy. Liberal recognition operates by counting, and its compensatory
narratives of abstract individualism everywhere labor to obscure this fact. Vidal and
Rechy call this bluff and put the mechanism of counting to queer ends.76 Confronting
censorship and censure, and their attendant economic consequences, Vidal turns out the
literary excess of melodrama, and Rechy carves down a pulp portrait of mathematical
reduction.77 What they share is a queer obsession with two overlapping and interacting
numbers games toying with the quantitative sciences of sex: serial killers and sexual
sequence.
In what follows I investigate the trope of number as it passes out of the
professional sexological lexicon and into the diffuse discourse network of postwar
sexuality. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948) and
Female (1953), the first data-driven quantitative studies of American sexual practices of
their kind and scope, commonly known as the Kinsey Reports, influentially labored to
depathologize sex generally (and homosexuality in particular) by scientific
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It’s not for nothing that both Vidal and Rechy, two of the most lauded “gay novelists”
in America, at all points in their long careers express extreme ambivalence about
identifying as gay, and also, in Rechy’s case, as a “Chicano writer.” Their resistance to
identitarian uptake signals their queer attempts at evasion of the liberal politics of
recognition and underwrites the logic of their pairing in this chapter.
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For a reading of Rechy and the field of queer studies that troubles any easy dismissal of
“the reductive” as unequivocally problematic, see Ben Nichols, “Reductive: John Rechy,
Queer Theory, and the Idea of Limitation,” GLQ 22.3 (2016): 409-435.
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recontextualization, setting aside questions of morality in favor of frequency, prevalence,
and distribution. Speaking sex in the numerical language of the quantitative sciences,
Kinsey furnished homophiles with a vocabulary to multiply.
Authors like Vidal and Rechy offered a resolution to the antipathy of narrative
and number that the popularity of the Kinsey Reports made so salient, marrying the
distribution logics of demography and the humanist psychology of character in the
literary form of serial sex. I follow the sexual aesthetics of number through these works
as far as it will go, to the brink at which it begs its own negation in the figure of the
variable, x. X marks the spot of historical transformation from the political economy of
deviant precarity to the identitarian regime of social difference, registered in a figure
potent with the imprint of quantitative sexology on the history of homosexuality. In
conclusion, I follow this figure into its final form as the sine qua non of queer theory’s
queer capacity, to ask anew “what does queer theory teach us about x?,” and perhaps
more significantly, what does x teach us about queer theory?78

II. Pulp Sexology
Among the reasons numbers proved symbolically useful both politically and
aesthetically for midcentury homophiles were these: (1) The Kinsey statistics on the
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I borrow the phrasing of this inquiry from the title of an influential 1995 guest column
of PMLA by Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, to which I return at length in closing.
Berlant and Warner, “What Does Queer Theory Teach Us about X?” PMLA 110 (1995):
343-349.
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incidence of homosexual contacts among American men suggested that the atomizing
discourse of antisocial sexual pathology might be eroded through sheer force of
demographic quantity—it was cheering to find you weren’t the only one, and that even
those who weren’t at least statistically speaking probably still had, at one point or several.
(2) As historian of sexuality Jonathan Ned Katz puts it in the first sentence of The
Invention of Heterosexuality: “In the early 1970s numbers of homosexuals began an
exuberant move out of our old secret lives.” These numbers made movements that are to
credit with the “coming out of the closet” formulation of gay politics, and the impetus for
this mandate—“come out!”—rested on the premise that one would be in quantifiably
good company. (3) The masculinist sexual aesthetics of this emergent demographic
category—the consolidation of homosexuality as identity above pathology, from the
“stud file” to the “clone” look—were serial.79
The sexual politics of quantity took shape in a broader post-WWII American
context of newly quantifiable social aggregates in which the discourse of number
suggested an emergent aesthetic mode seeming to rival the affective power of narrative
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On seriality and sameness with respect to the so-called “gay clone” see Tim Dean,
“Sameness without Identity,” Umbr(a) (2002): 25-41. On the logics of seriality
underwriting the field of sexual identity itself, see Annamarie Jagose, Inconsequence:
Lesbian Representation and the Logic of Sexual Sequence (Cornell UP, 2002). Jagose
concludes that book with a chapter on “pulp sexology,” by which she means sexological
studies published in paperback for a mass readership. My own use of that term
encompasses the genre to which Jagose refers, but also intends a looser constellation of
modes and genres including the pulp and paperback fiction on which sexology made an
indelible imprint, and the substantial gray area between fact and fiction, sexology and
literature, instigated by the saturation of postwar popular culture by both sex and science.
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fiction. The Gallup Polls and the Kinsey Reports delivered wounding blows to the
perceived primacy of narrative as a technology for representing human experience,
recasting their subjects’ most privately held personal narratives—their political
philosophies and their sexual histories, respectively—into mere checks, marks, and stats.
As Flannery O’Connor put it, “The storyteller is concerned with what is; but if what is, is
what can be determined by survey, then the disciples of Dr. Kinsey and Dr. Gallup are
sufficient for the day thereof.”80 Newspaper reviewers sounded similar notes of alarm,
one observing that “the prevailing influence” on American novelists, “seems to be Kinsey
rather than the now outmoded Freud,” and another asserting that the Kinsey Report’s
“effect on American novel writing has been traumatic. In the first decade A.K. (After
Kinsey), millions of words of fiction have spilled out that read like appendices to the
Reports.”81 If intimate stories could be better told with survey data and statistics, what
then of narrative? Story as a technology of human meaning making seemed to have met
its match, if not its end.
In his autopsy of the form that others would call “the living novel,” masquerading
as a joint review of contemporary literature and its theories, Gore Vidal speculated that
“so many of today’s academic critics [resort] to formulas, diagrams; the result, no doubt,
of teaching in classrooms equipped with blackboards and chalk. Envious of the half-
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Flannery O’Connor, “The Fiction Writer and His Country,” The Living Novel: A
Symposium, ed. Granville Hicks (1957), p.161.
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The first quotation is from David George’s contribution to The Saturday Book
(Hutchinson, 1955) and the second is from David Holloway, “Another Appendix to
Kinsey,” The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1961.
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erased theorems—the prestigious signs—of the physicists, English teachers now compete
by chalking up theorems and theories of their own, words having failed them yet
again.”82 What Vidal lamented—though he too would ultimately reap its rewards and
exploit its affordances—others celebrated, finding in this state of affairs new possibilities
for aesthetic innovation of a specifically masculinist kind, as we saw in Philip Wylie’s
homage to Kinsey in Chapter 1.
Others found Kinsey’s imprint on the world of arts and letters an unwelcome and
unseemly incursion. In 1951, one Ruth Edgar Malone of Pasadena, California, moved by
“the desperation born of fatigue” after reading a review by Gore Vidal in the Saturday
Review of Literature, wrote a pleading letter to the editor of that publication entreating
him “from now on to corral the ever more recurrent reviews of books by, for, of, and
about homosexuals to some department set aside under the heading of—let us say—
‘Sweet Are the Uses of Perversity’ […] The rest of us, benighted souls that we are, would
be thus warned away from yet one more notice that here again the Kinsey Report has
been rewritten in terms of ‘the young explorers.’”83
The representational power of narrative seemed to be giving way to the
ascendancy of the quantitative as a master-language for describing contemporary life, and
the status of sexuality, absent the stories that served as signatories of its moral
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circumscription, acquired a new uncertainty as well. The name Kinsey became a byword
for this state of affairs, shorthand for the cultural anxieties provoked by the general rise in
prestige of postwar statistics. The high literary novel seemed inadequate to the task of
reconciling its weddedness to bourgeois individualism with the aggregated masses of the
quantitative postwar period. This cleared ground for the increasingly popular and
deliciously formulaic paperback fictions of the postwar era to pick up some of the slack
let drop by the properly literary novel. The amenability of pulpy paperbacks to the seedy
and serial made them significant players in the postwar print culture of sexual
dissidence.84
Pulps take their name from the cheap wood pulp paper on which they were
printed starting just before the turn of the century. Pulp magazines dominated the market
before WWII, and during the war the distribution to servicemen of Armed Services
Editions of a carefully curated set of nationalistic novels with masculine themes primed
the postwar reading public for the paperback explosion to come.85 The war itself was a
popular theme in gay pulp reprints published in the 1940s and early 1950s. Titles like
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Tereska Torres’ lesbian war story Women’s Barracks (1950) and George Viereck’s gaythemed Men into Beasts (1952) exploit the sex-segregated setting of army life for
sensationalistic scenes of homoeroticism that are intended to arouse even as they are
decried by the novels in which they appear as abominably perverse. In the ensuing
decade covertly gay-themed “physique magazines” purporting to be admiring catalogues
of the classical male form were joined on the shelves by pulpy reprints of earlier literary
fiction with gay themes, such as Radclyffe Hall’s The Well of Loneliness, which had first
been published in hardcover in 1928. The first forthrightly homoerotic “paper-back
originals,” or PBO’s as they were called in the trade, arrived in the early 1950s, but the
boom in their production would not come until the laws governing obscenity shifted later
in the decade. This shift enabled less abashed representations of homosexuality. It also
emboldened gay writers to compose happier endings for their characters, whose fates had
hitherto been decided in advance by the imperative to denounce any sexualities that
strayed from the norms of heterosexuality as morally perverse and socially damaging.
Throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, homophile organizations took interest in pulps as
politically consequential representations of sexually marginalized lives. The Daughters of
Bilitis’s newsletter The Ladder (1956-1972), the Mattachine Society’s Mattachine
Review (1955-1967), and its affiliate ONE (1953-1969), featured book reviews and
running bibliographies of titles past and contemporary. The pulps themselves took
interest in these organizations in turn, including advertisements for events and newsletters
in the backs of books. Blueboy publishers strove to create an elaborate community
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around its pulp publications, expanding its operation in the late 1960s to include the gay
magazine Numbers—itself a reference to Rechy’s eponymous 1967 novel.
In the changing legal landscape of the early 1960s that saw a relaxation of
censorship laws as applied to literature, in large part due to the strategic efforts of Grove
Press’s Barney Rosset and legal team, many gay pulps became cannily self-reflexive
about their ambiguous relation to that safeguard against the classification of obscenity:
“redeeming social value.” Taking cover in a spurious inhabitation of the genre of
sexological and scientific writings about the “social ill” of homosexuality, pulps that had
in the 1950s earnestly insisted on their scientific merits over their more obvious erotic
ones began to toy with the convention. For instance, the prefatory note to The Half-World
of the American Homosexual (1966)—“This book is not a scientific treatise or an
encyclopedia of data and statistics. Rather, it is an excursion to a few of the fog-draped
ports along the seas of homophilia…”— coyly assures its readers that it is a work
intended not to engorge the mind so much as the loins, however much its quasisociological title may suggest otherwise.
Inspired by the ground-clearing work of the Kinsey Reports, pulps took up the
theme of sexology and the genre of the case history. As discussed in Chapter 1, The Sex
Probers (1961) and Miss Kinsey’s Report (1967) are explicit Kinsey satires, narrating the
stories of ersatz Alfred Kinsey & co. traveling around suburbia “researching” sex by
having it. Many pulps riffed more loosely on this theme of the erotic potentials of sexual
science, some carrying spurious citations and dedications to Kinsey. W.D. Sprague’s
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many salacious studies of American nurses and housewives all bore dedications to Alfred
C. Kinsey. Pulp novels like Arthur Adlon’s Lesbos is for Lonnie (1963) sported blurbs
lifted from the Kinsey Reports on their covers. These citations were cheeky, as well as
strategic. They drew on Kinsey’s scientific bona fides to assert “redeeming social value”
while at once invoking his prurient cultural capital to pique interest and court sales. That
is, both Kinsey’s scientificity and his suspect credibility were resources for a burgeoning
mass literary market capitalizing on the salability of sex.
The fact that Kinsey was himself routinely subject to censorship suggests how
limited the legal protections secured by invoking his name surely were. Rather than
serving as legal strategy, citations of Kinsey in racy literature were not evading
censorship but invoking it, and its aura of forbidden intrigue. This cross-over ran the
other way as well, with social scientific studies courting sales by approaching a degree of
salaciousness hardly distinguishable from the most baldly provocative pulp fictions. This
last genre incited sympathetic (though scarcely less sensational) rejoinders in its turn,
such as Jess Stearn’s influential study of lesbianism, The Grapevine (1965), homophile
writer Edward Sagarin writing as Donald Webster Cory in The Homosexual in America:
A Subjective Approach (1951) and The Lesbian in America (1964), and the numerous
insider accounts of lesbian life by Marijane Meaker writing as Ann Aldrich.
The increasingly dialogic relation between sexology and the pulps was not just
shaped by the law, but directly interfaced with it. The supreme court decisions in ONE,
Inc. v. Otto K. Olesen, Postmaster of the City of Los Angeles (1958) and MANual
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Enterprises, Inc. v. J. Edward Day, United States Postmaster General (1962)—both of
which hinged on homophile magazines confiscated by the post office—specified the
definition of obscenity such that representations of homosexuality were not to be
determined inherently obscene, but rather on a case-by-case basis like heterosexual
representations were. These rulings modified the definition of obscenity put forth in the
1957 decision in Roth v. United States that had in its turn narrowed the definition of
obscenity from any material seemingly intended to “deprave and corrupt” to only
material deemed “prurient” by “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards.”86 Bringing homosexual representation into the ken of this obscenity definition
implied that homosexuality was not monolithically detestable, but rather subject to
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consideration by “the average person” under advisement to contemplate the work in
which it was represented “as a whole.” Homosexuality was articulated with “community”
through the apperception of the “average.”
This highly reflexive set of relationships across genres and discursive domains
has significant methodological implications. If one sets out to understand the cultural
diffusion of sexual science it is difficult to distinguish professional sexology from
reportage and literature, and not just because journalistic commentators on Kinsey were
systematically strong-armed by Institute policy into becoming research subjects
themselves.87 As Jeffrey Escoffier has noted, unlike Freud, Kinsey did not propose a
theory of sexuality, only a method for describing it. In a narrowly constrained history of
sexology this might consign Kinsey to the status of historical digression, failing to
amount to a paradigm shift or even a very deep conceptual rejoinder to
psychopathological precursors and successors in the field of sexual science.88 But the
cultural diffusion of Kinsey makes a different case. The sexual scientific paradigm of a
given moment consists in an uneven network of genres and representational modalities
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whose transformations are poorly captured by a strict focus on professional sexological
tracts.89
In the crucible of sexological counting were forged the demographic logics of the
homophile movement whose avant-garde was the gay liberation front. The “cult of
statistics” also had its culture.90 The next two sections are about two of its key
elaborators: Gore Vidal and John Rechy.

III. Cold Blood
American obscenity law governed the kinds of plotlines sexually “deviant”
characters could live, the language authors could use to narrate those lives, and the
distribution of pulps, pamphlets, and paperbacks to their readers by mail. The postal
service was the bottleneck in which “obscene” materials were confiscated, and their
publishers held to account. These parameters, as well as more general social censure,
made writing under pseudonyms the norm for the profession. Famous homosexual
89
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authors of literary fiction like Gore Vidal took cover under noms de plume to pen their
own gay plots. Vidal’s work was given short shrift by The New York Times and other
press outlets that refused to review or advertise his works after he sympathetically
rendered the psychology of the homosexual protagonist of The City and the Pillar (1948)
under his own name.
The City and the Pillar was published in two different versions in short
succession. It is worth noting that neither version ends particularly well for any of its
characters, least of all the gay ones, but especially not the 1948 original that got Vidal
snubbed. In that version of the novel, as Vidal would later describe, the homosexual
protagonist “Jim strangles Bob [the object of his nostalgic obsession] after an
unsuccessful sexual encounter” (xvi). Vidal envisioned The City and the Pillar as a
“romantic tragedy,” the “nature of [which is] to end in death,” but was told by a skeptical
critic “that so sordid a story about fags could never be considered tragic” (xiv).91 Vidal
had wanted a tragic end, but feared he had instead produced a “melodramatic” one, “so
for a new edition of the book published in 1965 I altered the last chapter considerably”
(xiv). In the 1965 version, to which all subsequent editions are faithful, the novel ends
with Jim depressed, drunk, alone, and verbally assaulting a “little fag” (206) in a bar
before wandering down to the docks of the river to stare out speculatively onto an
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uncertain future, but rhetorically embedded in the same backward-looking reverie that
landed him there in the first place (207).
In the interval between his 1948 melodrama and his amended 1965 tragedy, Vidal
took a detour into pulp. In his paperback fictions of the 1950s Vidal multiplied the
doubling logic of the pseudonym into a sequence, taking on three different pen names in
an extended shell game of publicity and identity.92 Rather than retreating into the closet
or refusing to do so, Vidal played coy with its epistemology. He felt snubbed by the
homophobic literary market, but instead of recanting and writing “respectable” fiction, or,
conversely, going all-in on gay lit, he decided to make a joke of the whole scenario,
taking on a series of pen names that quietly allude to gay bathhouses, and writing
nominally straight fiction that is packed full of gay jokes. Thus he neither came out nor
closeted himself, but rather thematized the epistemology of the closet itself as the stuff of
a cheap mystery plot. Intuiting a literary historical opening he would later pronounce as
truism—“death has become the new pornography”—Vidal continued to earn a living
after The City and the Pillar left him snubbed by the mainstream literary establishment
by writing an erotic murder mystery trilogy (1952-4) under cover as Edgar Box.93 Vidal,
neither a fan nor, hitherto, an author of mystery novels, credits publisher Victor
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In addition to the Edgar Box trilogy, to which Vidal would, later in his career, profess
the most fidelity, Vidal also wrote Cry Shame! (1950, originally published in hardcover
as A Star’s Progress) as Katherine Everard, whose surname was borrowed from a favored
New York bathhouse, and Thieves Fall Out (1953) as Cameron Kay. He also wrote an
unpublished pulp novel in the early 1950s called Some Desperate Adventure.
93
The quotation is from Gore Vidal, “The Novel in the Age of Science,” The Quarterly
Journal of the Library of Congress 22.4 (1965): 288-299.
95

Weybright with the idea for the Edgar Box series.94 When Vidal inquired what he might
base the plots of such a series on, Weybright purportedly quipped, with an irony
redoubled in Vidal’s retelling, that Vidal should simply “write what you know.”95
The Edgar Box series follows the foibles of public relations consultant Peter
Sargeant, whose services are habitually solicited for public relations disasters so
egregious they resemble nothing more than crime scenes—and often literally are. His
drive to spin stories puts him in a race with police for information, making his job nearly
indistinguishable from that of a detective, and making the novels in which he appears
nearly indistinguishable from murder mysteries. But we are not dealing with the novel
and the police here so much as the novel and the publicist. Publicity lets Vidal
experiment with an aesthetics of surveillance as an alternative to an epistemology of the
closet, and the spin-doctors of bureaucratic dysfunction rather than double-speaking
closet queens are the real persons of interest. Peter Sargeant, the protagonist and narrator
of the trilogy, is not a P.I. but rather a P.R. man. The collapse between private
investigation and public relations is one that converts murder into media, prefiguring the
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“pathological public sphere” not as symptom but rather strategy, linked directly to the
politics of homosexual representation.96
Serial murder is the motor for the plots that enable the multiplication of their
author’s public facing persona. For it is Vidal’s attempt to manage his image that sends
him under cover as Box, who writes Peter not as a private dick, but a public one, making
him the public face of Vidal’s privately held sexual “pathology.” We learn Peter’s name
in Death in the Fifth Position (1952), the first book of the trilogy, only after another
character mistakenly calls him Jim—the name of Vidal’s offending protagonist in The
City and the Pillar—and Peter doesn’t bother correcting him. But he does correct the
reader, narrating “my name is Peter Cutler Sargeant II, but what the hell” (13). Thus
Vidal, blacklisted into dissimulation as Box for having written Jim, creates a novelistic
world in which Peter might as well be Jim if it will facilitate his management of public
relations. “Peter Cutler Sargeant II” is already flagged as a double, but his name stands in
for so many others, and vice versa, that he becomes a kind of public relation himself,
narrating opaquely in the first person—“master that I am of the worn cliché,” as Peter
self-describes in one of his first of many acts of self-cancelling self-disclosure (10).
The first sentences of Death before Bedtime (1953), second in the trilogy, find
Peter with a stranger on a train: “‘You know, I’ve never gone to bed with a man on a train
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before,’ she said, taking off her blouse. ‘Neither have I,’ I said, and I made sure that the
door to the compartment was securely locked” (9). Behind closed doors with his latest
assignation, Peter offers gratuitous verbal affirmation of the heterosexuality he is in the
process of enacting—seducing a woman by jokingly invoking his virginal innocence of
men. He locks the door to keep out strangers on the train, who he knows from Patricia
Highsmith are often as not a nuisance to the hetero status quo. Box writes a closet into his
train and locks the homophobic word play of straight seduction inside of it. Box’s
Bedtime doubles down on the homophobic logic impelling its doubles, wringing a hollow
laugh out of their irony and bringing out Highsmith in the process.97 This is less a
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its own kind of public relations mystery plot.
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symptom of the epistemology of the closet than it is a moment of its stylized animation.98
Vidal capitalized on it; for a 1964 paperback reprint of the Edgar Box trilogy—before he
had outed himself as Box—Vidal supplied a blurb for the book’s cover, proclaiming of
his own literary achievement: “The work that Dr. Kinsey began with statistics, Edgar Box
has completed with wit in the mystery novel.”99
Part of “the work that Dr. Kinsey began with statistics” had been to convert the
shadowy sexual recesses of the mind into a numerically coded data set, dousing the
Freudian excavation of the unconscious with the cold water of quantification. “‘Gore is a
man without an unconscious,’ his friend the Italian writer Italo Calvino once said. Mr.
Vidal said of himself: ‘I’m exactly as I appear. There is no warm, lovable person inside.
Beneath my cold exterior, once you break the ice, you find cold water.’”100 The serial
killer may be the form of appearance of the generalized criminological-actuarial
quantification of the social field of reflexive modernity—the “mass in person” as Mark
Seltzer has put it—but he is also the form in which serially deviant sexual actors are
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compelled to give themselves appearance, under conditions of legal, social, and economic
censure for representation of such a character as anything but pathological. That is,
Seltzer proposes that the serial killer is characterized by his “abnormal normality”—“but
what the hell,” as Peter puts it; for a deviant with aspirations for any other form of
recognition, that may be as close to normal as he is likely to get.
But as “the sexual scene” changed over the course of the 1960s, with it the
aspirations for gay representation.101 Wrung dry of their irony, the impersonal seriality of
the pulps that had made them a safe-haven turned them into a straightjacket as gay
liberation raised expectations for representation. As pulp novelist Larry Townsend
reported in The Advocate in 1970, Phil Andros (one of the many pen names of Samuel
Steward) and a small collective of other gay writers made a stand at a late 1969 rally
against the impoverishment of gay representation resulting from the formulaic constraints
of the paperback publishing houses, which dictated the proportion each book should
contain of characterization and plot versus sex scenes—in great favor of the latter:
On June 15, 1970, a meeting took place in the quarters of the Society for
Individual Rights (SIR) which may herald the beginning of a new era for
homosexual writers. […] Under discussion was the future of the gay novel. […]
Because of the difficulties in persuading standard publishers to produce books
with frankly homosexual themes, most of us have been forced into the ‘adult’ or
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‘porno’ market. None of us are overly pleased with this, as it restricts our range of
expression. […] We are limited to an exposition of 50,000 to 65,000 words—too
short for proper development of characters and plot, especially when it is
necessary to devote approximately 20 per cent of our text to ‘hots’ (sex).102
The logic of number pervaded not just theme but form, dictating compositional
proportion in a way that decided the priorities and potentials of the representable world in
advance. The pulps proved a frustrating consolation prize for the foreclosed “future of the
gay novel”—pliable fictional forms to a point, but short of an expressive literature by a
long shot.103

IV. Body Count
The New York Times review of John Rechy’s breakout Grove Press debut City of
Night (1963) proposes that “the book should be regarded more as sociology than as a
novel,” withholding endorsement of Rechy’s literary bona fides while hailing him “the
Kinsey of the homosexuals.”104 Aside from a mention of Kinsey embedded in Rechy’s
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fictional portrait of Thomas Painter in one of the novel’s vignettes, there is little in City of
Night to sustain such a title.105 Naming Rechy “the Kinsey of the homosexuals” says
much more about the signifying power of “Kinsey” as a metonym for sex than it does
about any particular qualities of either Rechy or the literary aesthetic of City of Night. Far
from tabulating sex histories, City of Night maps a network of urban scenes, describing
the bars, theaters, beach fronts, sidewalks, and parks where drag queens, hustlers, and
scores met up, hung out, and did business.
The becoming-sociological of the avant-garde in the face of the obscenity
strictures of the American legal system generated a relation that can cut both ways. It
enabled the truly sociological to look avant-garde, which is to say a popular sociologist
like David Riesman as much as Rechy can become composer of the Great American
Novel whether either are writing novels or not, just because even more importantly they
are writing sociology. When the New York Times reviewer called Rechy “the Kinsey of
the homosexuals” he meant to be discrediting his literary merit, but the ground beneath
literary merit itself was shifting such that he rather enshrined it. Sociology had become a
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literary genre. This is not to fall prey to the critique of post-45 criticism, leveled
insightfully by Stephen Schryer, that it has too often allowed the popular narrative
sociology of people like Riesman, on the strength of the mainstream popularity of his The
Lonely Crowd (1950), to stand in for postwar sociology as such, effacing in the process
the much more governmentally consequential structural functionalist sociological
tradition exemplified by Talcott Parsons.106 Rather, these two senses of the sociological
are operative immanent to the period, and in Rechy we see a moment of fraught
interaction between, on the one hand, the cultural value of a conflated literary-sociology,
and, on the other, the “new class” fantasy of an anti-technocratic humanist critical elite
who would be endowed with the power to adjudicate such value claims.
It is my contention that Rechy would make good on his title, “the Kinsey of the
homosexuals,” with his 1967 follow-up, Numbers, which chronicles two weeks in the life
of Johnny Rio, a one-time hustler now older, wiser, and off the streets, but briefly back at
it to make sure he’s still got it. Relating his two most famous novels in a 1995 interview,
Rechy notes, “The structure of the last portrait section [of City of Night] (“White Sheets”)
is borrowed from my fascination with mathematics. I saw the relationship between the
two characters in that chapter in terms similar to those involved plotting an algebraic
equation on a graph; given several factors, locating the intersection of two lines to
determine the exact point of revelation. In Numbers, I was writing about a series of
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sexual encounters, but the central metaphor is death, dying” (119).107 The troping of
sexual math towards death finds disturbing concretion in the AIDS epidemic in the
context of which Rechy delivered these remarks. But at the time of the novel’s
composition, the metaphorical conflation animating Numbers bespoke an anxiety about
the salutary closure seemingly foreclosed by seriality, the conclusion of which would
have to be mortally final if it was to conclude at all. In other words, the impersonal
relation enabled by the abstracting mathematical conceit underwriting character contact
in City of Night had, by the time of Numbers, become personal, as personal as life and
death.
Rechy diegetically introjects himself and City of Night into the opening scenes of
Numbers, the protagonist of which is greeted upon his return to Los Angeles with:
Oh, Johnny Rio, you should have been here few years ago—when that stir
happened! (I think you had just left.) Well! You probably remember him—this
young number that used to hang around the bars and Pershing Square? Well! He
wrote a book about Main Street and hustling and Pershing Square and queens, and
tourists came down looking for Miss So-and-So that he’d written about! And that
trashy big picture magazine did an article with photographs of Main Street […]
Now every time I pick up a hustler, I wonder if I’m going to end up between the
sheets of a bed or the sheets of a book! (25-26)
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With this Rechy warns against the facile conflation of paraliteratures and paraphilias in a
criticism shored up by a naïve reading of the strategic claims to the sociological that
would find a mimetic relation between them. He periodizes this misreading to his debut,
City of Night, and makes it a cliché in the mouth of a gossip in Numbers. The scene
converts the catachrestic conflation of bedsheets and book-sheets into a self-reflexive
formal principle. Paraliteratures and paraphilias need not be read in mimetic relation
because—the sociological premise sustaining such a reading now situated literally as
backstory—the whole complex of their conflation comes into view as an algebraic
symptom of a much more elaborate social geometry.
Johnny Rio “had made straight A’s in math” (32) and “was always good at
numbers” (35), as adept at handling “inventory” at his uncle’s store in Laredo as at
tallying “numbers” cruising him in Griffith Park. City of Night had played into the hands
of the sociological identification of these two forms of inventory as but so many forms of
economic activity generally. If there is a meaningful distinction between them, it is only
that while the one may be a hustle, the other makes one a hustler, but both effect an
effacement of particularity in the logic of equivalencies and exchange registered in the
protagonist’s namelessness. In Numbers the protagonist can keep his name, because
Johnny Rio isn’t in it for the money anymore. His sexual tally is slowly transformed into
“a vague game, emerging, vaguely” (126), rather than a job, though this is a hardwon and
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protean distinction: “I don’t need money, Johnny reminds himself,” and must remind
himself repeatedly (95).
This reminder is grounded in a new ontology in which Moses appears as a
precursor to Kinsey’s statistical instruments as much as an instrument of God’s will.
Johnny “imagines a roster, with everyone in the world—past, present, future—numbered
(as in that book of the Bible in which Moses is commanded by God to take a census of
his people): all listed neatly in long, thin, tight columns” (13). He is looking for “reasons”
but can find only “numbers”—this is the battle waged to convert the political economy of
gay precarity into a bona fide formalism of aesthetic expressivity rather than economic
necessity. As Rechy describes it, “The hustler-narrator of City of Night learns poses,
adopts them, to mask vulnerability. On the street, he’s paid for the role he’s playing, like
an actor; the artist, the sensitive child, looks on in surprise. In Numbers the protagonist is
an extension of the earlier narrator. Here, the narcissism has become even more overt,
more consuming: Johnny Rio’s creation of himself is more perfect and so, paradoxically,
that renders him even more vulnerable; there’s more to break.”108 In City of Night, being
a hustler externalized the threats to the narrator’s subjective coherence by locating them
in the vicissitudes of the sexual marketplace, rather than the sexual subject; in Numbers,
by contrast, “partly from the fact that he’s long fled self-examination—Johnny has
always relied strongly on symbols to externalize whatever bewilders or troubles him”
(191). Lacking the externalization of “role,” Johnny has recourse to “symbols,” such as
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numbers, but any irruption of the “self-examination” that “he’s long fled” threatens to
reveal these symbols as psychic symptoms, not externalities at all but expressive signs of
his self’s “bewilder[ment].” What Rechy names as the narrator’s “narcissism” in
Numbers we might as easily read as a sign of his sexuality’s condensation into a sexual
identity. Introjecting “the role he’s playing” into a “more consuming […] creation of
himself,” the narrator loses the socio-economic space of alienation from the role he has
been hired to play and acquires the vulnerability of a belief in his own self-identity.
The narrator of Numbers manages his vulnerability by making of it a “game” in
the form of a hustle, though he can no longer conceive of himself as a hustler. Johnny
generates the rules of the game by extrapolating a mathematical theory of his sexual
future. He has come “to Los Angeles for a reason he does not know: knowing only that
he’s returning for ten days. Exactly ten days” (10)—he doesn’t know the reason, only the
number; this becomes a recurring refrain. He iteratively feels his way into a form, and a
game: ten days, 30 men. He strains to insist that this ratio is anything but arbitrary:
Thirty… Where did it come from? Lurking… waiting to be spoken. Unconscious
calculations now becoming conscious: Feverishly: I’ve been away three years…
If I hadn’t left, I would have made it with, say, 300 people in one year… In three
years 900… I’m behind 900… How long would it take to catch up? … The least
I’ve made it with in one day in the park is three… At least three a day… into
900… that’s 300… I could catch up in 300 days… But I came back for only 10
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days, and that’s exactly how long I’ll stay. Ten into 300—… Thirty. That’s it!
Thirty! That’s the goal! (190)
The math puts him at ease: “He was battling against chaos, and all that matters is that a
symbolic ‘reason’ has again emerged to save him from disintegration” (191).
Rechy narrativizes hustling, sublating its economic logic into a narrative form
within which to tell the story of Johhny’s post-hustling life. When “symbolic ‘reason’”
fails to satisfy, what steps into the breach is story. Johnny transcodes the urban landscape
of public sex into the allegorical vocabulary of “The Myth of the Streets,” the fairytale
that vouchsafes hustlers against conflation with fairies. (The Myth, in short: I only do it
for the money.) The public toilet with a mirror in it in Griffith Park becomes “The
Observatory” in this new urban geography: the place he goes to gaze at himself,
sometimes even wink at himself, in the mirror. If counting is the method, observation is
the mode, not least self-observation, which stands in for the self-reflection Johnny
conspicuously lacks. The closest he comes to self-reflection might be gazing at himself in
the reflective sunglasses lenses of a mysterious butch number whose concealed eyes
beguile Johnny for pages before he understands that their mystery is his own mirrored
image. Reduced to surfaces, Johnny makes the most of them until he begins to suspect
that they may bespeak depths he cannot bear to plumb.
While the man with the mirrored lenses is enticing, his opposite number is
supremely disturbing. “The man with the two X’s,” or, sometimes, “the scary man with
the two X’s,” seems to be waiting for Johnny everywhere. The “two reddish X’s, about
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six inches long, on his back” recall the shuttered doors of the “gypsy woman” prophetess
upon whose presence Johnny had come to rely as a sign that the future remained
sequentially in place insofar as there was someone there to guess at it, whose beachfront
booth is “sealed, boards crisscrossed in stark X’s,” destabilizing his worldview entirely
(57). The X’s on the man are similarly unnerving in their ontological instability: “They’re
either tattooed or drawn on—Johnny can’t tell—or they could be relatively fresh scars,”
or “painted on (but why?)” (135, 200). In any case, “there’s something sinister about
them,” and they leave Johnny “vaguely repelled” (135). When he gets to the bottom of
things he realizes the provenance of the two X’s, but they do not for all that make any
more sense to him—and in fact, less. They are abrasions acquired through the
masochistic submission to a lashing leather belt, which the man entreats Johnny to wield.
Dumbfounded that he could be mistaken for the prospective author of the mark,
and “to his annoyance (though he doesn’t know exactly why he’s annoyed),” Johnny
“feels cold. ‘I’m not anybody’s executioner!’” he shouts at the man, drawing the line on
the reductive logic of number at the brink of its randomization of body count into
“anybody’s” execution (191, 200). Masochism makes no sense to Johnny, for he cannot
conceive of a self-possessed self, let alone one actively desirous of its own interruption.
“For every action, a reason. One without the other can topple Johnny’s whole world. Like
a row of dominoes. Although he can function for a time in a state of suspension […]
inevitably a questioning takes place” (177-8). The prompt and placeholder for the
question is X. “The man with the two red X’s branded on his back, slowing his car when
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he noticed Johnny, would have clearly stopped if Johnny hadn’t driven away hurriedly.
That guy’s still after me and he thinks eventually I’ll make his weird scene. The thought
lashes at Johnny,” as if a belt inscribing X’s in his consciousness (254-5).
Number is not a lasting solution for Johnny Rio but rather conjures its dialectical
twin, the variable, x, simultaneously a figure for number abstractly and a negation of
numerical specificity. X literally haunts the protagonist as the nagging undertow of the
novel’s numbers, the site where it attempts to quarantine its anxiety about narrative’s nag
on number and number’s drag on narrative, reducing people to their serial itemization and
thereby dehumanizing them and likewise the protagonist who is their tabulator—
“‘Count’? The word, looming large in his consciousness, startled Johnny. Oh, it’s not that
I’m ‘counting’ for chrissakes; it’s just that soon I’ll have enough (’have’?) and then I can
stay away from the parks and everything (‘enough’?). It’s not that I’m counting!” until
eventually “the horror that he is counting, accumulating numbers aimlessly, strikes his
consciousness like a sniper’s bullet” and “the numbers are losing even their few vestiges
of identity” (151, 190, 250). Johnny has to spin stories for himself about why it is
permissible for him to count.
X marks the spot in which a world made in the image of the political economy of
gay precarity is being despecified into social form where people don’t have a price. The
variable marks the return of a repressed pluripotent personhood eroding the discrete
naming of number, but it operates still in the reference world of the quantitative: it is not
number’s aversive opposite so much as its opposite number in negation. The threat of the
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X suggests that the far side of hustling is the homo with his legs thrown up, who never
knows quite how much he’s worth.109 Rechy’s sexual math in Numbers tries to be
probabilistic and predictive, but it runs aground against the psychic imperatives for
narrative and biographical closure both formally and thematically. The protagonist isn’t
satisfied by his math, wants something more, desires more than anything an “end” instead
of chasing eternally the numerical specter of his past projected out as predictive future.
He finds sequence unbearable as a form of life, however compelling it may prove as a
form for literature.
Rechy made a mark; Numbers became a brand. Advertising on tear-out order
forms in the back pages of the gay pulp novels published under the Numbers imprint of
Blueboy Press in the early 1970s, Numbers magazine enticed prospective readers: “Tired
of cruising? Try Numbers”; “We’ve got your Numbers.”

V. Queer Calculus
In their early anti-state of the field essay, “What Does Queer Theory Teach Us
About X?” Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner end with the “deferred” question, “what
does queer theory teach us about sex?” Ending their essay this way, they give the lie to
the staid professionalism conjured by their title, which apostrophizes the invitation they
received from the PMLA to author this “guest column” explicating queer theory for the
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profession, ventriloquizing its prudish prurience while continuing to defer satisfaction of
its curiosity and its demand. Rhyming the deferred question of sex with their title
question of x, they also give the lie to the apparent arbitrariness of the variable’s sign, as
“x” seems to trope inevitably towards “sex,” an echo that swallows its first letters but
does not lose their phantom phoneme. “Sex” seems to have been waiting in the wings all
along as the deferred syllabic context for “x.” But it likewise suggests that sex itself
shares some of the volatility or indeterminacy of the variable, making good on their
assertion that the queer power of the variable query is its capacity to “wrench frames”
(348). The prurient inquiry and the queer work of questioning: the difference between
them is a matter of style.
Writing in a 1974 special issue of College English on “The Homosexual
Imagination,” Dolores Noll likewise ends her essay with a bang: “Let me end simply by
quoting a sign consisting of letters pasted on a PMLA cover which appeared in an office
window in May of 1970, when those of us who taught at Kent were trying to grasp what
the slaughter of our students meant or should mean to us. It read: ‘We publish while our
students perish.’ I like to think that those words explain most fully why I am a gay
feminist activist at Kent State today” (315).110 Noll is describing the PMLA as the raw
material for a ransom note, where professional recognition of academic expertise comes
at the price of life itself. Institutionally legible expertise is politically quietist, or worse—
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efficacious in all the wrong ways, enabling the violent disciplining force of repressive
state power in direct proportion to its commitments to publishing disciplinarily legible
descriptions of it.
In juxtaposing these two examples I mean to suggest that the queer style of
commentary described, proposed, and performed by Berlant and Warner’s essay—a
“queer commentary” among whose chief practitioners they nominate “not faculty
members but graduate students” (343)—is no mere language game. The stakes are high,
and they are informed by a long history of justified skepticism and principled opposition
to the professionalizing protocols that would discipline the politics of sexual knowledge
production into docility. Among the things X marks is queer theory’s refusal to be selfidentical, to claim an identity politics, to generate professional protocols for selfreplicating recognizable rigor. As Kandice Chuh has argued in her critique of the
“aboutness” imperative of identity-affiliated field formations to self-reduce to topicality
in order to become legible to the neoliberal university as productive fields, a critique that
she describes as an extension of her “refusal of identitiarianism,” the drive to replicate
rigor is “otherwise known as discipline,” and it entails a reproductive logic that is
manifestly “unqueer” (127).111
Berlant and Warner articulate a queer rejection of this disciplinary reduction in
the language of number, an algebraic figuration of “resistance to being an apparatus for
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falsely translating systemic and random violences into normal states, administrative
problems, or minor constituencies” (348). “Systemic and random”—x captures both
while staving off their normalizing congelation into “social problem.” Berlant and
Warner don’t have science envy, they have rhetorical savvy—this is how to take their x.
Posing the “question of x” is not a symptom of scientism so much as a parodic invocation
of it, for it is a question they voice only to put in the mouth of the profession whose
reductive utility imperative it mockingly invokes. Far from Vidal’s vision of English
professors, “envious of the half-erased theorems—the prestigious signs—of the
physicists,” symptomatically “chalking up theorems and theories of their own,” x invokes
the problematique of scientism in the academy as it interfaces with publics and politics.
Berlant and Warner propose that this queer resistance to systematicity is not “a
commitment to irrelevance” so much as a reflection of queer commentary’s “vital
precedents and collaborations in aesthetic genres and journalism” (348). Berlant and
Warner gesture toward the uneven network of genres out of which emerges what they
propose calling “queer commentary,” rather than queer theory. As they put it, “the
metadiscourse of ‘queer theory’ intends an academic object, but queer commentary…
cannot be assimilated to a single discourse, let alone a propositional program” (343). And
yet it is difficult to hold onto incoherence after some nearly thirty years of academic
elaboration. While the field remains productively varied and non-self-identical, many of
those “vital precedents and collaborations in aesthetic genres and journalism” have been
sidelined as focus shifts to the crisis context of the university itself. Among the “vital
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precedents” that Berlant and Warner are citing we might list pulp sexology—the uneven
network of “aesthetic genres and journalism” and sexual science that underwrote a
historically transformative reconception of the social significance of sexual behavior, and
with it of homosexual subjectivity. Queer commentary is a laterally emergent genre
committed to posing questions that torque discourses. I contend this claim is reinforced
by the history of pulp sexology I’ve adduced, though it may seem at odds with the postempiricist antipathy to the sciences of sexuality that is the prevailing wisdom of
contemporary queer studies.
As we learned from Roger Austen and Alfred Kinsey as much as from Vidal and
Rechy, number as a modality of social registration and self-representation does not have a
predeterminate political efficacy. Quantification has, among other things, historically
underwritten what we might call a version of queer commentary avant la lettre, the
uneven network of postwar literary, scientific, and legal genres, expert and lay
discourses, that I have been calling pulp sexology. Pulp sexology highlights the historical
interaction between censorship, publishing history, popular taste cultures, minority
identity formation, political novel, sexological empiricism, quantitative and qualitative
social science, that comprises the discourse network of postwar sexuality and the context
for the emergent movements for sexual liberation and civil rights. Reading this network’s
thematization in the novels of Gore Vidal, we located among its applications of a numeric
imaginary an aesthetics of the pseudonym as multiplication of identity, plot as public
relation, an interaction between number and publicity that proposes the multiplication of
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identity as survival strategy. Following the gay novel out of the pulps and PBOs and into
the incorporated avant-garde, we found in Rechy an emergent queer auto-critique as he
self-historicizes the sociological hustler aesthetics of City of Night and emplots them into
the mathematical formalism of Numbers.112 Rechy intuits the logical extreme of the
sexual aesthetics of number in the algebraic upending of Number’s headcounts.
Turning with Rechy from hustler to homo and the non-self-identical desire that is
the undoing of both, we found that on the far side of quantity lies the vertigo of
indeterminacy.113 This is the psychic toll of homosexuality’s depathologization: freed
from the inventories of deviant taxonomy, the homosexual must confront the prospect of
queer dissolution in the face of his own desires. The name for this chiasmic undoing in
theory has early and often been x.114 Homosexuality and number reach an impasse that
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necessitates arithmetic’s becoming algebraic, integer superseded by variable in the
transformation of gay identity into queer insurgency. Vidal’s multiplication of public
faces and Rechy’s body counts in sexual series, shading into the vertiginously iterative
identity of homosexuality: both reach an impasse inside of which x stands as the negation
of numerical specificity and the resolution of infinite sequence. Queer studies harnesses
the unsettling indeterminacy of identitarian desire by condensing it into a figure for
critical capacity, the “question of x,” the posing of which has the power to “wrench
frames.” Rechy warns of the disturbing queerness of X, which draws quantification and
classification into uncomfortable contact. Their chimera is queer commentary.
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CHAPTER 3: INNER SPACE IN COSMIC VIEW: UNIVERSE/UNIVERSITY
I. Quonset Classroom
Experimental psychologist B.F. Skinner’s novel of educational utopia Walden
Two (1948)—a literary way-station between his scientific study of rats, The Behavior of
Organisms (1938), and his scientific study of humans, The Science of Human Behavior
(1951)—opens with a professor of utopian social design confronted with a newly
constructed utopian community by his former students, now veterans, in a former
Quonset barracks, now classroom. When Skinner set out to extrapolate his social
engineering theories, developed through behavioral experiments conducted on rats and
pigeons, into the humanist realm of literary utopia and utopian education, he centered the
Quonset classroom as the shared ground for a tweedy ivory tower dweller and his former
students, now freshly discharged from military service in the Philippines. Professor
Burris greets them with “the usual questions. Had they seen the new emergency housing
arrangements—the trailer camps and the reconstructed barracks? What did they think of
the Quonset classrooms? And so on” (1). They’ve come to give him the news that his
utopian whims have been actualized by his old friend, Frazier, in the form of a
behaviorist community named Walden Two (Walden One is Henry David Thoreau’s).
With this news, Professor Burris reluctantly recognizes that the Quonset hut may be the
site of utopian pontification, but it remains as remote from an actualized utopian project
as the ivory tower. Walden Two is the story of a professor’s utopian wish encountering its
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own frightful concretion in a counter-cultural madman’s utopian program.115 A narrative
of the Quonset classroom’s swords to ploughshares simplicity is laid plain as fantasy, as
it begs rather than resolves the question of the imbrication of welfare and warfare state.
Setting out from Professor Burris’s dissatisfaction with his classroom as a proxy for the
model community realized by Frazier, Skinner’s novel implicitly asks, what is the
architecture of a utopian education? This question prompts others: What is the
relationship between the campus and the idea of a model community? In the post-WWII
period particularly, how does the architecture of social reproduction scale, along with its
growing student body? How does a discourse of the temporary serve as a permanent
solution to the problem of articulating a plausible relation between campus and world?116
Quonset huts were developed in and named for Quonset Point, Rhode Island,
where their production commenced in 1941. Quonset Point was itself named in the
sloppily appropriative vernacular of colonization, and its namesake architectural product
became a potent component of the conversion of settler lands into land grants. Quonset
Point had been built into a naval air station and production yard in response to Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s 1937 initiative to increase defense measures in preparation for
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WWII. Quonset structures were based on an upgrade of the WWI British design for the
Nissen Hut, but redesigned to include a layer of masonite insulation that would make
them suitable for the variable climates of the global outposts of American military
hegemony. Approximately 170,000 Quonset huts were manufactured during World War
II to house soldiers and military facilities at home and abroad.117 Roosevelt’s 1942
Executive Order 9066 authorized the incarceration of Japanese Americans in internment
camps, which introduced the barracks as a domestic architecture, confirming “temporary
housing” and its logics of relocation as the architecture of permanent disavowal and
materializing the etymological affinities between college campus, prison camp, and
military encampment in the form of a dystopic planned community.
The Public Housing Authority sought to intervene on the post-WWII housing
shortage by encouraging the rapid erection of Quonset hut subdivisions on the outskirts
of major metropolitan areas, like New York and Los Angeles. Standard huts were
converted to small homes, which sold for $2,700 ($1000 for the hut and $1700 for the
home conversion). Public schools, especially colleges and universities, were the biggest
beneficiaries of surplus Quonset Huts; government projects were given first dibs on the
surplus before it was auctioned off to the public.118 The large number of returning
servicemen, combined with urban reordering by the federal government for defense
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infrastructure optimization, caused a housing shortage; with the incentives of the GI Bill
it also stimulated the unprecedented postwar increase in college enrollments.
Quonset structures served as offices, classrooms, and housing, establishing total
continuity between work, life, school, and service. Shipped from war-effort work yards to
land grant university campuses where they were reconstructed and multi-purposed, the
Quonset classroom was a total environment in its portability and ubiquity, rather than its
domineering institutionality.119 As Hugh Kenner noted, considering the poetry of Ezra
Pound, “Self-similarity in general confers the liberty to stop without incompleteness,”
making the repetition of nominally temporary forms as good a strategy as any for
constructing an environment both mundane and total.120 These temporary structures
persisted in numbers until the 1990s (the original war surplus, that is—proxies are still
being manufactured today by private contractors), in the meantime phased in and out for
double-wide trailers and all other manner of modernized ephemeral architectures,
austerity ready-mades for turning out credentialed graduates with a strong sense of scale
invariance and structural self-similarity: made if not born ready for the fractalized world
of self-referential administrative discourse.121
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The temporary classroom becomes the template for the master plan, representing
respectively the competing half-lives of administrative fantasies of the built environment
as the locus of student thriving, discipline, education, and containment. How does the
temporary Quonset classroom interface with the speculative master plan? Quonset huts
exist but are not supposed to last; master plans are speculative but they are meant to be
realized. These are not opposites, they are adjacent ephemeralities, and they have a
history of chafing at one another. Together they map the arc of war surplus turned
speculative future under the guiding hand of the administratively top-heavy postwar
multiversity.
“Multiversity” is former University of California President Clark Kerr’s
periodizing term for the model bureaucracy of American higher education to come,
coined in his Godkin Lecture on the Essentials of Free Government and the Duties of the
Citizen delivered at Harvard University in 1963.122 Kerr periodizes the history of the
modern university, placing himself at the forefront of its unfolding present. According to
Kerr’s history, the research university finds its roots in the seventeenth century with
Francis Bacon, who championed utilitarian and empirical knowledge; in the mid-
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nineteenth century Cardinal Newman’s “The Idea of the University” proposed a liberal
education trained to produce universal men with rounded knowledge, cultivated tastes,
and strong national character; in the 1930s, Abraham Flexner’s “The Idea of the Modern
University” saw specialists replacing generalists, entailing a multiplication of university
departments and institutes as philosopher becomes researcher and focus moves away
from teaching and towards scientific knowledge production. Clark Kerr’s “The Idea of
the Multiversity” follows upon this tradition, naming the administrative university in
which students in extension courses far outnumber full-time enrolled students, and the
university itself has “more employees than IBM” (7). But vestiges of all these stages
carry on into the present, creating conflicting senses of the university’s purpose: “These
several competing visions of true purpose, each relating to a different layer of history, a
different web of forces, cause much of the malaise in the university communities of
today. The university is so many things to so many different people that it must, of
necessity, be partially at war with itself” (8-9).
The multiversity is “an inconsistent institution,” “not one community but several”
(18), a “name” and a “reputation” for “institutional character” (19-20) which operates
primarily as a brand, rather than a culture. Abraham Flexner had compared the university
to an “organism,” implying integral relations between parts and whole; Kerr proposes
that the multiversity is instead a “mechanism,” “a series of processes producing a series
of results—a mechanism held together by administrative rules and powered by money”
(20). Kerr notes that “there are several competitors for this power,” and thus the
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multiversity must also function as “a system of governance like a city, or a city state: the
city state of the multiversity” (20). Interested parties vying for power include students,
faculty, administration, “public authority,” and “influences—external and semi-external,”
including the “informal influence” of “particular publics,” like donors, unions, local
communities, alumni, foundations, and federal agencies (20). In Kerr’s estimation, the
system of governance demanded by the multiversity is analogous to the United Nations,
and, like the UN, the multiversity finds that “peace” and “progress” are aims often at
odds with one another (36). The multiversity embodies this contradiction, and is
organized on its premise; as Kerr puts it, “a multiversity is inherently a conservative
institution but with radical functions” (37). It must ensure social reproduction while at
every turn opening itself inevitably to the possibility of social transformation. That is,
“the university must serve a knowledge explosion and a population explosion
simultaneously” (37).
Kerr periodizes not only the institutional organization of the university, but
likewise its spatial analogues. The liberal arts university was akin to a “village,” while the
modern university is more like a one-industry town. The multiversity, however, is like a
“city”: “The ‘city’ is more like the totality of civilization as it has evolved and more an
integral part of it,” underwriting the multiversity’s unique affinity with “the totality of
civilization” and its special microcosmic affordances as a model society (41). In Kerr’s
estimation, the multiversity is as alienating for its inhabitants as the modern city, but
precisely because of this it is uniquely capable of replicating the conditions of alienation
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that pertain to modern life in general, making it a site of hands-on education of a different
order. Kerr writes that “the multiversity is a confusing place for the student. He has
problems of establishing his identity and sense of security within it. But it offers him a
vast range of choices,” and “in this range of choices he encounters the opportunities and
the dilemmas of freedom” itself (42).
Kerr charts the trajectory of the university according to the successive models of
the space of the campus, from cloistered village to industry town to urban agglomeration,
and finds in each phase of its development that the campus operates as a model of the
world outside. But as the 1960s progressed, Kerr learned the hard way that the
relationship between campus and world is not so straightforward. Kerr was ultimately
relieved of his position as UC President by Ronald Reagan, Governor of California, who
compelled Kerr’s resignation in the fallout of the Free Speech Movement confrontations
between students and administrators at UC Berkeley beginning in 1964, which hinged on
the campus prohibition against outside political groups advertising on campus. The
problem, in other words, was precisely that the campus was supposed to be prevented at
all costs from modelling the world beyond it. Mario Savio, speaking on behalf of the
FSM, attacked Kerr for treating the university as an impersonal “factory” churning out
atomized conformists, and in a famous speech Savio urged the crowd to repudiate the
machine—“put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all
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the apparatus, and you’ve got to make it stop.”123 Kerr’s resignation effectively
eliminated internal resistance to Reagan’s plan to implement tuition in the University of
California system, laying the groundwork for an even more extensive elaboration of the
administrative ranks of the multiversity bank-rolled by student debt.
Is the campus a model for utopian communities generally, or a special case of
spatialized social form? Today the word “campus” describes tech headquarters as much
as school grounds. Does this generalize its power as social form, or pervert it along the
same trajectory by which counter-culture has become techno-culture, and the
communitarian utopian ideals of the 1960s have become the hypertrophied individualism
of libertarian techno-futurists who now wield more power than the state under whose
auspices they nominally articulate their venture capitalist visions of progress as
speculation, data aggregation, and surveillance.124 How do temporary structures of
education become semi-permanent architectures of social reproduction? Architecture is in
this sense an applied science; how is it deployed to remodel the military industrial
complex as the pastoral urban renewal conglomerate?
Skinner turned to literature to explore scientific propositions about social form,
leaving behind rats, pigeons, and humans provisionally to investigate the problem of the
model community in the medium of the word. In the next section, I offer an example of
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architecture conceived as speech, and its consequences. The University of Oregon
administration tried to shut down the question of campus’s relation to society at large by
employing an architect with a utopian rhetoric of design. The Center for Environmental
Structure, employed by the university, proposed that architecture is a language. What it
discovered is that, as a language, building constitutes a form of speech and confronts the
same problems of free speech and its suppression by the university administration as
language on campus in general.

II. Oregon Experiment
Christopher Alexander’s A Pattern Language (1977), a manual for “towns,
buildings, construction,” takes as its premise that space is structured like a language, and
thus can be either poetic or prosaic. This theory of the built environment was born of a
strange engagement: in the early 1970s the University of Oregon hired Alexander, an
architectural theorist with counter cultural leanings and professor at UC Berkeley, and his
architectural group The Center for Environmental Structure. They were charged with
helping the university reconceptualize its planning and development protocols after
students protesting the Vietnam War took the university’s plans for logging industry
motivated on-campus renovation and ROTC expansion as their immediate sites of action.
Alexander helped devise “The Oregon Experiment,” intervening on student protest with
palliative architecture and revising the Master Plan for campus development into a
nominally collaborative community document, overlaying the authoritative decree of
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university administration bellowing from the heart of the military-industrial complex with
the dulcet tones of California zen. In the Master Plan state reason and university
administration speak in one voice to elaborate a speculative fiction expressing the
dystopian wish for a campus porous to real estate speculation and military intervention.
Alexander was invited to intervene on the tentacular expansion of the
administrative ranks of the multiversity through architectural redesign, but this invitation
was extended by the administration itself. He has faith that poetic buildings will foster a
vital politics of place, while the university knows that poetry is no match for its own
prosaic control of the campus space. Skinner appealed to literature to resolve a scientific
inquiry; Alexander proposes a certain identity between architecture and literature, both
formally structured by pattern languages the poetics of which activate a utopian potential
in the everyday. Language after semiotics could be an applied science; after informatics,
it could likewise be a building material.
The collaboration between the University of Oregon and the Center for
Environmental Structure resulted in a new draft of the campus master plan, published in
1975 as The Oregon Experiment.125 It begins with an overview of the most alienating
campuses in the world, and culminates in a list of corrective patterns that might be
submitted to new combinations to produce a salutary space of student thriving and
administrative optimization, and it proposes that these aims need not be at cross purposes.
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Its guiding principle is that “organic form” achieved through small scale, small budget
“piecemeal growth” is superior to large scale, big budget, donor-named architectural
show pieces—that in the long run, the former does more to sustain the university as
institution. In the figure above, the two columns on the left present the subset of a master
list of standard patterns that apply to universities. University campuses, like all
institutional spaces, many city spaces, and some domestic spaces, are composed of
variable combinations of “looped local roads,” “wings of light,” “main gateways,”
“connected buildings,” and “south facing outdoors,” among other things. Many kinds of
spaces could be generated using those components. As Alexander notes, “This list of 37
patterns is extremely general: It deals with problems of density, buildings, open space,
roads, and paths. It does not deal with the specific problems that a university confronts.”
The column on the right presents a supplementary list of university-specific patterns
developed through the Oregon Experiment, including “small student unions,” “classroom
distribution,” and “department hearth.”
Alexander and his colleagues at the Center for Environmental Structure published
The Oregon Experiment in 1975 as book three in a series, the preceding two volumes of
which would not be published until 1977 and 1979, respectively. Thus while The Oregon
Experiment purports to present a subset of a more comprehensive list of general patterns
to fit the special case of the university, in fact the university precedes the general building
patterns and the philosophical speculations on their most salutary combinations, which
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would subsequently appear in A Pattern Language: Towns, Building, Construction
(1977) and The Timeless Way of Building (1979).
The Oregon Experiment, like the other two volumes in the series, presupposes that
human thriving depends upon the homology between architectural dynamism and
organismic dynamism. The differentiation of social forms and spaces would ideally
proceed according to biological principles like mitosis, as the figure above illustrating
“the growth of a new department” indicates. One of the more extreme instances of the
formal restructuring of university life is the proposal that optimal academic department
size can be determined in advance based on the principles of organic form, and that the
structure of academic departments should be prescribed on this basis. Alexander writes,
“when a department is too large, students and faculty become alienated… Therefore:
Limit the size of any university department. Our current best estimate for the tolerable
maximum is 400 students plus faculty. When departments grow beyond this size, they
must be split to form new departments.” The presumption that departments are
differentiated on the basis of their epistemologies or objects of concern is supplanted by
the premise that they are differentiated primarily on the basis of their sense of
community, or their office space. This premise holds that academic departments take as
their organizational mandate the elimination of “alienation,” and the converse: that they
architecturally compel identification.
The Oregon Experiment uses captions and illustrations to cajole its readers into
perspectival alignment with its own design imperatives: “The University of California,
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Irvine Campus. Can the people of the community identify with this master plan?” “A
typical master plan. Can you understand what is going on here?” If the answer to these
rhetorical inquiries is presumably “no,” that may have as much to do with the fact that
these are a specialized genre of image, and if the reader—let alone “the people of the
community”—is anything but an architect or planner there would be no reason at all for
them to know in advance how to decode such an image. This, of course, is precisely
Alexander’s point—that architecture should be legible, from inception to construction, to
the people who inhabit it—but part of the reason his plan never took off is that “the
people of the community” are more concerned with attending classes at UC Irvine than
with erecting its classrooms. Concern for the classrooms over and above the learning that
is supposed to happen within them is a sign of something gone terribly awry, and
compelling that concern requires that the classroom itself be disturbing—like a barracks.
In 1947 war-time pre-fab temporary housing structures were purchased by the
University of Oregon and erected in a development called Amazon Family Housing for
married students, who at the time were mainly veterans and their families attending
Oregon on the GI Bill. The nominally temporary structures composing the Amazon
housing development in fact persisted for nearly half a century, and by the 1990s they
had deteriorated to such an extent that the university decided to address their decay. By
that time students with families were a demographically different prospect than they had
been in 1947, and what had been married student housing had been reclassified as low-
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cost housing.126 Responding to state fiscal imperatives that incentivized demolishing and
rebuilding rather than retrofitting, UO decided to raze the Amazon housing. The plan
became an issue. UO assembled a safety review board to produce a report in 1992 which
determined that, though the buildings posed no immediate threat to safety or health, they
would likely begin to present a fire hazard starting in 1996; and in 1996 they would be
demolished.
In the meantime Pat Hadley-Saisi, a graduate student in the master’s program in
Planning, Public Policy, and Management at the University of Oregon, entered a bid for
Amazon Family Housing to be recognized as a National Register Historic Site. Put
otherwise, as the Register-Guard reported at the time, “a graduate student uses the skills
she’s learned at UO to force the university to preserve a housing complex.”127 She set out
to use her master’s tools to preserve the houses the university was in the process of
dismantling. Hadley-Saisi argued for the preservation of the complex on the basis of its
link to the 1944 G.I. Bill, which she argued had wrought a historically unprecedented
reconfiguration of American housing design, of which the Amazon housing was an
exceptionally unaltered example—due to decades of neglect, its 1940s design had been
preserved. Over the course of 1994 the bid was approved, first by the city of Eugene,
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which caused delays and paperwork for campus admin, and then by the state of Oregon,
which caused more delays and more paper work and perversely self-satisfied
administrative annoyance that you might call ambivalence if it were not so brazenly just
self-congratulatory cognitive dissonance: “‘She did complicate things for us a lot,’ said
Dan Williams, UO vice president of administration. ‘But you can’t help but have some
sense of pride that what she has achieved has been the result of her education at the
UO.’”128 They were of two minds about their student’s learning.
In fact, the only thing that the National Register designation entailed materially
was that federal funds could not be used for demolition. UO proceeded as planned. The
National Register rescinded its designation once the site ceased to exist. Christopher
Alexander and the Center for Environmental Structure were brought in for the rebuild—
luxury dorms—and then fired in showy fashion when public relations got ugly. Four units
were spared, purchased by St. Vincent de Paul and spliced, relocated, reconfigured, and
bordered with a historically faithful WWII era white picket fence per the specs of the
National Register, whence they became low-cost housing once more.129
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The Amazon project was of course not the first time Oregon had appealed to
Alexander to resolve a thorny public relations problem with the palliative vocabularies of
participatory design. Oregon’s employment of Alexander in the 1990s represents the
extent of their tone-deafness, imagining that a strategy that proved effective in the 1970s
could be merely redeployed decades later without taking stock of the circumstances at
hand, and of their closed system of self-similar jargon: they had, by the 1990s, basically
abandoned in all but name the processes Alexander had earlier implemented, and so
invited him back to repopulate the shell of his idea hollowed out by its irrelevance to
university administration. It also demonstrates the fungibility of vocabularies of
architectural “vitality” and those of “urban revitalization,” where intentional community
may mean separatist commune until it means eminent domain, and the distinction hinges
upon whose intention is meant to be the organizing one.
The most recent version of The University of Oregon Campus Plan (Third
Edition) states, in peculiar passive voice, that:
By 1973 the need for a new plan was acknowledged, and the Center for
Environmental Structure, headed by Christopher Alexander, was retained for that
purpose. The result of this collaboration between the Center for Environmental
Structure and the university was The Oregon Experiment. Instead of creating a
static fixed-image master plan The Oregon Experiment established a process by
which development decisions could be made on an ongoing basis. This concept
acknowledges the fact that the exact nature and magnitude of future changes
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cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty, and that object-oriented plans
based on explicit assumptions about the future become outdated as the ‘future’
becomes known.130
“By 1973 the need for a new plan” was indeed “acknowledged,” but forcibly: student
protesters took action on two glaring emblems of the campus’s openness to industrial and
military interests—a logging road that ran through campus frequented by trucks and
machinery, and the ROTC building, which students occupied and variously attempted to
dismantle. And thus Alexander’s first engagement with Oregon began in 1970, when the
university, floundering between the cautionary tale of Kent State and the intolerable
interruption to university business as usual that its own brewing student movement
threatened, sought an aesthetic solution to its material impasse. The answer was
participatory. Process is all.
Alexander’s commitment to participatory planning of architectures to maximize
vitality and aliveness demands an abstract identification with one’s institutional role,
function, and habitus as life-force: what space will make you feel most alive, where
“you” is understood to mean that version or aspect of you that is a secretary, department
chair, student worker, janitor, professor, lab technician, or what have you.
It is not always the case that universities construct deliberately obstructionist
architectures to thwart student organizing—though they certainly have done so, as the
supposedly “riot-proof” brutalist campuses of UC Irvine and elsewhere readily attest.
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Rather, universities as often enlist students in the planning of their own palliative
environments to so busy them with reshaping the university that they have no time or
incentive to organize within its walls. Alexander’s implicit demand that “the people of
the community identify with the master plan” may have been intended as an invitation to
reconceive of master planning, but in effect registers equally as an insistence on the
assimilation of the university’s speculative fantasy of its form into the identity of its
inhabitants. The fractalization of university self-registration in which reports generate
more reports, rather than resolutions, obeys a similar logic: the bureaucratization of
architectural development that converts subjects of the institution into its ceaselessly
engaged commentators and elaborators.
Alexander adjudicates the success or failure of the built environment on the basis
of its “vitality,” which he “diagnosed” according to a multifactorial analysis of its poetic
interface with its inhabitants. The current Oregon Campus Planning Office translates
Alexander’s principle of “diagnosis” into the vocabularies of actuarial state planning:
“existing conditions”: “The purpose of diagnosis studies is to record the existing
conditions of the campus as they relate to the university Campus Plan’s policies and
patterns. […] The principle of diagnosis is one of the six basic principles of the planning
process adopted by the university in 1974, known as ‘The Oregon Experiment’, and
elaborated upon in the Campus Plan.” Elaborated upon—which may as well mean overwritten. The product of Alexander’s collaboration with Oregon was not a building but a
book. And the “experiment” named in that book’s title was not an experiment in

136

architecture, but an experiment in the university’s infrastructural vocabulary, an opening
of that vocabulary to the concept of the “future” in scare-quotes, an “experimental”
disposition towards its own “development decisions” that converts a “static fixed-image
master plan” into an ongoing “process.” At least one Quonset hut remains on the Oregon
campus: it houses the Campus Planning office.

III. Science Fiction / Science Fact
Reflecting in 1976 on the reception of Walden Two (1948), Skinner notes that
upon its initial publication the book went virtually unnoticed for “a dozen years. Then it
began to sell.” He attributes this late “awakened interest” to the closing in of reality on
what “was, at the time, little more than science fiction.” Skinner “had thought that an
experimental analysis of behavior could be applied to practical problems, but [he] had not
proved it. The 1950’s, however, saw the beginnings of what the public has come to know
as behavior modification” (vi). And by the 1960s, “a technology of behavior was no
longer a figment of the imagination. Indeed, to many people it was altogether too real”
(vii).131 Skinner attributes the success of his novel to the incidental realism it acquired as
reality changed around it. Passing from “little more than science fiction” to the
“altogether too real,” his utopian novel finally found its dystopian audience. What his
account misrecognizes is that between 1948 and 1976, it is not the genre of his novel that
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changed, but rather the meaning of genre. In 1948, a speculative fiction of behavioral
modification was not “little more than science fiction,” it was simply bad science fiction.
Skinner’s novel did not pass from science fiction to realism, but rather from
uncompelling to exceedingly relevant science fiction. In the intervening dozen years, his
conceit became not so much “real” as eminently science fictional, as the domain of
science fictional engagement with the world shifted towards the near-future, the soft
sciences, and the realm of human behavior—newly captivating to both science and
science fiction.
In the moment between Walden Two’s 1948 publication and its 1970s acclaim,
science fiction became as interested in the terrestrial world as it had been in
extraterrestrial life. The title of Isaac Asimov’s 1957 short story collection, Earth Is
Room Enough, might as well be the motto of this movement, signaling a larger shift
underway that finds it full realization in the new wave science fiction of the 1970s. But,
in fact, earth was not room enough—the population crisis of the late 60s, which is the
central focus of Chapter 4, changed the tenor of the idea of “space” such that space age
science fictions found new material in the limited space on Earth. Science fiction became
as interested in the so-called “population bomb” as it had been in the atomic bomb, and it
set to work imagining the mechanisms of social reproduction that would be necessary to
sustain a culture forged on the premise of ever-increasing numbers of people living in
finite space. Science fiction encountered a scale problem: how to construct a model
community for growing numbers.
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Exemplary of this shifting focus was Robert Silverberg, who, around 1970,
transformed his writing style by transforming his working style.132 Silverberg had been
publishing science fiction stories and novels regularly since the 1950s on a strict
schedule, producing roughly “twenty to thirty pages a day of publishable copy,” five days
a week—fifteen or so pages before lunch, and another fifteen after, sometimes producing
as much as a complete 7,500-word short story in a single day. “During the late sixties”
Silverberg ceased writing “like a machine” and struggled to articulate a different
relationship between his writing and ideas (214, 213). Symptomatizing the shift in the
science fiction field from pulp periodicals to proper literary production, Silverberg notes
that his “years as a high-volume producer had given me skills to say what I wanted to say
clearly and effectively in a single try. What I wanted to say, though, became ever more
complex and difficult to express, [and] writing novels, once a job of two or three weeks,
has become an endless procedure” (214-215). The first novel he wrote in this new style
was The World Inside (1970).
The World Inside sets out from the population crisis of the late 1960s and
extrapolates a dystopian resolution to the crisis in the form of a radical reconfiguration of
the infrastructures of the planet to sustain ever-increasing numbers of human beings.
Rather than colonizing a distant planet with greener pastures, Silverberg plots an inward
turn: the whole world is indoors, within the confines of towering skyscrapers called
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Urban Monads, or Urbmons. Set in 2381 in Urban Monad 116 in the Chipitts
constellation, the novel imagines a world that has resolved the population crisis of the
1950s by “verticalizing.” The name “Chipitts” gestures towards the discourse of
megalopolis emergent in the 1960s that predicted the future of American social form
recast in urban agglomerations whose new names would be portmanteaus of their
constituent cities—Chipitts (Chicago to Pittsburgh), Boswash (Boston to Washington,
D.C.), Sansan (San Diego to San Francisco).133 The residents of the Urbmons in The
World Inside have outlived this era of urban sprawl and reconfigured its horizontal
extension into vertical stacks. They have forsaken the natural world as well as the
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historical world of human civilization and reconsolidated the Earth’s population into a
network of thousand-storey skyscrapers. Each floor of these skyscrapers has been
assigned the name of a now-uninhabitable city of the “ancient” world outside: Paris,
Rome, Shanghai, London, Prague, and so on; Pittsburgh houses the archives, Louisville
hosts the administrative offices. Each chapter inhabits the real-time, present-tense
consciousness of a different resident: a sociologist, a historian, an urban planner, a
housewife, and a rock star, all experiencing slow-burning existential crises reaching fever
pitch at the moment the narration enters their heads. Each of these characters is
differently struggling to achieve perspective in a world with no outside.
Here is the historian, Jason Quevedo, mid-crisis: “He must perform a double act
of imagination: it is necessary for him to see that vanished world from within, as though
he lived in it, and then he must try to see the urbmon society as it might seem to someone
wafted forward from the twentieth century. The magnitude of the task dismays him” (6970).134 Quevedo is at work on a historical-sociological tract called The Urban Monad as
Social Evolution: Parameters of the Spirit Defined by Community Structure. He is
obsessed with trying to understand how spaces shape their inhabitants over time, a
question that is not only unanswerable but nearly unaskable in his monadic cultural
context. His method is to inhabit the subjectivity of a citizen of the twentieth century, to
speak to himself “the sort of words an intelligent liberal American of, say, 1958 would
use” (70). His devil’s advocate offers him this rejoinder to the dream of the Urbmon’s
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unchecked proliferation of human lives: “But what good is letting them exist, if the best
they can hope for is a box inside a box inside a box? What about the quality of life?”
(71).
The Matroyshka doll figure (“a box inside a box inside a box”) that empowers the
human sciences to make bold leaps of scale is literalized in the architecture and
infrastructure of the Urban Monad as dystopian cell, self-similarity recast as totalitarian
suppression. If it is accepted as premise that changes in scale do not—cannot—amount to
changes in form, then the prospect of collective organizing is evacuated of its
transformative potential, and obedience and conformity cannot help but follow. This
amounts in the novel to a self-reproductive ecstasy that forms the major premise of this
dystopia of 2381: everyone’s highest aim is to reproduce wantonly, literalizing again the
principle of self-similarity at the scale of the individual. Their children are uniformly
referred to as “littles,” a byword for their world’s self-similar replicative logic of
reproduction. It is a novel written in the present tense for a people who have eugenically
eliminated discontinuity from their epistemological toolkit—urbmon society is so
thoroughly self-similar that there is no opportunity for, and nothing to be gained from,
historical reflection.
In The World Inside, there is no history, and there is no outside; there is only the
inner space of institutional interiors and the lonely depths of human interiority. Rather
than abandoning the despoiled Earth for another planet, The World Inside rewrites the
space age as the age of inner space. This is exemplary of a larger trend in science fiction
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based on the sense that history had caught up to, or even outpaced, its predictive fictional
speculations. Sociologist Yole G. Sills, writing in 1968 about the utility of science fiction
to the social sciences, noted that “with the closing of the gap between imaginative pseudo
science and almost prosaic reality, with the advent of atomic power plants, satellite traffic
jams, and space walks, popular interest in the fictionalized potential of the physical
sciences has become jaded. There is mounting evidence that it is being superseded by a
fascination with the potential applications of the social sciences” (474).135
Beginning at least as early as the Gernsback era of the 1920s, science fiction had
been defined as fundamentally future-oriented, a genre of prediction. Samuel Delany
offers a typical schema by which to differentiate science fiction from other genres:
science fiction consists in “events that have not happened,” as distinct from literary
fiction generally, or what he calls “naturalistic fiction,” which is about “events that could
have happened,” and fantasy, which is about “events that could not have happened”
(34).136 Delany defines science fiction as fundamentally future-oriented, not necessarily
prescriptive but definitively predictive. In his speech to the Science Fiction Writers of
America in 1971, Jack Williamson proposed that its predictive power made science
fiction “good medicine for future shock,” the disorientation bred by rapid technological
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and social change roiling mainstream Americans entering the 1960s.137 But as science
fiction’s predicted futures were realized in the present, the genre’s social function seemed
less clear. When history seemed to have caught up to the most expansive predictions of
science fiction, how did the genre redefine itself and its capacities around a new set of
relations to historical circumstance?
Writing in 1953, Ray Bradbury described the strange discovery that a short novel
he had written, “intended as science fiction,” seemed to have become all too real.138 “I
thought I was writing a story of prediction, describing a world that might evolve in four
or five decades. But only a month ago, in Beverly Hills one night,” he saw the premise of
his story being played out by his neighbors. “This was not science fiction. This was a new
fact in our changing society. As you can see, I must start writing very fast indeed about
our future world in order to stand still. I thought I had raced ahead of science… In the
long haul, science pulled abreast, tipped its hat, and fed me the dust [because of] my
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failure to count on certain psychological needs which demanded satisfaction earlier than I
supposed” (364). Bradbury offers a re-definition of science fiction for these new
historical circumstances: it is “the fiction of ideas, the fiction where philosophy can be
tinkered with, torn apart, and put back together again, it is the fiction of sociology and
psychology and history compounded and squared by time.” He differentiates science
fiction from other genres on the basis of its special capacity to address these issues, only
recently alien to its concerns but now in its purview alone: “If you try to cram
philosophical and sociological theories into the non-science-fiction tale, you more often
than not wind up with more crust than filling. It takes a very agile writer indeed to keep a
book together under such conditions” (365). In Bradbury’s estimation, science fiction is
the privileged genre for philosophical, sociological, psychological, and historical
investigation—no longer just predictive, now engaged.
Bradbury notes that a failure to account for the pressing significance of
“psychological needs” prevented his predictive science fiction from outpacing his reality.
The science fictional turn to inner life that would follow in the next decades centered
psychological concerns to embolden its predictive scope. Science fiction needed a further
frontier for its extrapolative imaginations and found it even deeper within.
In 1953, for a volume on Modern Science Fiction: Its Meaning and Its Future,
Isaac Asimov wrote “Social Science Fiction,” entreating his fellow authors to train their
speculative gaze upon pressing social problems, and to train their creative energies on
extrapolating possible transformations of them. In 1962 J.G. Ballard wrote “Which Way
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to Inner Space?” in which he argued, like Asimov, that reality has caught up to the
wildest galactic and ballistic imaginations of science fiction and so the genre must get
serious and undertake an exploration of the real final frontier: the human mind. These are
two way-stations mapping out respectively the incipient and fully-realized articulation of
the position usually associated with “New Wave” science fiction and its turn to the “soft”
sciences and to character, psychology, and interiority.
The New Wave is the name for the school of sci-fi authors affiliated with Michael
Moorcock’s magazine New Worlds. Moorcock and his affiliates were based in the UK,
including a core of British authors and some Americans living in London. Samuel Delany
has vocally protested his conscription into that school in the historiography of science
fiction (as well as the conscription of his fellow American social science fictionists,
particularly Ursula Le Guin who is often made into a kind of poster child of American
New Wave), insisting that developments in a literary field as demotic as science fiction
are poorly captured by models borrowed from literary history (“schools,” networks of
affiliation around key publications, celebrities, or institutions, etc.), and that in any case
he had never published in New Worlds anyway.139 But a better distinction might be drawn
along the lines of divergence between Britain and America as world powers. Moorcock’s
New Wave science fiction was activating a decolonial imaginary, taking up themes like
lost worlds regained, cultures reconstituted and transformed, infrastructures of
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connectivity—a kind of reparative anthropology. The American equivalent instead
nominated the campus as its final frontier of experimental interiority. (And not just in
science fiction. As scholarship on cold war era student exchange programs; the rise of
inter-disciplines, area studies, and minority fields; and foundation funded research and
foreign policy has made clear, the campus is a crucial testing ground for and site of
American imperialism.)140 As a literary project to harness campus unrest into novelistic
form, this sci-fi was largely conservative even when it thought itself sympathetic to the
student protests whose energies and imaginaries it aimed to extrapolate. Skinner’s science
fictional campus novel was just a little ahead of its time. But the questions Skinner’s
novel raised about utopian education and the role of fiction as variously propaganda,
education, advertisement, and entertainment remained major concerns of science fiction
throughout the ensuing decades and up through especially the early 1970s.
The perception that empirical history had caught up to the wildest imaginations of
science fiction eroded its claim on the speculative in a way that, rather than threatening
the genre’s most fundamental definition, emboldened it to claim a new social relevance.
As Isaac Asimov put it in “Social Science Fiction,” “until 1945 it was only too easy to
dismiss science fiction as ‘weird stuff’ […] And then a weapon right out of science
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fiction ends WWII and changes the balance of power on Earth” (176). Asimov proposes
that authors should capitalize on this shifting ground of realism to assert and exploit the
relevance of their fictions to “accustom the reader to the notion of change” (189), a task
for which the genre is uniquely suited insofar as it amounts to “social experimentation on
paper” (192). Asimov offers “social science fiction” as the name for this engaged science
fiction, and defines it as “that branch of literature which is concerned with the impact of
scientific advance upon human beings” (158), in which “scientific advance” is broadly
construed to refer to modernity itself. Asimov further stipulates that “social science
fiction is the only branch of science fiction that is sociologically significant, and that
those stories, which are generally accepted as science fiction… but do not fall within the
definition I have given above, are not significant, however amusing they may be and
however excellent as pieces of fiction” (159). Asimov proposes that in its sociologically
significant form, “science fiction is the literature of social change” (189), and that “the
contribution science fiction can make to society is that of accustoming its readers to the
thought of the inevitability of continuing change and the necessity of directing and
shaping that change rather than opposing it blindly or blindly permitting it to overwhelm
us” (196).
Robert Heinlein echoed Asimov’s assessment, writing in 1959: “By means of
science fiction one can (as one does in mathematics) examine the extremes of a social
problem, search it for inflexures, feel out its changing slopes… Science fiction joyously
tackles the real and pressing problems of our race, wrestles with them, never ignores
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them—problems which other forms of fiction cannot challenge. For this reason I assert
that science fiction is the most realistic, the most serious, the most significant, the most
sane and healthy and human fiction being published today” (44-45).141
In his address to the Science Fiction Writers of America convention in 1971,
Frederik Pohl cast skepticism on the idea that the predictive capacity of science fiction
was its signal social contribution, proposing that “the whole study of the future is
misconceived,” and offering instead that “there is no real value in predicting the future…
The real reason for looking into the future is to decide what kind of world you want to
live in and to try to make it become reality.”142 Science fiction was not predictive, that is,
but prescriptive—a tool for shaping collective aspirations for a transformed world—a
utopian literature.
Robert Silverberg followed The World Inside with Dying Inside (1972),
deepening the theme of inner space by recasting the dystopian vitality festering in the
domestic interior of the urban monad as the necrotic interiority of a telepathic
misanthrope slowly losing his powers. Dying Inside tells the story of Columbia
University alum David Selig, now middle-aged, under-employed, and completely
unremarkable except for the fact that he was born in possession of a penetrating
telepathic insight into the minds of others. Davis has spent his life skating by, and he has,
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in a sense, never left college. He makes a living by cruising the Columbia campus for
undergraduates looking for someone to ghost-write their term papers, a task for which he
is exceptionally skilled on account of his telepathic capacity to inhabit his clients’
authorial voices. He can write papers that read as if sprung from their own minds. But
David’s powers are on the wane for reasons he cannot explain, receding like his hairline
as he ages into his otherwise perfect mediocrity.
In 1973 Dying Inside was awarded the inaugural John Campbell “special award
for excellence in writing,” introducing a new criterion for evaluating science fiction:
good writing. Dying Inside is somewhat aberrant as an instance of science fiction in that
it is a character study, bucking against one of the signal tenets of the genre that holds that
even seemingly individualized protagonists of science fiction are always fundamentally
personifications of an idea or stand-ins for a collectivity. For instance, one of Joanna
Russ’s propositions about the genre in “Towards an Aesthetics of Science Fiction” holds
that “despite superficial similarities to naturalistic (or other) modern fiction, the
protagonists of science fiction are always collective, never individual persons (although
individuals often appear as exemplary or representative figures),” and further that
“science fiction’s emphasis is always on phenomena—to the point where reviewers and
critics can commonly use such phrases as ‘the idea as hero.’”143 But Dying Inside is a
very peculiar kind of character study—it grows into the form as it prunes the telepathic
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synapses of its central character, stepwise singularizing his psychology by slowly
eliminating its most singular characteristic. As the novel progresses and David’s
telepathy dissipates, he must develop for the first time a theory of mind to replace his
telepathic technique. The question of inter-subjectivity—the problem of other people—
arises anew for David as his mind erodes his ability to stand in for others himself.
David is turned in to campus authorities by a disgruntled client whose paper he
has botched, unable to summon sufficient telepathic insight to write it convincingly, but
needing the money enough to try to fake it. Processed through the system of university
administration that oversees his infraction against school policy, which lands him
ultimately in the office of the Dean—also a Columbia University alum, and David’s
former classmate—David confronts what justice means within the university as total
institution. In that climactic moment he realizes that the campus, inside of which he has
spent the better part of his life, is not a model of America but rather its most dystopian
parody. David is losing his power to connect to other people, and his last chance at social
integration is to seize the opportunity for re-education that the Dean, pitying his arrested
development, offers to him in lieu of a penalty. But David is so repelled by the inwardfacing smugness of the university administration that he sees the Dean’s invitation to
become a “research assistant” not as a rehabilitation program, but as an extra-legal ruse to
entrap him in the internecine workings of the university.
David begs to be turned in to the authorities. The idea that his fate will be
adjudicated internally by college deans is a worse prospect than imprisonment, for in the
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university, unlike the prison, there really is no outside. As the Dean narrates to David a
speculative trajectory for his rehabilitation, beginning as a research assistant and working
up the para-academic ranks of the university hierarchy, David convulses with the
thought; his consciousness flags and he experiences visions of himself cut lose from
Columbia, Manhattan, the planet itself, losing not just his telepathic powers but his entire
identity—the subsequent chapters of the novel unfold in a placeless discursive reverie, a
patchwork of fragmented dreams and memories issuing from we know not whose
consciousness. The university as universe collapses scales, and with its alignment of
campus with cosmos makes of the former: everything. This is the campus novel in the
age of the multiversity. Administration itself takes on the quality of the monstrously
science fictional, and the campus is an alien heterotopia as disorienting as a distant
planet.
The World Inside is about architectural interiors, and its privileged form is the
skyscraper; Dying Inside digs even deeper into interiority as a problem for collectivity
and locates its privileged form in the campus. In this respect, Dying Inside is
exemplary—the inward turn of science fiction ends up more often than not on campus, a
site where architecture, infrastructure, and interiority are ideally fused in a special
symbiotic relation in the scene of education and site of the alchemy of social
reproduction. The campus poses the problem of the relation between interior space and
interiority, how to change minds inside institutional forms that are meant to endure.
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Readings of the campus novel as spiteful satire highlighting the insularity of
academic culture in the confines of a cloistered campus neglect the significant science
fictional manipulations of the genre that play with scale and animate the literary historical
collapse between the literary marketplace and the literary critical field that has sometimes
been called “the program era.”144 The campus in the imaginary conjured by the campus
novels of the 1940s was an insular and petty place, whose smallness of mind and grounds
alike condemned it to self-aggrandizing irrelevance. But in the 1950s it seemed a
plausible “model of America,” and by the early 1970s it seemed positively futuristic,
roiled by student activism and patrolled by modern military, and a spate of science
fictions became increasingly interested in the campus as setting and social problem.145
What did campus fiction become in the age of the multiversity? One answer is: science
fiction.
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IV. Model Thinking
This chapter is about the campus as a site of articulation of science fiction and
campus novel in the postwar era as genres of education and national extrapolation, that is,
as genres of institutional critique and imagination uniquely poised for this task by a
convergence between literary history and world history that positions “scale” as the
organizing rubric of the period. Scale is implicated alike in questions of cultural value,
disciplinary epistemology, infrastructure, and demography—not least the infrastructure
and demography of education. The immediate postwar period sees an unprecedented
boost in college enrollments, and a vast expansion of the American system of institutions
of higher education exemplified by Clark Kerr’s tripartite California model of community
college, state college, and research university.
The concerns of the science fiction field were well matched to the epochal
transformations contemporaneously remaking the social function of the American
university system. If Kerr’s nomination of this new educational-bureaucratic form as the
“multiversity” did not already resound as eminently science fictional, widespread
nominations of the campus as science fictional setting drove the point home more
directly. Consider, for example, Ursula Le Guin’s heterotopic imagination of a
mathematician space traveling into a Visiting Assistant Professorship at the university of
a neighboring planet in The Dispossessed (1974)—which I will discuss further below.
Likewise Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five (1969), which offers a speculative
recasting of Chicago-school anthropology through Billy Pilgrim’s alien abduction into
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captivity in a human zoo where he is held for observation by extraterrestrial investigators
of the human condition. John Barth’s epic extrapolation of the punning conflation of
universe and university in Giles Goat-Boy, or the Revised New Syllabus (1966) imagines
the campus as a world unto itself made in the image of the cybernetic deity who likewise
spawned its prophet, the Grand Tutor. The scale shift aggrandizing the campus in the
cultural imaginary seemed a ready-made science fictional premise begging for literary
extrapolation.
The recasting of higher education as mass education was part of a broader effort
to ensure that aggregated Americans operated as Leviathanic constituents of a democratic
body politic rather than radicalized masses of an impending revolution or the conformist
adherents to a repressive communism. Chapter 2 touched on the state-engineered
democratization of cultural production, what Loren Glass has called “vulgar modernism,”
or the becoming-sociological of the literary avant-garde under pressure of McCarthyist
obscenity law.146 The “cold war modernist” reading of abstract expressionism and
affiliated aesthetic movements of the post-WWII period as CIA endorsed prophylaxis
against communist conformism is instructive here.147 The state-curated novels of the
Armed Services Editions sent to WWII servicemen overseas that planted the seeds of the
postwar “paperback revolution,” mentioned in Chapter 2, laid some of the early
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groundwork for these developments.148 This democratization or vulgarization of literary
culture conspires with world historical developments in science and warfare to generate a
skepticism about the continued relevance of high literary forms as well as about the
ability of language per se to withstand the assault on its descriptive power being waged
by ascendant vocabularies of science in general and number in particular. Other
representational modalities and logics of social description were nominated, and narrative
was submitted to iterative extrapolation in defense strategy scenario planning, simulation,
and modeling.149
Contemporary scholarship attempting to articulate a political program for the
humanities in crisis has proposed, among other things, a style of “model thinking” that
sees the germ of utopian community incubating in the bureaucratic recesses of the
academic department as social form.150 This idea has an under-acknowledged history,
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experiencing the height of its popularity in the cold war when an ideology of free
thinking individualism seemed the best bulwark against communist conformism, and in
turn seemed best embodied by the expressive arts and interpretive humanities.151
Contemporary nostalgia for the welfare state, the privileged role of the campus, and of
the humanities in particular, neglects the historical conditions of possibility for this
privileging of university as “model community”: the identity of welfare state and warfare
state that finds in the humanities a mechanism for generating human capital and a deep
cover for its imperatives to anti-communist totalitarian governance.
Clark Kerr proposed that the governance of the multiversity was akin to the
United Nations; far from a merely convenient analogy, this was in fact a proposition that
had been taken quite seriously. The International Social Science Council (ISSC), founded
in 1948 as one of several academic councils constituting a new research arm of the
United Nations, funded studies into, among other things, academic forms as models for
international politics. In 1968 the ISSC published the results of a decade-long
collaborative study of “the small conference” conducted by anthropologist Margaret
Mead and photographer of human behavior Paul Byers. In the resulting book, The Small
Conference: An Innovation in Communication, Mead wrote Part I, “The Conference
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Process,” beginning with an account of the historical emergence of the conference as a
new post-WWII communications form developed out of a confluence of research on
group dynamics in professional, therapeutic, and other settings. Byers presented his
photographs of “many to many communication” at three different types of conference
with an analytical discussion in Part II, “Still Photography as a Method of Conference
Analysis.”152 The Small Conference relies on its own kind of model thinking, offering
photographic documentation of a few minutes of conference proceedings as indicative of
larger social dynamics and communication principles—“this conference lasted four days.
I shall examine in detail a segment lasting about four minutes” (65).
The kind of model thinking underwriting the small conference study depends on
the premise of scale invariance, the idea that changes in scale do not entail changes in
form, and that premises established at small scales will remain true at large ones. This
was a premise of much postwar social theory, enthralled with the self-similarity of fractal
mathematics that finds, the deeper it looks, only ever more of the same.153 This logic
underwrites imperialism as an expression of democratic freedom, premising a global
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monoculture cultivated by a single world power as an extension of the model community
of social contract at scale, to the world at large. The academy might be a “model
America,” and America, in turn, a model nation. This idea was subtended not by a sense
of homology between national forms, but rather by the premise that American
exceptionalism could be generalized: the exception proves the rule—model thinking.
Recent returns to form and formalism in literary studies have taken up that idea in
its most capacious sense, insisting on a formalism that would bridge seamlessly between
literary forms and architectural ones, and extend to abstract social forms like patriarchy
as well as concrete institutional forms, like schools. This is a provocative premise, and a
seductive one: it radically extends the remit of literary studies, not by capitulating to the
expansive prestige of quantitative methods like those of the digital humanities nor by
insisting that, il n’y a pas de hors-texte, everything is a species of literature. Rather, it
suggests a ubiquity not of the literary object but that literary methods have a special
ability to identify forms that shape not just works of literature but also the worlds in
which they circulate and the people who read them.
Christopher Alexander and the Center for Environmental Structure helped the
University of Oregon take what could have been an unsettling reconfiguration of their
institution of social reproduction into an architecture of social transformation, and
convert it instead into an endlessly self-referential process. This is exemplary of model
thinking generally, which in the last instance can imagine nothing but more of itself.
Echoing Alexander’s premises about the vital politics of architectural pattern languages,
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recent criticism on the politics of form takes it for granted that a poetics of the built
environment will enhance its humanity, that forms structured like language are better
forms for collective life. But words are the raw materials of poems as well as propaganda.
Insisting on formal continuity between word and world invites this loophole of design:
forms have affordances for those in power, too.154
Samuel Delany and Marilyn Hacker, in the introduction to the final issue of
QUARK, their short-lived “quarterly of speculative fiction,” caution that “fiction makes
models of reality. But often we need models for observations of an accuracy and
sophistication beyond that of the country school house” (9).155 Delany and Hacker draw
attention to the margins of error of modeling, which are not to be ignored but rather
exploited for their illustrative power. They begin their discussion by emphasizing that
“even a statement like 2+3=5 is only a model of ‘the real world.’ As a model it represents
the world only more or less accurately” (7). Ideally, model thinking emphasizes not scale
invariance but rather the discontinuities between forms literary or mathematical and the
world they are meant to model, in order to question again the logic of modeling itself as
representational strategy for understanding how to change the world for the better.
Other writers at the time saw in the logic of university as model America not an
opportunity for transformative politics but rather a claustrophobic constraint on literary
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art. This era was decried by the likes of Gore Vidal as one beset by a pandemic of “Unovels” written by teachers merely to be taught, confirming the self-similar logics of
university administration. Vidal prognosticates that according to this logic, already
pervasive, “eventually the novel will simply be an academic exercise, written by
academics to be used in classrooms in order to test the ingenuity of students. A
combination of Rorschach test and anagram. Hence, the popularity of John Barth, a
perfect U-novelist whose books are written to be taught, not to be read.”156 Mark
McGurl’s The Program Era substantiates Vidal’s suspicions with literary historical
context, “track[ing] a period in which institutions, not individuals, have come to the fore
as the sine qua non of postwar literary production” (368). McGurl’s study reveals the
interaction between literary market and literary critical field through the creative writing
program, wherein the university becomes an active participant in structuring the literary
market by credentialing writers with a particular style of literary critical expertise and a
particular inward-facing reverence for the campus. Science fiction shows this interaction
between market and criticism in a different way—the interaction between the genre
system and the professionalizing humanities and human sciences. Chapter 1 examined the
conditions by which quantification acquired the authority to tell society who and what it
is; this chapter is about who and what has the authority to tell society what it should be.
The claustrophobic closed-system that nominated the university as model community
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demanded a reconception of utopianism in the university. This charge was led by a
confluence of social theory and science fiction in the form of social science fiction—the
“sociology of the possible.”

V. Sociology of the Possible
In 1969 Professor Thomas Clareson of the Wooster College Department of
English transcribed a tape-recording of the 1968 MLA Forum on Science Fiction for
circulation to his university colleagues, not unlike John Barth who framed his cybernetic
campus novel Giles Goat-Boy, or The Revised New Syllabus as a transcription of the
mythology of the university recorded on two reels of tape. Clareson’s transcription was
published in the May 1969 issue of Extrapolation, the science fiction journal he founded
a decade earlier.157 The theme of the Forum was “Science Fiction: The New Mythology,”
a revised new syllabus indeed, and it featured presentations by preeminent sci-fi scholar
Darko Suvin, and author-critics Isaac Asimov and Frederik Pohl. The preliminary
remarks of the panel moderator Bruce Franklin address the resistance with which the
study of science fiction has been met in the academy. He notes that as the “Seminar has
developed and we have moved toward something like this Forum, it has been necessary
to present many arguments about the legitimacy of this area in our field” (70). But he
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frames these battles in terms of curricular revisions rankling his colleagues in
departments of English generally, citing suspicions of science fiction as one piece of a
larger skepticism “about the relevancy of literature to life, and the whole question of what
kind of literature is appropriate to be taught in colleges and universities” (70).
When the Q&A was opened to the audience, Robert Silverberg—commenting, as
the transcription reads, “off-mike”—was the first to intervene: “My name is Robert
Silverberg, and I have no academic affiliation, but I do write science fiction. I’d like to
take issue with every word that has been spoken” (94). Silverberg is given the
microphone and elaborates his point, “I really must deplore the unanimity of opinion that
came from this platform, because it seems to me you gentlemen were all expressing a
utilitarian and not a literary view of science fiction that is rather dreary to a practicing
writer. You were speaking almost entirely of the predictive role of science fiction” (94).
He continues by specifying that “prediction, though of course an important part of
science fiction, is nevertheless never a very successful part of science fiction… I wonder
if there could be some discussion of that role of science fiction: science fiction as
literature” (95). Science fiction as “prediction,” as we saw above, was by 1968 an
outmoded way of describing the central aims of the genre. Silverberg intervened on the
academic “unanimity” being consolidated at the MLA to aerate the critical discourse with
a sense of the new designs for science fiction as literature.
Science fiction author-critic Joanna Russ began her 1975 article “Towards an
Aesthetic of Science Fiction” by addressing the question of science fiction as literature
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head-on: “Is science fiction literature? Yes. Can it be judged by the usual literary criteria?
No” (112).158 She elaborates that
the access of academic interest in science fiction that has occurred during the last
few years has led to considerable difficulty. Not only do academic critics find
themselves imprisoned by habitual (and unreflecting) condescension in dealing
with this particular genre; quite often their critical tools, however finely honed,
are simply not applicable to a body of work that—despite its superficial
resemblance to realistic or naturalistic twentieth-century fiction—is
fundamentally a drastically different form of literary art.
Its distinguishing feature is, Russ proposes, “that science fiction… is didactic.” While
this might seem to make it perfectly suited to the English classroom, it is precisely the
criterion of its didacticism that condemns it as juvenilia and prohibits its valorization as
legitimate literary art. Russ observes that many professionals “take easily and kindly to
science fiction,” counting among them “city planners, architects, archaeologists,
engineers, rock musicians, anthropologists, and nearly everybody except most English
professors.” By Russ’s estimation, English professors need to catch up with the
subculture—“rock musicians”—and the applied and social sciences of the day that find in
science fiction their most imaginative elaboration as practices of world-making.
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Theodore Sturgeon, writing in 1972 for the New York Times Book Review, where
he had a weekly column starting in the mid-1960s, noted that “We are in the midst of a
science fiction boom. Unhappily, however, it seems to be most marketable when it isn’t
called science fiction and when it is written by people who never appeared in Analog or
Galaxy or The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction.” He concurs with Kingsley
Amis, who “once mordantly described the general public’s attitude toward science fiction
thus: ‘This is good! It can’t be science fiction!’ and ‘This is science fiction! It can’t be
good!’” Sturgeon perversely attributes the derogation of science fiction to an outsized
cultural scientism that provokes a desire to destroy its idols: “Do we worship science?
You can bet your holy tithe we do. And do we jump at the chance of scorning something
with ‘science’ as part of its name? I submit to you that this is the source of the effort to
make of science fiction [an escapist juvenile pastime] which it simply refuses to be. I
believe that with any other name—‘extrapolative,’ ‘speculative,’ ‘knowledge-fiction’—it
would not have been so snobbishly, shabbily treated.” With that Sturgeon bids “farewell
to science fiction as genre, and to the larger chore of defining the field.”159
Sturgeon may have been ready to say goodbye, but the chore of defining the field
had only just gotten underway. The tides were shifting, and Amis’s definition was
already giving way to a subtler sensibility about science fiction’s aesthetic merits and
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serious-minded provocations. The 1973 conference on “The Writer and Science Fiction”
at Penn State was a watershed moment in the consolidation of science fiction’s cultural
prestige, ratified by academic interest. Its line-up of participants mixed writers and critics
to consider the place of science fiction in the academy and in culture. A newspaper article
reporting on the conference summed up its consequences for the field in its title:
“‘Weirdo’ Writers of Sci-Fi Okay Now.”160 The fact of the conference being reported in
newspapers at all was itself indicative of its significance as harbinger of a sea change in
the field’s relevance. The conference was not merely a respectability bid, but reflected
the larger networks of interaction between writers and critics being consolidated in the
university in the early 1970s.
The conference was convened by the Science Fiction Research Association,
founded in 1970, and it was attended by approximately 200 people. The New York Times
coverage of the conference, “Science Fiction Getting Serious Study on Campuses,”
adopted the tone of science fiction to report on the event: “A strange, mutant species of
literary man has been romping here [at Penn State]… and if they have been emitting odd
and raucous cries, it is because they are science fiction writers, experts and fans, and they
are celebrating the fact that science fiction is becoming a subject of serious scholarly
study. After light years of travel aboard the pulp magazines and paperbacks, it has come
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in out of the inter-galactic cold.”161 Professor Philip Klass (under the name William
Tenn, a notable science fiction author) is quoted as saying, “Suddenly, we’re
respectable.” Leslie Fiedler addressed the convention in a speech titled “Science Fiction
and the University Community”:
Slowly at first, then faster and faster, reaching maximum velocity in the past
couple of years, science fiction has passed from being an occasional and
distrusted intruder in the university to being a standard part of the academic
scene… God knows how many science fiction courses for credit are being given
in universities in the U.S.; nobody can keep track of them… dissertations are
being written in the field of science fiction, and the visiting lecturer in science
fiction has become as standard on campuses as the touring poet.162
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Eric Pace, “Science Fiction Getting Serious Study on Campuses,” New York Times,
September 18, 1973, p. 36.
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As for the visiting lecturer in science fiction, it was Leslie Fiedler who, in 1975,
offered Samuel Delany his first academic gig, a visiting Edward S. Butler Chair
Professorship at SUNY Buffalo. (Incidentally, that chair had been made vacant by the
departure of its previous visitor, John Barth, who had occupied the position from 19651973.) Delany’s influential 1972 essay “Letter to a Critic: Popular Culture, High Art, and
the S-F Landscape,” though it does not explicitly name him, was addressed to one critic
in particular: Leslie Fiedler, in response to Fiedler’s evidently condescending remarks at
the Science Fiction Writers of America convention in 1971, which were never published.
While Delany’s essay would suggest an antipathy between them, in fact it is their shared
investment in cultivating an academic discourse of science fiction that underwrites
Delany’s subsequent career as author-critic. Indeed, Delany has come to embody
singularly among science fiction writers the figure of the author-critic bridging the worlds
and discourses of academic criticism and science fiction subculture. The condition of
possibility for his exemplarity on this count is the historical moment in which literary
critics in relative positions of institutional power became interested in popular culture and
the demotic arts as instrumentalities to university life, and the program era opened onto
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Officers of the Science Fiction Research Association “estimated that 500 science fiction
courses would be given at universities and colleges around the country this academic
year, mostly English departments,” at institutions including Cornell, Colgate, Stanford,
Notre Dame, University of Illinois, and Penn State. Of the thirty-seven papers presented
at the conference, notable titles included Beverly Friend’s “The Classroom in Orbit,”
Jerry Pournelle’s “The Writer and the Academic,” and Jack Williamson’s panel on
“Teaching Science Fiction—Methods and Goals.”163

the academicization of genre fiction. Delany’s “Letter to a Critic” was published in The
Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of Science Fiction (1977). On Delany’s
relationship to Fiedler, see Conversations with Samuel Delany, ed. Carl Freedman
(University Press of Mississippi, 2009), pp. 43, 49, 167, 191.
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Thirty-seven hours of the conference proceedings were tape-recorded for posterity,
archived at Penn State’s Pattee library. Several publications emerged from the conference
proceedings, including one, “Special Issue: The Writer and Science Fiction,” edited by
the conference co-organizer, Arthur O. Lewis, which was notably published in the
Journal of General Education, confirming the significant quotient of academic interest in
science fiction that recognized the genre primarily as teaching tool. Lewis reported in his
introduction that: “The significance of the Penn State Conference lies largely in the fact
that for the first time substantial numbers of academics were brought together with
substantial numbers of practicing science fiction writers so that contacts between the two
major groups concerned with science fiction could become firmer, and individual
members of the two groups could better understand what each group has been trying to
do. Much of the success in bringing together the two groups results from the
happenstance that one co-chairman, Philip Klass (‘William Tenn’), now a professor of
English, is a widely-recognized writer and critic of science fiction, while the other cochairman, myself, is a professor of English and academic administrator who has been
long and deeply involved in science fiction scholarship. This fortunate combination
meant that one co-chairman had wide acquaintance with academic scholars and one had
wide acquaintance with writers” (x). Arthur O. Lewis, “Editorial Comment,” The Journal
of General Education 28.1 (1976): ix-xiv.
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Theodore Sturgeon’s comments on the Penn State conference are revealing of the
scope of interdisciplinary interest in science fiction as the field gained a critical mass of
scholarly legitimacy in the early 1970s:
A handsome offer to become Distinguished Professor in Residence came to me
from a West Coast university—at the invitation of its Sociology Department. The
English Department at Penn State, host to the Science Fiction Research
Association, had me attend a four-day symposium attended by scholars from all
over the country, and some from Canada, Israel, Australia and others. I then went
to Cornell for an all-University address under the aegis of the Astronomy
Department, and next to M.I.T. for a talk at the behest of the Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory. Prof. Philip Klass of Penn State, who writes under the
name of William Tenn, spoke recently in Delaware to their History Department.
Academia, then, has opened its doors — its front doors—to science fiction, a
development which could have profound effects on the field. A glance at the list
of papers read at the Penn State affair makes it clear that the ‘legitimization’ of s-f
is not sudden nor shallow nor narrow. It might be said (it has been said!) that s-f
provides to the university a new mother lode of thesis and dissertation material
and a new chance to gain those Brownie points so essential to promotion and
tenure. This may be a factor, but, judging by the quality and care of the papers
submitted, and the wide interest demonstrated by so many different segments of
the college community, one must conclude that the virtually undefinable literary
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area called ‘science fiction’ has found a podium; and judging by the number of
segments of the university which have extended serious and respectable welcome,
s-f will be rammed into no one’s cubby-hole; one will have to be built for it. […]
maybe, just maybe, I will begin to get review copies of Pynchon and Nabokov
and the mainstream critics will see Aldiss and Pangbom and Silverberg.164
Science fiction was being institutionalized in and through the academy, as a legitimate
modality of artistic production, a serious field of study, and a curricular tool. One
commentator advised that “readers who still think of science fiction as escapist pap for
the semiliterate may be chastened to learn that science fiction scholarship has become
something of an industry. Hardly a month goes by without the publication of another
collection of historical, bibliographical and critical essays about s.f. aimed at an
ever-expanding high-school and college market.”165
The shifting relationship between science fiction and the academy did not happen
overnight, nor did it happen in a vacuum. Mass cultural forms were having their moment
as academic discourse resolved its alienation from contemporary politics in a convulsion
of curricular crises that nominated “popular culture” as a field of study, and science
fiction along with it.166 As Leslie Fiedler put it, the science fiction boom comes within
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“the larger context of the relationship between universities and popular culture in general.
A crisis in pedagogy and criticism” had arisen, undermining “the old-fashioned, elitist
theories—that there is a serious literature on one hand and trash on the other.”167 Cultural
value was being reconfigured in relation to the mass cultural genre system and the new
social movements. The academicization of science fiction was subtended by this
historical circumstance, and by a huge amount of institutional labor towards generating
the pathways to intelligibility for science fiction in the worlds of scholarly criticism and
university curriculum. In 1958 the Modern Language Association approved a Seminar on
Science Fiction for the annual convention; its inaugural session that year was called “The
Significance of Science Fiction.” (The following year the seminar theme was “The Future
of Science Fiction.”)168 In 1959 Extrapolation began publication as the official
Newsletter of the MLA Seminar on Science Fiction. For its first issue, its editor Thomas
Clareson annotated the bibliography of his 1950s dissertation on American science
fiction, 1880-1915, completed for the English Department at the University of

Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (University of
Chicago Press, 1993).
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Quoted in Eric Pace, “Science Fiction Getting Serious Study on Campuses,” New York
Times, September 18, 1973, p. 36.
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The two longest-running seminars in the MLA are the Seminar on Science Fiction,
founded in 1958, and the Seminar on English Literature in Transition: 1880-1920,
founded in 1957. It’s not incidental that American science fiction and British modernism
form the poles of professionalization in the discipline of English on its way out of the
1950s, splitting the professional attentions of new class literary critical elites between
modernist writers thematizing professional alienation in literary fictions purported to be
the products of artistic genius, and science fiction writers churning out formulaic fictions
under conditions of workaday alienation in the mass-produced literary marketplace.
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Pennsylvania. In 1972 the journal inaugurated a recurring column titled “SF in the
Classroom,” devoting one essay per issue to the teaching of the genre. By 1978 it had
1400 subscribers in 38 countries.169
The Milford writers conference was founded by Damon Knight, Judith Merrill,
and James Blish in 1956, and the journal Science Fiction Forum was founded in 1957 as
an extension of it. The Clarion science fiction writers workshop was founded by Robin
Scott Kelley at Clarion College in Pennsylvania in 1968, on the Milford model. In 1972
Milford relocated to the UK and became a cornerstone of the New Wave. In 1968, James
Gunn filmed a series of interviews, talks, and lectures as resources for his course on
science fiction at Kansas University and others like it. Guest lecturers were some of the
most renowned authors and critics in the field, including Poul Anderson, Isaac Asimov,
John Brunner, Clifford Simak, Harlan Ellison, Damon Knight, Frederik Pohl, and Jack
Williamson. In 1975 Gunn held the first Intensive English Institute on the Teaching of
Science Fiction, a four-week course covering the history of science fiction in short stories
and novels.
This was the program era in genre fiction. Science fiction came to campus not just
thematically as part of its turn to inner space, but also literally, as a curriculum. And
further, the university became implicated in the production of science fiction through its
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Thomas Clareson, “Introduction,” Extrapolation: A Science-Fiction Newsletter,
Volumes I through X, December 1959 to May 1969 (Gregg Press, 1978): 1-2. See also his
wife, Alice S. Clareson, who provides an augmented narrative of the founding of the
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40.4 (1999): 271-276.
172

writers workshops and visiting faculty positions. Rachel Buurma and Laura Heffernan’s
work on “the teaching archive” of English is instructive in its directive to consider the
classroom as a space of disciplinary history in formation, and one that upends tidy
narratives of predominating schools and methods by recovering the vast array of texts
and techniques in the practice of teaching literature.170 The literary history of genre
fiction, and of science fiction in particular, is often locked in a struggle between formalist
and historicist accounts of genre boundaries and definitions, the difference between, for
instance, defining science fiction as a genre of “cognitive estrangement” (formalist) or as
a genre precipitated by the industrial revolution (historicist).171 But the teaching archive
of science fiction encourages us to consider genre fictions as embedded in a mass cultural
genre system (romance, horror, mystery, etc.) in tension with the academic or classical
genre system (comedy, tragedy, lyric, etc.), and likewise informed by the shifting
disciplinary system of university knowledge production internally differentiating under
pressure of professionalization.172
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The three major peer-reviewed science fiction journals to date are Extrapolation,
founded in 1959; Foundation: The Review of Science Fiction, founded in the U.K. in
1972; and Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973 at Indiana State University with an
editorial board including Darko Suvin, who would serve in that capacity through the
journal’s first decade of publication. Suvin had just one year earlier published his fieldtransforming essay “On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre,” notably in the pages of
College English, a bid for the legitimacy of expending scholarly labors in the study of
science fiction not as an aesthetically dignified literary form nor a sociologically
significant popular genre, though both of those aspects certainly figure in his discussion,
but rather as a teaching resource, a useful way of leveraging some relevance on behalf of
literary education through this genre with its robust set of conventions for conjuring the
relation between word and world.173
The period of roughly 1960-1980 saw the sudden uptake of science fiction by the
academy, both as a domain of legitimate scholarly inquiry, and as a curricular imperative.
Courses in science fiction sprang up in English departments around the country, and
articles sprang up in journals and newsletters documenting their consequences for the
field of science fiction. In 1961 Mark Hillegas at Colgate and Bruce Franklin at Stanford
offered what were likely the first English courses devoted entirely to science fiction. And
yet Mark Hillegas could write of “The Course in Science Fiction: A Hope Deferred” in
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Extrapolation in 1968, documenting continued resistance from his colleagues despite
enthusiasm from his students. But a critical mass was quickly reached. Jack Williamson’s
1971 essay “Science Fiction Comes to College” concludes with an annotated list of sixtyone science fiction courses being offered in college English departments in the academic
year 1970-1971 and estimates that the total college course offerings in science fiction that
year numbered nearly 200. By the time of his subsequent report, Teaching SF (1975), the
list had increased substantially. Williamson noted of science fiction’s new relevance in
the college curriculum, “most teachers and students are motivated by a sense that science
fiction has a special relevance to life in our transitional time. In a world of disturbing
change, it can become folklore or gospel… Deriving its most cogent ideas from the
tensions between permanence and change, science fiction combines the diversions of
novelty with its own pertinent kind of realism” (68).174 Science Fiction: The Academic
Awakening (1974) edited by Willis McNelly was distributed as a supplement to volume
37.1 of the College English Association’s Critic in 1974, intended as a primer to catch
English professors unaccustomed to reading or teaching the genre up to speed on their
discipline’s growing new subfield.
Like Suvin’s essay, remembered now for its theory but offered then as a rationale
for academic attention to science fiction as teaching tool, many of the most famous
science fiction anthologies began life as guest lectures delivered to undergraduate
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audiences as part of a new science fiction curriculum. Guest lectures on science fiction at
the University of Chicago in 1957 by Robert Heinlein, C. M. Kornbluth, Alfred Bester,
and Robert Bloch were collected as The Science Fiction Novel: Imagination and Social
Criticism (1959) with an introduction by Basil Davenport. Kingsley Amis’s New Maps of
Hell: A Survey of Science Fiction (1960)—the Ballantine Books 1960 mass market
paperback edition touts it as “the book that made science fiction grow up”—began life as
lectures at Princeton in 1959.
This is also a moment that sees a proliferation of anthologies, edited collections,
and primers addressing the idea of “social science fiction,” which would bring literary
critical conceptions of science fiction into contact with something like the nineteenth
century tradition of the “social problem novel” and the critical discourses developed to
apprehend it. Reginald Bretnor’s edited collection Modern Science Fiction: Its Meaning
and Its Future (1953) features Issac Asimov’s “Social Science Fiction” essay, as well as
contributions from Arthur Clarke, John Campbell, and Philip Wylie, among other
notables, speculating on the engaged future of the genre. Anthropologist Leon Stover
collaborated with science fiction writer and critic Harry Harrison to compile Apeman,
Spaceman: Anthropological Science Fiction (1968), “an anthology of speculation,
fictional and nonfictional, about mankind,” that conceived of social science fiction very
broadly and featured short fiction, excerpts, and comics, concluding with a long critical
essay by Stover on the utility of science fiction as an extrapolative technology for the
social sciences. Stover also collaborated with Willis McNelly on Above the Human
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Landscape: An Anthology of Social Science Fiction (1972), which collected short fiction
and excerpts divided into sections on “community,” “systems,” “technology,” “realities,”
and “tomorrow,” and concludes with several critical essays by the editors on “science
fiction as culture criticism.” In McNelly’s The Adcademic Awakening, Leon Stover
contributed an essay on “Social Science Fiction” that listed instances of the genre as well
as anthologies collecting fiction for sociological ends, including James D. Miles and
George R. Peters’ The Social Organization of the Future (1974) and Bernard S. Philips’
Worlds of the Future (1972).
Sociologist Richard Ofshe’s The Sociology of the Possible (1970) set out to
“provoke its readers into thinking about sociology in a certain fashion: how things could
be or might become, rather than how they are and how they came to be that way” (xi). It
features selections by sociologists and psychologists, including B.F Skinner, alongside
excerpts from social science fiction broadly construed, including Plato and E.M. Forster
alongside Philip José Farmer and Kurt Vonnegut, and divided into sections on
“Interpersonal Behavior,” “Institutional Arrangements,” “Social Organization,” and
“Culture.” Sociology Through Science Fiction (1974), edited by John Milstead, Martin
Harry Greenberg, Joseph Olander, and Patricia Warrick, collects mostly contemporary
short form science fiction under highly detailed rubrics, each with a preface describing its
thematization of a specific matter of sociological concern. Its master categories are “The
Study of Society,” “Social Organization and Culture,” “Self and Society,” “Social
Differentiation,” “Social Institutions,” and “Population and Urban Life,” and its sub-
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topics include “collective behavior,” “deviance,” “social and cultural change,” “race,”
“age,” “social class,” and so on. The introduction proposes that “to the development of
sociological consciousness, or sociological imagination, science fiction is particularly
well suited. The questions science fiction writers ask are not about one social world, but
about countless possible social worlds. As models, the societies described in science
fiction can generate serious inquiry into the nature of contemporary social reality. That is,
they provide starting points for constructing hypotheses about the present” (xii-xiii).
Yole G. Sills’s contribution to the 1968 International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences on “Social Science Fiction” concurs with this assessment, citing social science
fiction as “an instrument for social commentary and criticism” (474) that “might warrant
systematic analysis” by social scientists in so far as it offers “reflections of the
apprehensions and aspirations of a self-conscious society” (480).175 She identifies “this
new genre of literature” as successor to two literary traditions: “modern utopias and
dystopias” and the “classic science fiction” of H.G. Wells and Jules Verne (474). In her
assessment, “much of social science fiction is so inept in style and plot that it hardly
merits consideration as literature… Much of it is published between the same lurid
magazine and paperback covers as is classic science fiction… As a result, it has shared
the same fate of being dismissed by literary critics as a minor, cultist offshoot of
traditional literature… To the social scientist, however, the emergence of a vast body of
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literature on the periphery of his academic vision… is of more than casual interest” (474).
She proposes that “as a cultural phenomenon, social science fiction provides evidence of
the growing impact of the social sciences on popular culture” (474).
The example of John Rechy in Chapter 2 demonstrated how a discourse of
“sociological” literature mediated the critical reception of minority fiction, creating a
backwater of the paraliterary bestseller celebrated for its documentary function but
disparaged in the same breath for being merely that. Here, these anthologies show a
different facet of the relationship between sociology and literature, as science fiction
leveraged a discourse of its sociological merits into a new academic legitimacy that
doubled as a discourse of its social efficacy. Science fiction is assessed for its
sociological merits and offers itself as a kindred social scientific discourse. While
sociology describes the composition and operations of society as it is, science fiction
claims to extrapolate with commensurate rigor what society will be, could be, and,
increasingly, what it should be. While the novels of sexual subculture discussed in
Chapter 2 could be held at arms length from the literary proper with a compensatory
discourse of their sociological merits, science fiction insisted that its value as literature
was in its power to outdo sociology at its own game—and it found confirmation in its
uptake by social scientists themselves.
Science fiction came out the other side of academia having taken on some of its
critical apparatus. Adopting the mantle of utopian speculation handed it by academics
who saw in it a more perfect realization of their hamstrung critical labors, science fiction
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of the utopian variety carried its inward turn to its final extent: self-reflexivity. As Fredric
Jameson describes, “as the true vocation of the utopian narrative begins to rise to the
surface—to confront us with our incapacity to imagine Utopia—the center of gravity of
such narratives shifts towards an auto-referentiality of a specific, but far more concrete
type: such texts then explicitly or implicitly, and as it were against their own will, find
their deepest ‘subjects’ in the possibility of their own production, in the interrogation of
the dilemmas involved in their own emergence as utopian texts” (293).176 Exemplary of
this utopian self-obsession in Jameson’s estimation is Ursula Le Guin’s The Lathe of
Heaven (1971), which “more transparently than much other SF… is ‘about’ its own
process of production” (293).
The Lathe of Heaven (1971) is something of a peculiarity insofar as it makes the
project of science fiction the crux of its narrative drama, without very comfortably
inhabiting the genre of science fiction itself—science fiction figures in this utopian
fantasy less as genre than as theme, and in this way crystallizes a set of relations
characteristic of the scene of science fiction’s cultural diffusion as mode and metaphor in
the postwar period, and its institutionalization as academic discourse in the decade of
Lathe’s publication. In Theodore Sturgeon’s account, The Lathe of Heaven, “carrying on
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the concept that there is more room in inner space than in outer space… brings reality
itself to the proving ground.”177
The sociology of the possible: science fiction was rising to the occasion of
utopian literature. Jameson notes that utopian literature is always to some extent about the
impossibility of its own project, and it is made up, at its best, of a working through of the
contradictions that prevent its full realization. As science fiction becomes increasingly
entwined with the university, the campus naturally gets swept up into science fiction’s
contemplation of the conditions of possibility for its own utopian project. Science fiction
ends up asking the question “what is a utopian education?” in terms of the campus and/as
the world. The Lathe of Heaven is a novel about experts cravenly instrumentalizing the
imagination of a reluctant artist to wreak self-serving havoc on the world. It dramatizes
academic experts as technocratic careerists, allegorizing the academic uptake of science
fiction as professionalization ploy. In the novel these experts manipulate science fiction’s
utopian fancy into a horrifyingly instrumentalized utopian program—rather than escapist
fantasies, its science fictional nightmares are realized as urban renewal program.

VI. The Man in the Middle of the Graph
The Lathe of Heaven is a story of a draftsman, George Orr, possessed of a power
over which he has no control and for which he is seeking a cure, and the power-hungry
psychiatrist, Dr. William Haber, who instrumentally manipulates this power for his own
177
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ends instead of curing it. Orr has “effective dreams,” which is to say his dreams remake
the world in their image each time he has one, no matter how “incoherent, selfish,
irrational” they may be—and indeed they mostly are (14). These dreams not only change
the present, but they fabricate a deep historical past to vouchsafe its bizarre new qualities,
and only Orr maintains the “double memory”—and by the end it is much more than
double—of the various realities that he has wrought.
As Orr’s unconscious mind cobbles together by turns “cheap utopian concepts, or
cynical anti-utopian concepts” (148)—at a certain level they converge—we see a clichéd
array of science fiction tropes concretized on the ground of the city. Orr only dreams
about Portland, making it the beneficiary of the world’s best innovations as well as the
privileged target of its most horrific devastations—at least it cuts both ways. (In effect the
Vietnam War and its attendant atrocities become provincial soap-operas of the
Willamette valley, conceivable as tragic only in their immediate proximity to the mind
and body of the mourner, who is also the one who has wrought the mourned destruction
in the first place.) But the novel itself swaddles this process in the conventions of fantasy:
if you extract this quasi-fantastical frame story, the novel would read this way: after the
end of the world, living in a solipsistic web of his own creation, an anomalous man is
taught how to dream righteously, and extra-physiologically, by a race of telepathically
endowed Aliens of his own invention who speak a mythical language only ever partially
intelligible to him, but most so when allegorically conveyed through the repeated playing
of the song “with a little help from my friends” by The Beatles. The novel is set in a post-
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apocalyptic 2002 in which the sounds of the Beatles are as lost to cultural memory as the
lyrics to “Down by the Riverside”—one of its lines, “Ain’t gonna study war no more,” is
recalled only as a hazy fragment of “an old song,” a fragment in which Orr cannot
remember the operative verb: he tries “fight” before finally landing on “study” (135).
The stabilizing third here is Heather Lelache, by turns a legal secretary and a
privacy lawyer, depending which of Orr’s dreams she is living in, but in any case a
representative of the law to whom Orr turns to mediate his increasingly fraught doctorpatient relationship with Haber. Lelache is a “brown” woman, with a “mixed nature,” the
daughter of a white hippie mother and a black father who, significantly, fell in love over
their shared commitments to protesting war as university students “back in the ‘70s.”
This aspect of her character makes her both the perfect foil and ideal wife for Orr, whose
name is a none too clever pun on his own “mixed nature”: his nature is to mix, to inhabit
the position of “either/or,” dissolving the oppositions that would produce biraciality as an
intelligible identity category in the first place. That is to say, while in one sense Orr and
Lelache inhabit, if not the same, then, analogous positions between worlds, they are also
constitutively, perhaps even ontologically, at odds with one another to the extent that
Orr’s very being consists in his tendency to dissolve the binaries that form the
constitutive ground of Lelache’s character. Here Orr’s “double memory” approaches
something like a pun, or a sideways slide towards social critique, a way of contemplating
the capacity of science fiction modes like “cognitive estrangement” to represent social
forms like “double consciousness.” But the novel ends up making the binarisms of
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American racism the formal answer to its desire for a properly dialectical historiography,
foreclosing this line of reasoning long before it produces any interesting answers.
To illustrate this point as the novel does, let us recall that about halfway through,
Orr dreams a world into being in which racial strife has been obviated by a trick of
evolution: all humans have gray skin. The only catch, of course, is that in such a world
Heather Lelache, whose “color of brown was an essential part of her,” who “could not
have been born gray,” does not—indeed, cannot—exist (130). Orr, on the other hand,
“could be born into any world. He had no character” (130). This lack of character is in
fact Orr’s defining characteristic. Interpreting the results of the battery of personality and
intelligence tests to which Orr has been subjected as part of his treatment, Haber tells
him, “You are so sane as to be an anomaly. […] In quantifiable terms, you’re median.
[…] You cancel out so thoroughly that, in a sense, nothing is left. […] You’re the man in
the middle of the graph” (138). Orr is the impossible embodiment of statistical man, the
form given to the nullity of the statistically normal, and he bends reality to conform to his
dreams of the real, but it is a reality into which others fit only with much cognitive
dissonance—or rather, with precisely that degree of cognitive dissonance meted out by
the standard deviation from “the man in the middle of the graph,” who is in fact no man
at all, but rather more like “a piece of uncarved wood,” as Lelache describes him
throughout.
The violence of the remaking of the ground of Portland in the novel is due to the
fact that the “master plan” is composed of the contents of the unconscious of the man in
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the middle of the graph. That is, the city is being made for the lowest common
denominator, the unconscious imaginary of the average man, which is to say the most
constrained imaginary possible for it springs directly from the repressed psychological
content of the “median.” In this way the novel points up a disturbing statistical
inhumanism lurking in the heart of the master plan. The genre of the master plan is, in
fact, a speculative map of city space whose symbolic horizon is constrained by its
affiliation with the aesthetic imaginary of the non-entity, a statistical model of the city
and its dwellers. This is exactly Jane Jacobs’ critique of the master plan as privileged
approach to urban development.
In “The Kind of Problem a City Is,” the final chapter of The Death and Life of
Great American Cities (1961), Jacobs notes that “Beginning in […] the 1930’s [in the
US], city planning theory began to assimilate the newer ideas on probability theory
developed by physical science. Planners began to imitate and apply these analyses
precisely as if cities were problems in disorganized complexity, understandable purely by
statistical analysis, predictable by the application of probability mathematics, manageable
by conversion into groups of averages” (436). “It became possible also to map out master
plans for the statistical city, and people take these more seriously, for,” Jacobs writes,
“we are all accustomed to believe that maps and reality are necessarily related, or that if
they are not, we can make them so by altering reality” (438). This is essentially the
premise of Le Guin’s novel, in which reality is reconfigured nightly to match the dreams
of Orr, “the man in the middle of the graph.” In Jacobs’ estimation, this is a mistake not
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only because it enacts a violent inattention to the material conditions of the world, but
also because it misrecognizes the significance of aberrant outliers to abstracted
expectations. She warns that city planners “have inevitably come to regard ‘unaverage’
quantities as relatively inconsequential, because these are statistically inconsequential”
but in fact, “‘unaverage’ quantities are important as analytical means—as clues. They are
often the only announcers of the way various large quantities are behaving, or failing to
behave, in combination with each other” (443).178
The novel triangulates its perspective on statistical extrapolation through its three
main characters. Haber is a representative of institutional power and a mouthpiece
advocating the absolute abstractions of governmental-cum-actuarial logic. His motto is
“the most good for the greatest number” but actual “people” mean nothing to him, and he
means nothing as a person—he is not characterized at all, has no details or “life” beyond
descriptions of his ambitions and general philosophy. Lelache, a privacy lawyer, takes
people on a “case by case” basis, absolutely particularized, helping them manage the
imperfect fit between real life and legal abstraction by shielding their particularities from
the law’s incursion into the private realm. Orr is the statistical nullity shunted back and
forth between them, as each attempts to marshal the power of the median on behalf of
their diametrically opposed world views. In Dan Bouk’s cultural history of quantification,
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How Our Days Became Numbered, he describes the way actuarial risk society is
premised on an insuperable tension between quantification and particularization,
professionally embodied by statisticians and doctors.179 We see that organizing tension
being played out in the conflict between Haber and Lelache, quantitative experimental
psychologist and privacy lawyer, each of whom wants with Orr to make the exception
prove the rule, or the rule prove the exception.
The Lathe of Heaven is a post-apocalyptic novel, but it is not a dystopian one. It is
a thought experiment in utopian world-making that takes apocalypse as its premise. In
this way it is something of a cheap shot: it secures as ground for its utopian imaginary the
tabula rasa of absolute annihilation, so that its fantasy may the better proceed
unencumbered by the extant world and beyond the question of reform or/versus
revolution, for there is nothing to reform, nothing to overthrow. (This is one difference
between infrastructure and form: a wholly new envisioning of infrastructure requires
something like annihilation or apocalypse as its condition of possibility.) It is both bleak
and naïve, in that sense. The world ended in April of 1998. As of 2002, the present in
which the action of the novel unfolds, Orr (or his unconscious mind, at any rate) is
spinning his wheels trying to make a world from scratch, or anyway to make a world that
will not itself end in annihilation. History is a trailing back-formation; it is there, but only
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as a guarantor of the present reality that Orr has dreamed up wholesale; in other words, it
is close to arbitrary, something like “back story.”
The “science” involved in this fiction is the science of historiography: effective
dreams, and the aliens and all the rest that they bring into existence, are all the stuff of
fantasy. But the efficacy of the dreams nonetheless rigorously complies to the mandates
of natural history, wherein the laws of genealogy and evolution, of speciation and
sequence, cause and consequence, are invariably obeyed: in fact this is evidently the only
parameter governing the effects of Orr’s dreams. But these historiographic manipulations
are made manifest only spatially, in line with Fredric Jameson’s characterization of the
exemplary artistic production of the postmodern moment as a spatialization of the
temporal.
The novel is something of a successor to Le Guin’s short story of a decade or so
earlier, “Ether, OR.” In a tongue-in-cheek hypothetical table of contents organized
according to 18 idiosyncratic genre categories, Le Guin classifies “Ether, OR” as
“Oregonian Realism.”180 She was kidding, but only sort of. It is something of a
regionalist or local color piece, a multi-perspectival account in the vernacular of life in a
largely working-class rural Oregon town called “Ether” that could not be more typical
save for the fact that it wanders unbidden around the state, much to the dismay of its
inhabitants. Of her initial conception of the story, Le Guin has said, “I thought the town
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was going to sort of shift in time. And it wouldn’t do it. It would only shift in space.”181 If
in “Ether, OR” the town shifts around the state of Oregon, in Lathe of Heaven Oregon
becomes something of a palimpsest, and Portland becomes the primary locus of its reinscription, innumerably overlaid with various iterations of what a “city” might be.
In 1943, the city of Portland hired famed New York master planner Robert Moses
to design a highway system that would make the city more accessible to suburban
commuters. Moses’s design, which entailed highways cutting through neighborhoods in
sweeping ribbons 8-lanes wide, was approved and funded by the state. The Mount Hood
freeway, which would displace approximately 1,700 residential buildings, became the
target of much opposition, and in 1969, as the state began buying up properties in the
highway’s path, public outcry consolidated into active protest. The freeways became the
crux of Portland’s 1972 mayoral race, ultimately decided in favor of Neil Goldschmidt,
the anti-freeway candidate, who killed the project and repurposed its funding into support
for the construction of a light-rail system which was finally built 10 years later.
Considered in this context, Lathe of Heaven looks like “Oregonian Realism”
indeed—if you just ignore, for a moment, those pesky telepathically endowed aliens. The
climax of the novel involves Orr struggling to halt Haber, who has himself acquired the
ability to “effectively dream,” from eradicating the world’s forms, and taking down its
infrastructure with them. Notably, the first thing to go is language: as Haber’s dream
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begins to take effect, all the city’s signage is wiped clean—“Nothing said anything.
Nothing had meaning” (170). Then comes the rest: “The buildings of downtown Portland,
the Capital of the World, the high, new, handsome cubes of stone and glass interspersed
with measured doses of green, the fortresses of Government—Research and
Development, Communications, Industry, Economic Planning, Environmental Control—
were melting. They were getting soggy and shaky, like Jell-O left out in the sun” (171).
Amidst this, Orr’s “car swung wild in the abyss, between the unforming city and the
formless sky” (172). Orr’s response is to abandon the roadways to ride, instead, a
“funicular” into the eye of this deformation, offering a strangely prescient image of a
Portland rescued from the grip of a maniacal “master plan” of highways “unforming” the
city by a lowly draftsman with public transit dreams. I want to suggest that the form of
the “master plan” is one that The Lathe of Heaven is fully in conversation with, and
through this proximity the master plan itself comes to look like something of a
speculative fiction: it faces all the same problems of totality and closure, of representation
and reference, that science fiction does, and perhaps more so, as it is actually responsible
for concretely conjuring the world it represents.
The novel seizes upon this problem of having to close that gap, marshaling the
conventions of fantasy to critique the maniacal fantasies of “master planning” that
science fiction world-making and urban development both entail. The major difference
between fantasy and science fiction in this context is that fantasy elaborates a moralized
world: the setting is predisposed to be hostile or amenable to its characters, and character
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is subordinated to “role,” to the place you occupy in this uneven terrain, this stacked deck
in the struggle between moral incompatibilities. In science fiction, some impersonal
rationality or commitment to extrapolative rigor replaces this sense of the moral, and
neutralizes the terrain. But in wrapping a fantasy framework around a science fiction
premise—cognitive estrangement—The Lathe of Heaven constitutes a reminder that the
infrastructure by which we construct a world is never morally neutral, and there are better
and worse ways to undertake that project.

VII. Universe/University: An Ambiguous Utopia
Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed (1974) was published in paperback with
marketing copy on its front cover: “an ambiguous utopia.” This description was so apt
that it seemed to have sprung from authorial intention, rather than advertising, and over
the subsequent decades the phrase has been adopted as if it had always been the novel’s
subtitle. Samuel Delany’s Trouble on Triton: An Ambiguous Heterotopia (1976) was
named partly in reference to Le Guin’s novel, solidifying the ratification of copy as title.
The marketing apparatus of science fiction shapes its artistic ambitions, sometimes
impinging on them, other times amplifying them, but always present as a component of
its aesthetic force and public reception. Le Guin’s somewhat exceptional status as
academia-literate critical darling has sometimes worked to obscure her works’ status as
science fiction, as which it is beholden to a particular set of conditions of production.
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When Stephen Schryer nominates The Dispossessed as exemplary of New Left
utopianism, precisely this kind of elision is operative.182 Schryer’s examples of a
resurgent utopian literature of the Vietnam War era are novels by Marge Piercy and
Ursula Le Guin, but he curiously skirts the question of science fiction, offering instead a
historicist reading of their novels as thematizing the contradictions of the New Left being
worked out in parallel by the new class fantasies of academic professionals. This chapter
has labored to show that science fiction was not merely nominated as the utopian branch
of academic fantasies of political engagement out of abstract affinities, but as a
consequence of a decades-long process of incorporation of science fiction in the
curricular imperatives and campus ideology of the academy.
Schryer’s reading of Le Guin is insightful and detailed, and it moves the critical
conversation about her work in a salutary direction, expanding its scope of relevance by
sharpening its critique to a point. But it also perpetuates a tendency in Le Guin criticism
to read her work not within the tradition of science fiction but rather as a privileged kind
of what Gore Vidal derisively termed the “U-novel,” novels that, however allegorically
disguised, are about university life written by and for university insiders. We are now
accustomed to thinking of Le Guin as an exemplary social science fictionist—from her
natal context as the daughter of anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, all else more or less falls
in line—but by insisting on her relation to linguistics and anthropology we miss out on
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her interest in quantification, and specifically the quantitative social sciences.183 Or, to
put this another way, accounts of social science fiction that treat the genre as synonymous
with an interest in ethnography sometimes seem to forget that the major trend in social
science of the postwar period is a shift from qualitative to quantitative methods. “Social
science fiction” describes the quantitative “hardening” of social science into a speculative
mathematics as much as it does the science fictional turn to the soft sciences.
The Dispossessed is the story of a Visiting Assistant Professor of mathematics
overcoming his culture shock when he takes a new post at a university far from home. Of
course it is also a novel about primitive accumulation, colonial dispossession,
exploitation and expropriation of natural resources, capitalism, anarcho-socialism,
intergalactic travel, human speciation, linguistic determinism, and a number of other
things. But fundamentally the plot of the novel is that a V. A. P. hates his boss, loves his
comrades, and tries to shake things up in the system that creates these divisions of interest
and power. Its protagonist, the mathematician Shevek, wields an anti-capitalist aesthetics
of number against the instrumentalization of math by capitalism and the administrative
profit motives that make for miserable, profitable multiversities.
The Lathe of Heaven dramatized the problem of conflating word and world,
representation and reality, human psychology and statistical generalization, and it made
manifest the impending horrors that result from utopian literature assimilating statistical
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thinking to its aesthetic toolkit. The Dispossessed names this problem as a specific
symptom of capitalism, rather than a natural allergy of utopianism to number, and it tries
to imagine an anti-capitalist aesthetics of number that could rouse dupes of capital to
revolutionary social transformation by speaking their quantified language back to them
with a different logic. Shevek is operating under the ideological reign of the philosophy
of Odo, which holds that the social body is an organism metabolically primed to maintain
the order of homeostatic balance. This framework allows him to experience math as
possessing something of the autonomy of art, so foreign is it to the predominating
biological metaphorics of his context. His math remains potently aesthetic and nimbly
expressive. He is moved by it. He finds it beautiful.
Over the course of the novel Shevek comes to recognize that the precondition for
number to be a true modality of self-expression is the abolition of capitalism as the
master language of quantification. He can speak to the people of the hyper-capitalistic
Urras in his native numeric tongue because capitalism has made them numerate, but he
must transvaluate their sense of number’s instrumentality and enliven them to its
expressivity. He can authentically express himself numerically without feeling selfalienated because capitalism has not expropriated from him his appreciation for math as
an autonomous aesthetic medium. On his planet, Anarres, it is language that is
instrumentalized—the deliberately monolingual Anarresti speak Pravic, a “rational”
language invented on the occasion of Anarres’s founding to be commensurate with a new
politics and new polis, and it is spoken by no one else in the universe. On Anarres
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language per se is thus indistinguishable from the nationalistic ideology that underwrote
its invention and continues to underwrite its grammars and vocabularies.
In The Dispossessed, the struggle between number and word as competing
descriptive vocabularies of social experience has to be resolved in Shevek before he can
generate the “unified theory of time” that enables “the ansible”—an intergalactic
communications technology that would spell the end to universal strife—to come into
existence. Shevek mistrusts his language and feels a misfit between it and his experience.
He prefers number and takes refuge in it, but in his world this is anti-social and explicitly
coded as such by his teachers and cohorts, who find his singular mathematical genius
“egoistic” because his expertise is “private” and therefore at odds with the ideological
order of his property-less world. He learns Iotic, the language of Urras, so that he can
enter into the collegial discourse of knowledge production with Urrasti university
scientists, socializing the language of number that is reluctantly his private property at
home. But on Urras he learns for the first time of the social oppression wrought by
quantification through a capitalist logic that converts people into numbers in order to
assert exchange equivalences and extract value. In the novel’s climactic scene, Shevek
occupies the center of the Capitol Square on Urras, mirroring the mathematical Magic
Square of his primary schooling (in which the integers 1-9, gridded, add up to the same
number in all directions), and makes a speech in Iotic to the Urrasti, rousing them to
political action.
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In this moment Shevek unifies narrative and number in his own person, and in
doing so is able to tap into a socialized political vision simply by giving expression only
to his own concerns, a magical alchemy by which his private concerns are aligned
completely with the social concerns of the collective to whom he speaks. As he makes his
speech, the content of which is not revealed in the narrative, we learn that “when he
spoke, speaking was little different from listening… He spoke their mind, their being, in
their language, though he said no more than he had said out of his own isolation, out of
the center of his own being” (300). Shevek finally feels like he expresses himself in
language, but the form in which that expression can take shape is mathematical, the form
of inhabiting the center of the Magic Square that enables omnidirectional equivalencies
without asserting exchange values.
The ansible is the corollary to Shevek in technological form of this
rapprochement, the technology that represents identity as transmission, as Shevek also
does in the moment of this speech: he is speaking to a crowd but feels as though he is
simply expressing himself to himself. The ansible does “not transmit messages…
simultaneity is identity. But to our perceptions, that simultaneity will function as a
transmission, a sending” (344). Shevek’s articulation of the content of his identity is
identical to the interest of the collective, and his expression of his identity is experienced
as a transmission of political knowledge and imperative to the crowd. This is a school of
narrative closure on the model of E. M. Forster totally perverted: instead of birthing a
baby or consecrating a marriage, Le Guin’s narrative thrusts towards birthing a
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technology that will solve the problem of historical transmission and intergenerational
continuity. The ansible, child of the unified theory of time born itself of the unification of
word and number, stands in as child to a world that is post-reproductive, post-nuclear
family, post-private property. D.W. Winnicott’s formulation, “sowed a baby, reaped a
bomb,” is very nearly literalized here.
The self-identity, itself identical to collectivity, that Shevek achieves in the
middle of the square stands as counter-point to the horrific generalization of private
psychological content that George Orr experienced as “the man in the middle of the
graph” in The Lathe of Heaven. But both venture to resolve the antinomy of individual
and collective by means of a quantitative logic of scale, and they demonstrate the
consequences of building fictional worlds premised on the model personhood of their
characters. If Le Guin and Silverberg show how the scale invariant premises of model
thinking are problematized by character, the texts dramatizing shrinking protagonists in
the next chapter take this insight to its logical extreme. Le Guin’s “man in the middle of
the graph” becomes Richard Matheson’s “incredible shrinking man” as a logic of
calibration and quantification is consolidated into a world order. In Chapter 4, I take up
the convergence between population explosion and atomic bomb crises to ask, when
world historical action appears to be unfolding at inhuman scale—the micro scale of the
atom, or the macro scale of the planet—what is the fate of the human who tries to scale to
that level?
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CHAPTER 4: MALTHUS WITH A COMPUTER: POPULATION BOMB ON
SPACESHIP EARTH
I. “Has man’s conquest of space increased or diminished his stature?”
The “Anthropocene” gives a new name to a phenomenon a long time in the
making. This chapter takes as its premise that the aesthetic and epistemological
ramifications of this epochal designation are likewise newly visible, but not altogether
new. It thus sets as its task the delineation of the forms and functions of a set of cultural
texts of the 1940s-70s that prefigure the scalar analytics envisioned by recent discussions
of climate change in the humanities. In tracing this history, one finds a series of
inversions, discursive condensations, and detours into the figurative, operating under the
sign of “stature” and running up against the limits of the earth.
In 1963, a “Symposium on Space” convened to address the question “Has man’s
conquest of space increased or diminished his stature?” The arrayed answers form the
centerpiece of Encyclopedia Britannica’s 1963 volume of The Great Ideas Today, the
yearbook series designed to evaluate the relevance of “the great books of the western
world” to the most pressing concerns of the given year.184 Hannah Arendt, Aldous
Huxley, Paul Tillich, Herbert Muller, and Harrison Brown each take a shot at answering
this question. A reprint of Thomas Malthus’s famous essay on population closes the
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volume. In the volume’s twinned obsessions with Sputnik and Malthus, space and
population, hanging as they do under the sign of “stature,” one finds an organizing
impulse of mid-century thinking about the scaling of man to planet. This essay follows a
line of thinking out of The Great Ideas Today, in its course shifting the focus away from
“the conquest of space,” and instead onto “the stature of man.” In so doing it grounds the
cosmological anxieties of the space race in the Earth as the parametric condition of
human life, attending to those domestic narratives of diminution, on the one hand, and
population explosion, on the other, that set the potential to colonize other planets to one
side in favor of a thorough-going account of the terrestrial effects of exceeding the
Earth—be it by spaceship or resource depletion.
While scholarship from a number of disciplinary perspectives has elaborated the
spatial imaginary of the social sciences and literatures of the mid-twentieth century that
invest newly in the category of data and the mode of mathematical formalism to describe
the built environments that contain and support human social life, this essay scales up
once more to consider the spatialized and scalar logics of human climes writ large: the
anthropogenic climate change that is remaking both the planet itself and our conceptual
tools for making sense of the human species’ relationship to it. The Anthropocene is the
newest proposed geological epoch, dated to the moment when human influence on the
planet becomes readable in the stratigraphic record. The International Commission on
Stratigraphy has yet to endorse an official periodization, but a majority contingent of its
Anthropocene Working Group has proposed pinning the moment to the first nuclear
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bomb detonation, the Trinity nuclear test of July 16, 1945, conducted by the United
States Army at Alamogordo.185 Recent humanities approaches to thinking the
Anthropocene have attempted to make sense of its conceptual consequences by
historicizing conceptions of weather, climate, ecology, eschatology, or by theorizing
agency at scale—be it through very large or very small inhuman units like icebergs,
tectonic plates, bacteria, or microorganisms, or by reconceptualizing the locus of exertion
of human agency as the species or supra-individual collectivity. In what follows, I take a
different tack, elaborating instead an account of the planet conceived as form in which
human life can be made to flourish. In the history that underpins this account, the planet
is taken as a naturally given form reconfigured as a technology for supporting human life:
“spaceship earth.”186
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“Spaceship Earth” is an unusually itinerant image, and one that was mobilized by
ecological, environmentalist, conservationist, economic, speculative, policy, and
governmental movements alike, though the values and goals motivating these various
mobilizations were often far from aligned with one another. Compare for instance the
Whole Earth movement of Stewart Brand and the economic theory of Kenneth Boulding,
both of which take “spaceship earth” as their mascot, for an exemplarily stark contrast.
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Figured as a spaceship, the earth is a fragile form under threat of buckling from
without or busting from within by dint of human hubris—the outsizing of human
existence relative to the planet that sustains and contains human life. Spaceship earth is
manned by a human crew of variable size and stature, in possession of divergent but
complimentary skillsets that must be expertly aggregated and properly scaled in order to
keep the intricate form of the planetary vessel intact. This image is ubiquitously
literalized into science fiction plots at midcentury, but perhaps in exemplary form in
Richard Fleischer’s film (and Isaac Asimov’s famous novelization of the same) Fantastic
Voyage (1966) in the team of astronauts, surgeons, biologists, and weapons experts
radically scaled-down for their “fantastic voyage” into the human bloodstream aboard a
spaceship shrunken and repurposed for travel in resolutely human climes—the viscera.187
Outer space is refigured as visceral interior, as the spaceship meant for travel in the
former is scaled down to traverse the latter. The chimeric entanglement of these two
scales, outer space and human interior, is emblematized by the new universality of the
spaceship as both conveyor and protector of human life, no matter the terrain: a vehicular
planetarity. It also underwrites the crux of the plot, in which the fate of a world under
threat of nuclear eradication rests upon the eradication of a blood clot in the body of the
one man with the knowledge to disarm the bomb. That is to say, planetary survival is

187

Fantastic Voyage, directed by Richard Fleischer. USA: Twentieth Century Fox, 1966.
Isaac Asimov, Fantastic Voyage. New York: Bantam Books, 1966.
201

contingent upon the removal of micro-obstructions to the scaling-up of human
knowledge.
To put this slightly differently, in Fantastic Voyage (1966) one witnesses a
representation of the historical hand-off between organic and mechanistic models of the
social world that forms the backdrop to the discourse of the stature of man that it is the
project of this chapter to chart. In the consolidation in the early 1960s of the figure of
“spaceship earth” manned by a human crew tasked with keeping everything in proper
proportion, one finds a knitting together of the ecological, economic, and aesthetic in a
common logic of system and scale. Like the contemporaneous figuration of society as
organism with its attendant ecological theories of social formation and social deviance,
but operating at several greater orders of magnitude, the figure of spaceship earth encodes
ecological thinking at a planetary scale. By scaling up and away from the organic model
in favor of a technological one, “spaceship earth” as conceptual model attempts to clean
up the improperly algorithmic logic of the social sciences of the preceding decades, still
in the thrall of the biological, by reconceiving of the earth as a technology of life-support,
rather than a biological system. The equilibrium that the planet must maintain is thus
reconceived as a problem of mathematical distribution (of resources and the populations
that consume and produce them) rather than homeostatic regulation of competing subsystems, as it was for the structural-functionalist founders of American social theory of
the early twentieth century. The locus of responsibility for maintaining this balance is
also relocated from the social world as autonomously operating organic system to its
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constituents, as the earth is reconceived as at once the sustaining ground and precarious
charge of its human inhabitants. But born of these shifts—the aggrandizement of human
ecology and human responsibility, both—is a new uncertainty about the stature of man, at
once puny with respect to a newly expansive world and grotesquely bloated with newly
staggering power over that world.
In what follows I collate the discourses of population bomb and space race as the
two most substantial attempts in the twentieth century to assay the limits of the earth.188
Their affiliation is consolidated through a set of examples that explicitly grapple with the
relationship between population, space, and planetary limits, and that utilize a figure of
stature to think this conjunction of terms. This figure operates unevenly and sometimes
simultaneously as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, or absolute literalization,
synchronically bridging otherwise quite disparate modes and genres and bringing a
complex conjunction of concepts into view. I find in this account of a conjoined
population bomb and space race discourse a commitment to the Earth as absolute limit
that makes these texts both precursors of and resources for the kind of thinking
necessitated by the Anthropocene. This allows us to reframe the conversation as one
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about the parametric and the scalar—rather than the catastrophic and the tragic. I propose
that the discourse of the Anthropocene in the humanities be organized not around the
history of science and the future of humanism, but rather the history of stature and the
future of formalism. 189 This is to say that the opposition between humanism and
scientism that is explicitly articulated in the historical discourse on space and planet, and
inadvertently shored up in the contemporary one, is a false opposition, and an analytically
mystifying one.
Part of the crux of its mystification resides in the changing fates of formalism,
articulated historically as a scientific analytical procedure consisting in the conversion of
linguistic meaning into pattern, sequence, and structure, and leveraged now quite
differently as a riposte to the ousting of close reading by the arrayed methodologies of the
“quantitative turn,” chief among them those that fall under the penumbra of the digital
humanities. That is to say, formalism has mediated between humanism and scientism
over the whole arc of the history I trace here, but where initially it marked a fearful
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There is an ample literature on the history of the social significance of human stature
that operates adjacently to the project at hand. Because the texts of interest to the present
study are ones that conjure an aesthetics of stature occasionally literalized through the
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encroachment of the coldly scientistic into the properly humanistic province of narrative
meaning-making, it now serves as a bulwark against the encroachment of the scientistic
into the very same humanistic terrain. I inquire in what follows after a formalism that
would refrain from reinscribing an ideologically freighted opposition between an
embattled humanism and a destructively hegemonic scientism. By reading the figuration
of human stature in population bomb and spaceship earth discourses together, I
historicize humanism in terms of a moment in which it was being heartily opposed to a
fearfully scientistic mathematical formalism in order to analytically disentangle
formalism from the grips of a spuriously moralized debate between these false poles.
In the philosophical discourse of planetary limits in the early years of the Cold
War, formalism is always already wedded to the scientistic abstractions of the
mathematical, which stands accused of displacing the humanism of the linguistic, and
there was perhaps no more prolific accuser on this count than Hannah Arendt. I will
return to her work in greater detail in closing, but I will begin with it now in order to
consider the framing function granted to her in a much-cited essay by Dipesh
Chakrabarty, whose two essays on the Anthropocene from 2009 and 2012 have quickly
become the most discussed of the humanities contributions to the discourse of the
conceptual consequences of anthropogenic climate change.190
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In the more recent of these essays, “Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of
Climate Change,” Chakrabarty routes his closing thoughts through a brief reading of
Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958), the prologue of which meditates on the
significance of Sputnik’s 1957 launch into the Earth’s orbit and the possibility it
represented of “escap[ing] from man’s imprisonment to the earth,” as Arendt (quoting an
unnamed newspaper) puts it.191 Chakrabarty invokes Arendt’s reading of Sputnik as a
way of tracking the distance between the 1950s and the present, finding that the “fateful
repudiation of the Earth” (2) that Arendt hypothesized “has come in a shape Arendt could
not have even imagined in the optimistic and modernizing 1950s” (15).192 Global
warming, Chakrabarty writes in the final sentence of this essay, marks a “profound
change in the human condition,” a change that provokes many of the same questions that
Arendt broached in 1958, but that portends entirely different answers, free of what
Chakrabarty identifies as her “optimism regarding the survival of the human species”
(15)—because the Anthropocene admits of no optimism on this count.
But while Sputnik may signal the first “step toward escape from man’s
imprisonment to the earth,” the repudiation of the earth that Arendt cites is in fact
twofold, consisting of a flight from both earth and world: the “modern world” was “born”
not with Sputnik, but “with the first atomic explosions,” and the “alienation” that
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characterizes this modern world consists in a “twofold flight from the earth into the
universe and from the world into the self” (6). Both of these lines of flight derive from
the inadequacy of human speech to the new conditions of the modern world, from the
“trouble” that “the ‘truths’ of the modern scientific world view, though they can be
demonstrated in mathematical formulas and proved technologically, will no longer lend
themselves to normal expression in speech and thought” (3). This entails the problem
“that we, who are earth-bound creatures and have begun to act as though we were
dwellers of the universe, will forever be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak
about the things which nevertheless we are able to do” (3).
Given these newly cosmic climes, in which “earth-bound creatures” behave as if
universe-dwellers, Arendt reluctantly concludes, as Chakrabarty also does, that the newly
modified human condition renders Marxism inadequate to a politically astute account of
the present. The new relation each author identifies between humankind and the earth
precipitates the need for as yet unavailable vocabularies. Arendt is hardly optimistic
about the likelihood of cultivating such vocabularies; in her estimation, it seems likely
that speaking and doing “have parted company for good” (3). But what “we are able to
do” in Arendt’s estimation is not just launch Sputnik into the orbit of the earth, or leave
Earth for some other post in the universe, but rather, and more pressingly, detonate
atomic bombs that would obliterate the earth and ourselves. This is the difference she
draws between the “modern age” and the “modern world” – the age began with the
Enlightenment; the world came into being with the bomb, and it will cease being with it,
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too (6). However “optimistic” Arendt may be about “the survival of the human species,”
her optimism is set against the ground of a modern world “born with the first atomic
explosions,” a world “against whose background [her] book was written” (6).
Chakrabarty notes in his earlier essay on climate, “The Climate of History: Four
Theses,” that “the anxiety global warming gives rise to is reminiscent of the days when
many feared a global nuclear war” (221). But he is quick to note that the two are
distinguished from one another by “a very important difference”: while “nuclear war
would have been a conscious decision on the part of the powers that be,” global warming
“is an unintended consequence […] of our actions as a species” (221). While it is fair to
say that global warming cannot be detonated in the same way that a bomb can, it is
precisely Arendt’s point that the existence of the atomic bomb is an “unintended
consequence of our actions as a species,” or as she puts it, of the “thoughtlessness—the
heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’ which
have become trivial and empty,” a habit which she counts “among the outstanding
characteristics of our time” (5). As a species we have endorsed a scientific program that
exceeds our ability to articulate our actions in speech. The product of this program is an
“unintended consequence” insofar as it exceeds human powers of intention: the bomb
inaugurates the moment in which “know-how” and “knowledge” have “parted company
for good.” That is, anxiety about the threat of global nuclear war prefigures the anxiety
about global warming not just in its apocalyptic posthuman imagining, but also in the
phenomenological rendering of human species-being that it inspired in mid-century
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narratives that take the bomb as the parametric condition of “all thinking about the
present.” 193
As Arendt writes, and as Chakrabarty cites, in the possibility for the repudiation
of the earth represented by Sputnik, and more ominously by the bomb, science had
landed upon a thought that “up to then had been buried in the highly non-respectable
literature of science fiction” (2). I propose that one such burial site is Richard Matheson’s
The Shrinking Man (1956), and his film adaptation of the same as The Incredible
Shrinking Man the following year—the year of Sputnik’s launch.194 These stories
imagine not the repudiation of the earth that Arendt locates in Sputnik, but rather the
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It is also the case that climate change, while certainly an “unintended consequence” in
its particulars, is in fact also monitored, mediated, produced, and managed by “the
powers that be.” To suggest otherwise is to too promptly eschew climate change from the
purview of politics. While Chakrabarty cites Giovanni Arrighi’s Adam Smith in Beijing
as evidence of the shifting “mood” of “globalization analysis” towards global warming
(199), he neglects to cite the conclusions of Arrighi’s analysis: namely that the extent and
imminence of the global geological consequences “of our actions as a species” depend in
large part on the ecological limits imposed and encountered by developing economies
such as China’s. The strong periodizing move that Chakrabarty tries to interpose between
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repudiation of the earth that Chakrabarty locates in climate change. I turn to the 1950s not
to track the distance between that moment and this one, but rather to track the continuity
between Matheson’s figures of the human and Chakrabarty’s. I take these texts less as
exemplars of the repressed political unconscious of either their moment or the present
one, and instead read them as heavy-handed literalizations of the ideas put forth by recent
humanistic attempts to think the present through global warming. The place of the literal
in thinking about the present will be of greater concern as the chapter progresses.

II. The Shrinking Man
There are few more dogged narrativizations of an asymptotic logic than Richard
Matheson’s The Shrinking Man, the 1956 novel that Matheson adapted into the
screenplay for Jack Arnold’s better-known film version of 1957, The Incredible
Shrinking Man.195 Where the film sticks to straight chronological sequence, the novel
proceeds as an extended inhabitation of the brink of “zero,” intercut with flashbacks to
taller times, titled only with the number of inches of its protagonist’s height. He shrinks
“a seventh of an inch a day, as precise as clockwork. He could have devised a
mathematical system on the absolute constancy of his descent into inevitable
nothingness” (83). This decline, plotted on a Cartesian plane, would make for the
195

I claimed that there has scarcely been a more dogged narrativization of the asymptote
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simplest of lines, descending arithmetically from a y-value of seventy-two inches by oneseventh of an inch per day, ticked off along the x-axis. But such a line, unchecked, come
the five-hundred and fourth day, would pass cleanly through zero and into the negative.
That’s all well and good for a line, but what of the man upon whose diminution this
“mathematical system” has been devised?
The great revelation at the end of novel and film alike is that what had seemed
like an inexorable march towards the nothingness of death turns out in fact to be an
asymptotic approach towards subsumption into the earth. But instead of disappearing into
oblivion, the shrinking man simply disappears from the world of human perception into
the “new world” of geological being (in the novel) or the cosmic ether (in the film),
tracking both sides of Arendt’s prophesied “twofold flight from the earth into the
universe and from the world into the self” (6).
While the film maintains a shot of Carey disappearing into a bed of leaves as the
camera zooms out in a crane shot to take in the landscape—a nod to the novel’s closing
meditation on leaves—it does one thing and says another: the voiceover comes in strong
on the side of cosmic mysticism. The images ultimately catch up with the narration,
however, which is in the last instance reinforced by a dissolve of the crane shot of the
landscape into a shot of what is supposed to be the universe in full, followed by
successive dissolves into increasingly tighter close-ups of our galaxy and finally of a
hazy ringed planet that resembles the opening sequence of the film, featuring the atomic
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“mist” that passes from credit sequence to diegesis to jump-start Carey’s diminution.196
The voiceover monologue paired with the closing sequence begins, “It was as if
my body had ceased to exist,” and ends:
I looked up as if somehow I would grasp the heavens, the universe, worlds
beyond number, God’s silver tapestry spread across the night. And in that moment
I knew the answer to the riddle of the infinite: I had thought in terms of man’s
own limited dimension. I had presumed upon nature that existence begins and
ends—that’s man’s conception, not nature’s, and I felt my body dwindling,
melting, becoming nothing. My fears melted away, and in their place came
acceptance, all this vast majesty of creation—it had to mean something, and then I
meant something too. Yes, smaller than the smallest, I meant something too. To
God, there is no zero. I still exist.
This is a fantasy in which dissipation entails not a repudiation of the earth but a
redistribution of human meaning, displaced from “man’s own limited dimension” onto
“all this vast majesty of creation.” To the extent that Carey has been absorbed into the
order of the “vast,” his dissipation is in fact a reconsolidation of his significance: though
his body has “ceased to exist,” the film closes with a definitive declaration that “I” exists
still. He may be “nothing,” but he’s not “zero”—that is, he has no presence but he is not a
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nullity, and according to the logic of the film, being “nothing” may be the best way to
“mean something” in any case.
Where the film posits a mystical reconciliation of man and world, a quasireligious reunification of man and nature through the dissipation of the former into the
latter, the novel closes with an image of agential absorption into a microscopic material
world which is coded as an exploratory journey, an infiltration of the geological structure
of the earth. Ultimately these prove to be one and the same—the novel ends this way:
Last night he’d looked up at the universe without. Then there must be a universe
within, too. Maybe universes. […] He’d always thought in terms of man’s own
world and man’s own limited dimensions. He had presumed upon nature. For the
inch was man’s concept, not nature’s. To a man, zero inches meant nothing. Zero
meant nothing. But to nature there was no zero. […] Suddenly he began running
toward the light. […] Scott Carey ran into his new world, searching.
If in the film “zero” is man’s imposition upon God, in the novel it is “nature” for which
“there was no zero.” And it is not the “universe without” with which Carey will be
reconciled, in which he will “still exist,” but rather the “universe within” that forms the
“new world” in which his “search” will commence. While “I meant something too” is the
rallying cry of the film’s resolution, an insistence upon the meaningfulness by proxy of
absorption into the sublime cosmic order, in the novel Carey becomes a force of another
order, an explorer acting ecologically in the deep structure of the earth’s matter.

213

While the diminishment of the shrinking man’s size may be arithmetic, decreasing
linearly in even increments, the warping of his scale is logarithmic, becoming
exponentially more distant from the human perceptual scale of “man’s own world” as he
approaches “zero” and finds “his new world” organized around “nature’s” concepts,
rather than man’s. That is to say, “reality was relative,” and one-seventh of an inch means
a lot more to a shrinking man on day four-hundred and ninety-seven, when he’s one inch
tall, than it does on day one, when in fact he fails to register any change at all. (It takes
him weeks to notice that he’s shrinking.) The Shrinking Man thus dramatizes both the
difference between size and scale, and the linkage between the geological and the cosmic,
through the mathematical formalism of the asymptote and the perspectival aesthetics of
scale: the ever-receding and expanding bounds of “man’s own limited dimensions,”
capable finally of apprehending the cosmos itself as man and geology are enfolded into
one another.
This obsession with the asymptote, with how close one might come to a limit
without ever reaching it, with how long one might defer the moment of contact with a
parametric condition or extend the tail of one’s curve along its side—this obsession, that
is, with logistic functions and logarithmic scales, with depicting and imagining the
scaling of time and space, people and planet, to their joint limit—this is a formal feature
yoking population bomb and space race to one another in the post-World War II period as
part of an effort to cultivate models for calibrating the scale of man to planet.

214

III. The Space Age
“‘Has man’s conquest of space increased or diminished his stature?’ These ten
simple words are pregnant with almost as many major problems in semantics” (21).197
Aldous Huxley opens his contribution to the “Symposium on Space” with this
disheartening observation, resituating the discussion (like any good scholar invited to
weigh in on someone else’s program) as an inquiry into the semantics of its organizing
question. Huxley determines in short order that this question, to put it bluntly, makes no
sense. Or rather, it makes too much sense, as each of its constituent terms signifies in
several directions at once. After taking great pains to enumerate these “major problems,”
Huxley distills them into a fundamental inconsistency in the meaning of “man,” as
animal-species versus human-culture, its two modes pitted at cross-purposes insofar as
“man, the species, is now living as a parasite upon an earth which acculturated man is in
the process of conquering to the limit—and the limit is total destruction” (24). Born of
this conflict is another: acculturated man, “preoccupied […] with new worlds to conquer”
is “apt to forget that [the] much-touted Space Age is also the Age of Exploding
Populations” (25). And indeed, this link has largely been forgotten in the decades since
Huxley’s diagnosis.
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For their part, the editors of “A Symposium on Space” note in their introduction
that the question of “the conquest of space” is already passé, even though, in 1963, it has
yet to really happen. The real question is “the stature of man.” This is the pressing issue
behind the endless debates over space travel; this is the question that transcends the
boredom of the cold war framework that reduces everything to a symbolic contest of
clout between American and Soviet powers.198 If we grant “the stature of man” abstract
meaning that “the conquest of space” has come to lack, then we apprehend the population
bomb as a problem at once newly enveloped in the cold war framework, and newly
meaningful beyond it. The “conquest of space” is, in this view, nearly a synonym for
“population explosion,” it is just a matter of whether the “space” at hand is extraterrestrial or squarely Earth-bound. “The stature of man” is likewise double, a figure for
moral fortitude as well as for a species grown too large for its plot.
By the time the title of Paul Ehrlich’s best-selling The Population Bomb (1968)
became a catch-phrase for the population crisis of the 1970s, the space race framework
that the Britannica editors were eager to reconfigure had been largely sloughed off, and
lost with it was the link between the “Space Age” and the “Age of Exploding
Populations” upon which Huxley had so vehemently insisted. When The Population
Bomb landed on bookshelves in 1968, it did not inaugurate a discourse so much as it
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condensed one.199 Ehrlich’s book trained the course of population discourse towards
conservationist, birth control, and policy efforts, and away from social hygiene and
communist containment. (It’s easier to talk about conserving resources than it is to talk
about brainwashing populations, or eradicating them.) But in so doing, The Population
Bomb did its part to obscure the tangled origins of population discourse in nationalist
catastrophizing, imperial eugenics, and big business lobbying efforts that saw the
population explosion as being bad for the maintenance of capitalism’s globally
distributed inequalities, and bad for the “stable-state economics” that would come to
acquire many other names, including, a decade later, “spaceship earth.”200
Ehrlich’s title is a citation of entrepreneur Hugh Moore’s 1954 pamphlet by the
same name, which advises vigilance against “the deadly triangle of War, Communism
and World Population,” and warns that “Today the population bomb threatens to create
an explosion as dangerous as the explosion of the H bomb, and with as much influence
on prospects for progress or disaster, war or peace. But while the H bomb is only being
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stockpiled, the fuse of the population bomb is already lighted and burning” (15).201
Moore’s clarion call explicitly links the population bomb to the H bomb, nominating both
as world historic threats to the “progress” of humankind. In this framework the Cold War
imperatives of communist containment become coterminous with an American imperial
eugenic project. Moore’s pamphlet recasts the Cold War as a struggle over the parametric
conditions of human life, not just competing ideological frameworks. The parameters are
set out between population bomb and hydrogen bomb, two figures for the potential to
obliterate humankind at unprecedented scale.
Ehrlich’s book issued from a line of postwar population explosion discourse of
which Moore’s pamphlet is but one part. This discourse is perhaps best exemplified by
two best-sellers of 1948, Fairfield Osborn’s Our Plundered Planet, and William Vogt’s
Road to Survival.202 Vogt described man’s relation to the earth this way: “The human
race is caught in a situation as concrete as a pair of shoes two sizes too small” (288).
Vogt figures the human population of the planet as a man outgrowing his vestments, but
new ones are not an option. If the human race’s feet are to be loosed from its crowded
shoes, it must trade them in for a new foothold in the earth itself. Human thinking
likewise must reckon with the material substrate of the planet as “total environment” to
which our “philosophies” must be scaled. Closing out a long paragraph of rousing
exhortation to epistemological reconfiguration, Vogt writes: “Our philosophies must be
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rewritten to remove them from the domain of words and ‘ideas,’ and to plant their roots
firmly in the earth. Above all, we must weigh our place in the society of nations and our
future through the decades to come in the scale of our total environment” (286).
Fairfield Osborn, in his best-seller of the same year, Our Plundered Planet
(1948), shares Vogt’s commitment to weighing the place of the human race “in the scale
of our total environment,” but he scales up considerably, proposing that “we can best
comprehend the human situation today if we first peer through the long vistas of space
and time” (5). Osborn’s name for this maneuver is “the long view,” for “perspective
sometimes provides its own insight” (5). The insight that perspective provides in this case
is that “our home, the earth, is one of the smallest of the nine planets that belong to a star
that we call the sun” (5). However, “the sun is, in fact, a relatively insignificant star”
when set against the scale of the galaxy, and our galaxy in turn is relatively insignificant
when contextualized in the universe as a whole—a whole the size and scale of which are
inconceivable to the human mind. Osborn’s “long view” entails a rhetorical zooming out,
away from “our home” and from the teeming populations of mankind who inhabit it, in
order to reconfigure the earth as a small and vulnerable planet precariously occupying a
tiny corner of an inconceivably vast universe. The earth, that is, must be coddled, like the
“newborn babes,” “the children of the earth,” 175,000 of whom are daily “freed from the
darkness of their mothers’ wombs” to become “day after day a living part of the
environment into which each of them has come” (3-4). Like Vogt, Osborn locates his
proposed solution in the instantiation of a feedback loop yoking man to planet as twinned
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entities united in a shared struggle to persist in the indifferent darkness of extraterrestrial
space, a prognosticative line syncing Osborn to the figure of spaceship earth to come.
Viewed long, the earth is scaled down. As Osborn puts it, “so it is that the earth is
constantly becoming smaller, or rather our knowledge of it is leading us to think of it as
diminishing rapidly, which, after all, amounts to one and the same thing” (33). The
recasting of material condition as epistemological effect that this characterization
performs allows Osborn’s ultimate designation of “The New Geologic Force: Man” to
stand as both figure and fact, describing the power of the species to alter the geology of
its home planet as well as inaugurating a conceptual schema that constitutively binds man
and planet to one another (32). “Man” is redefined by apposition in geologic terms, as
“the new geologic force”—strikingly prefiguring contemporary critical reconfigurations
of “agency” in the era of climate change that relocate human agency at the geologic
scale.203 Osborn’s articulation of man and geology prefigures this turn of thought, but
until it sinks in, the human race is but a “plunderer” of a precarious planet.
This disposition towards the earth, as a vulnerable system in need of a steward but
inhabited only by a naturally reckless crowd, would come in the ensuing decades to be
crystallized in the image of “spaceship earth,” a phrase coined in the late 1960s across the
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The language of “force” is particularly resonant with contemporary discourse. For
example, Chakrabarty (2009) extends the metaphor of “force” in order to describe the
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writings of Buckminster Fuller, Adlai Stevenson, Kenneth Boulding, and Barbara
Ward.204 Aboard spaceship earth, humankind must imagine itself as a species working in
concert among its ranks and with the planet to pilot a course through the time and space
of the universe. The species and the planet that sustains it, and that it must in turn sustain,
float free in the infinite abyss, with only each other to cling to. This is a different
imaginary than the hubristic vision conjured by Vogt—man too big for his britches, and
earth embarrassingly buckling under his load—but it shares this figure’s investment in
describing a planetary limit, and in staking the definition of the planetary on its
parameters.
One can still hear echoes of Buckminster Fuller’s “Operating Manual for
Spaceship Earth” (1968) in the contemporary literature about climate change, as for
instance in a 2009 report authored by a team of climatologists including Paul Crutzen,
who popularized the term the Anthropocene. This report, “A Safe Operating Space for
Humanity,” is devoted to “identifying and quantifying planetary boundaries that must not
be transgressed.” The report, like the predecessors I have here discussed, is attempting to
address “the scale of human action in relation to the capacity of Earth to sustain it”
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(474).205 The yoking together of population and climate crises on the model of “spaceship
earth” carries on today with the likes of Elon Musk, Space X, and Mars One, as the
privatization of space travel makes the dream of creating self-sufficient human residential
colonies on Mars increasingly plausible, if still not actually realizable.206
Osborn would follow up his best-seller of 1948 with another of 1953, The Limits
of the Earth, “the purpose” of which was “to stress the influence […] exerted by the
relationship between people and the resources of the earth. This is indeed the eternal
equation—the formula that holds the key to human life, then, now and tomorrow” (5).207
The Limits of the Earth would find an echo twenty years on in the Club of Rome’s The
Limits to Growth (1972), novel in its implementation of computer modeling to describe
the interrelation of elements in a world system, but fundamentally little more than an
extension of Osborn’s concern into new methodological terrain.208 Their goal was to
provide a conceptual model to aid in the achievement of “a society in a steady state of
economic and ecological equilibrium” (196). To do so, they mandated that “man must
explore himself—his goals and values—as much as the world he seeks to change. The
dedication to both tasks must be unending” (197). Their vision entailed the installation of
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an “unending” perspectival feedback loop between “man” and “the world,” binding them
to one another as proxies for economy and ecology.
The Club of Rome, an informal international association of scholars across the
disciplines with a working group based at MIT, published The Limits to Growth in 1972
as the first report for a general audience of the results of “Phase One of the Project on the
Predicament of Mankind.” Mankind’s predicament was this: “man can perceive the
problematique, yet, despite his considerable knowledge and skills, he does not understand
the origins, significance, and interrelationships of its many components […]. This failure
occurs in large part because we continue to examine single items in the problematique
without understanding that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, that change in one
element means change in the others” (11). The strategy that they devised to resolve this
predicament was, as one of their critics would promptly put it, “Malthus with a
computer.”209
Man and planet are thus imagined in systemic relation as a provisional conceptual
resolution to the “problematique” that arises from the former’s propensity to outpace the
latter. But because the alchemy by which the system in which man and planet are alike
embedded comes to be “more than the sum of its parts” remains murky, the question of
the relation of man to planet raises itself again as a problem of how precisely to scale
them to one another. The Limits to Growth arises from a moment of convergence between
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the historical trajectories of population and space discourses. What had been—for writers
like Moore, Vogt, Osborn, Ehrlich, and Malthus (without a computer)—a social problem,
the problem of how to structure and maintain human social forms given the economic and
ecological constraints imposed on them by the finitude of the planet on which they take
shape, becomes, with The Limits to Growth, a representational problem, the problem of
how to model a problematique that otherwise remains conceptually elusive to the humans
laboring blindly within it. With a computer, Malthusian thought can be made to model a
relation formally that Malthus had decried morally. The model itself rises to salience,
subordinating both its primary terms in favor of a focus on their joint limit.
As the scaling of man to planet becomes a representational problem, it becomes a
parametric inquiry rather than an ontological one. The nature of man and earth are
rendered moot in the face of an inquiry into their formal entanglement—no longer “the
human condition” so much as the parametric conditions of human life. Here the double
senses of the “stature of man” as denoting both physical size and moral integrity begin to
delaminate in favor of the primacy of the former. It is in revisiting this moment that I
locate the possibility of shifting the discourse of the Anthropocene away from the
catastrophic and the tragic, and into the parametric and the scalar. The decades straddling
the second World War may have been the “age of the crisis of man,” as Mark Greif’s
recent book by that name argues, but they were also the age of “the predicament of
mankind,” as The Limits to Growth put it, a moment of massive upheaval and extensive
discourse on the crisis of the Earth as parametric condition for human life. What Greif’s
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study leaves out of the picture by focusing on narrowly humanistic tracts is the
contemporary ecological-cum-economic discourse—a kind of prototypical and apolitical
instantiation of world systems thinking—that witnesses the crisis of man happening in a
closed system bounded by the earth, such that the crisis of man is also the crisis of
planet.210 The name given to their joint limit conceived as representational problem is
“carrying capacity,” a concept derived from Malthus that redacts his social thought into
the representational idiom of mathematical formalism to address the new scene of the
mid-twentieth century. This transformation of Malthusian thought is what lands his An
Essay on the Principle of Population, first published in 1798, in the pages of The Great
Ideas Today 1963 alongside the “Symposium on Space.”

IV. Limits to Growth
Inspired in the mid-nineteenth century by Malthus’s Essay, the mathematician
Pierre François Verhulst developed what he called the “logistic” equation to model the
growth parameters narratively described in Malthus’s work. While Malthus’s model of
population growth consisted in forecasting the inevitable incompatibility between two
factors—geometric population growth outpacing arithmetic production—the logistic
210
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equation had the virtue of modelling population in a way that is inclusive of the “checks”
on growth that Malthus described (i.e. positive checks that raise the death rate, and
preventive ones that lower the birth rate). Population and its checks are represented by a
single line, deforming into a sigmoid curve as it accommodates the hindrances to its
otherwise exponential increase. Rediscovered and popularized in the 1920s by American
biologist Raymond Pearl, the logistic equation became the standard model for
representing a stabilized relation between population and resources in a given
environment, despite being only haltingly successful as a predictive model, and not
markedly better as a descriptive one.211
Population, to be meaningful, must be modeled. The Limits to Growth represented
a new way of modelling the “limits of the earth,” and it marked a key moment in the drift
into the figurative of “carrying capacity” as a formalization of the problem of man-planet
mismatch: carrying capacity is a figure for the scaling of human to environment, a
descriptive name for their joint limit.212 As humanity begins to be viewed at the species
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level by conservationists, and as globally linked by economic and political networks by
just about everyone else, the “environment” is reconceived as the planet itself.213 In this
reconception, carrying capacity becomes a figure for a parametric planetarity.
Carrying capacity emerges from population discourse as a representational
problem: how does one figure a limit and the trajectory by which it is approached? How
does one formally represent the proper scaling of man to planet? We find illustrative
resolutions to these representational conundrums as they unfold across two pairs of
novels and their filmic adaptations of the same period, the late Matheson adaptation The
Incredible Shrinking Woman (1981), and the adaptation of Harry Harrison’s sci-fi novel
Make Room! Make Room! (1966) into the Charlton Heston vehicle Soylent Green
(1973).214 These texts, and their filmic adaptations in particular, formalize two organizing
aspects of the modelling of carrying capacity. Soylent Green “grounds” this model by
short-circuiting it, binding population and production to one another in geometrically
increasing lockstep by converting human corpses into a food supply. The Incredible
Shrinking Woman shorts this circuit in a different way, aggrandizing one woman’s
shrinkage into a population control solution—shrinking populations, rather than people—

Capacity Concept,” Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 75.3 (1994): 141-57;
and Nathan F. Sayre, “The Genesis, History, and Limits of Carrying Capacity,” Annals of
the Association of American Geographers 98.1 (2008): 120- 34.
213
Sabine Höhler, “The Law of Growth: How Ecology Accounted for World Population
in the 20th Century,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 8.1 (2007): 4564.
214
The Incredible Shrinking Woman, directed by Joel Schumacher, Universal Pictures,
1981. Harry Harrison, Make Room! Make Room! New York: Double Day, 1966. Soylent
Green, directed by Richard Fleischer. USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1973.
227

motivated by a closed-system logic that necessitates eradicating others in order to get
bigger oneself. Across these films we can see the ingenious symbolic resolution of the
Malthusian contradiction through a tighter and tighter braiding together of space and
population, a union out of which “space” comes to mean in equal parts the expanses of
outer space and the evaporating terrestrial space of a crowded planet.
Yet a third formalization of the scaling of man to planet is articulated in The
Incredible Shrinking Man (1957). Each of these texts innovates a strategy for the
symbolic resolution of the Malthusian conundrum—the incommensurate scales of the
production of resources, on the one hand, and the reproduction of humans on the other.
The confluence of cold war logics of global governance and ecological postulates about
the sustainability of the human species sets the stage for this conundrum to unfold as a
rapprochement between man and planet, and each of these texts grafts into the cleft
between them different connective tissue to make of this dichotomy a systemic set of
relations striving for equilibrium. Soylent Green collapses economy and ecology into
identity and lodges this new unity in the breach, while The Incredible Shrinking Woman
reifies human populations as manipulable empirical units of resource consumption rather
than casting them as the mathematical abstractions derived from the aggregation of
individual lives that they in fact are. But the earliest of these, The Incredible Shrinking
Man, is closest to a distillation of the man-planet problematique to its central terms. Its
representational vocabulary hews closest to the conundrum of scaling man to planet
because it is capable of imagining so few solutions to interpose between them, offering
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instead a Robinsonade dramatizing man’s confrontation with the indifference of his
environment to his survival. The solution it proffers to this scalar incommensurability is
located not in economy, ecology, or world systemic redistribution of people or resources,
but in the project of scale itself, the perspectival rescaling of man to the planet on and in
which he lives.

V. The Stature of Man
As The Incredible Shrinking Man’s eponymous Scott Carey begins to shrink, he
attempts to liberate his wife, Louise, from her marital obligations. Louise protests, “I love
you,” but he replies, “No, you love Scott Carey. He has a size and a shape and a way of
thinking. All that’s changing now.” In short order his wedding band falls off of his
shrinking finger and bounces around mockingly on the floor of their car, crassly
demonstrating that Carey’s size, at least, is indeed changing now, to say nothing yet of
his shape and way of thinking. It is easy to be distracted by this cheap shot at Carey’s
masculinity, casting aside incidentally the tripartite transformation that he has just
credited with rendering him ineligible for love in favor of a tight focus on the first term,
“size.” And indeed, size is obviously a crucial theme of The Incredible Shrinking Man,
but in their conjunction, “size,” “shape,” and “way of thinking” constitute a discourse,
more pressingly, of scale—as the novel also illustrates in its own way above. The crux of
it, as the shrinking man himself puts it in the novel from which this film was adapted, is
that “he was not shrinking, but the world enlarging” (22).
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In The Fantastic Little Girl, Matheson’s screenplay for a sequel to the film that
was never produced, Scott Carey’s wife Louise falls prey to the same shrinking process
and joins his company in the deep structures of the earth’s matter—Adam and Eve set to
repopulate an earthly Eden now writ stratigraphic.215 This is a creation myth for the
Anthropocene if ever there was one, the suffusion of the geological with human presence,
and the “golden spike” planted not at the stratum delineated by the byproducts of man’s
earthly activities (industrial production, nuclear testing), but at the stratum wherein man
himself is deposited in the earth’s structure.216 The etiology of both Scott and Louise
Carey’s shrinking derives from their exposure to some admixture of pesticide and
radiation. The relationship this provenance plants at the root of the drama of stature
between agricultural production and nuclear panic anticipates the epistemological
indecision of the stratigraphic debates, resolved in advance by transforming these
phenomena into the joint cause of an existential condition. 217
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The Incredible Shrinking Man, like so many b-movies of its moment, has looked
to critics like a closed case, a straightforward—not to say graceless—channeling of cold
war anxieties into the medium of film, with minimal interference along the way from any
concern for artistry or sophistication. If it has some deeper meaning this is secured only
allegorically, which is to say by gesturing beyond itself, because all it contains in itself is
a series of puns on impotence: a grab bag of dick jokes. But this obsession with size
leaves shape and thought hanging. Scott Carey “had a size and a shape and a way of
thinking. All that’s changing now,” not just the first term. The problem isn’t that Carey is
too small to fulfill his marital obligations; the problem is that he is now too small relative
to Louise (he has an affair with “Mrs. Tom Thumb,” a midget carnival performer, quite
ably).218 In other words, size alone doesn’t matter much; what matters is that “reality is
relative”—this is one “way of thinking” about “size” and “shape.”
Readings of the film as a kind of pop psychoanalytic parable, male impotence
standing in for masculine anxieties more generally—the weakest kind of allegorical
reading—amount to reiterations of cold war ideology, not demystifications of it, to the
extent that they cede the terms of analysis to the facile Freudianism that so heavily

designate the geological transition from Holocene to Anthropocene epochs revolve
around whether it is waste deposits derived from the industrial revolution, or radiationexposed soil derived from nuclear testing, that form the hallmark of this new epoch.
218
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representing “distorted” human scale by conjuring a character whose stage-name is
citational of an eponymous celebrity “dwarf,” whose marriage to Mr. Tom Thumb was a
tabloid sensation in the immediate postbellum period in the eastern United States
(Franzino 2015).
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saturates the popular discourse of the period that its power to decode its objects has been
evacuated in advance through ubiquity and diffusion.219 We might locate a different way
of reading these materials by zooming out, away from the nuclear family and into the
family of man.220 On the periphery of this inquiry lies a claim about cultural authority,
and an inquiry about scale: why should it be the case that b-movies dramatize only
Freudian theses? As Susan Sontag noted early on, “science fiction films are not about
science. They are about disaster […] If you will, it is a question of scale. But the scale
[…] does raise the matter to another level.”221 Following the matter to another level, I
want to expand the sense of what the Freudian might mean here: not the family romance
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so much as the “consequence of man’s raising himself from the ground,” which is to say
the Freud of phylogeny, not ontogeny. It is this Freud who authored a set of “theoretical
speculations” on the history of the species and its futures, who ventured the
historiographic hypothesis that “the fateful process of civilization” begins with the
coming into stature of man, “with man’s adoption of an erect posture” (54, n. 1).222

VI. The Human Condition
If Freud speculated that civilization began with man’s adoption of an erect
posture, Hannah Arendt predicted that civilization would come to an apocalyptic end
with man’s arrogant stature. In “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man,” her
contribution to the “Symposium on Space,” Arendt predicts that the end of the world will
come with the hobbling of man back down from his hubristic heights wherein, buckling
under the cosmological weight of his own totalizing scientism, man will have no choice
but to regard himself behavioristically, “like a rat.” “Under these circumstances,” she
warns, “speech and everyday language would indeed be no longer a meaningful utterance
that transcends behavior even if it only expresses it, and it would much better be replaced
by the extreme and in itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs.” Arendt’s
philosophical concern was not borne out by the historical unfolding of her feared future,
but in its nomination of mathematical formalism as the apotheosis of mid-century
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scientism, it serves in spite of itself as a very apt naming of an emergent aesthetic mode,
exemplified in texts like Matheson’s and in concepts like carrying capacity.223
Mathematical formalism did not (only) entail a reduction of man to rat—though its
affiliation with population modeling conceptually derived from animal husbandry and
nonhuman ecology does indeed go some distance towards eroding the distinction
between man and animal. But this erosion is not for nothing, as mathematical formalism
simultaneously instantiates a powerful mode of representing the relation of human kind to
its sustaining conditions, which include those conditions underwriting the persistence of
man as animal, which is to say as species: the ecology and geology of the planet Earth.
Arendt rounds out her vision of the asymptotic approach towards “meaningless
formalism” with a final insistence on the absoluteness of the limit of which she writes:
“the conquest of space and the science that made it possible have come perilously close
to this point. If they ever should reach it in earnest, the stature of man would not simply
be lowered by all standards we know of, but have been destroyed.” But the stature of man
has neither been “lowered by all standards we know of” nor “destroyed,” as Arendt
warned in these final remarks of her bitterly foreboding essay. In light of the recent
deluge of popular and scholarly reports, remarks, critiques, and jeremiads on the dawning
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of the age of the Anthropocene, one might rightly say that the stature of man has been
absolutely hypertrophied, aggrandized to cosmic proportions by the very science that
Arendt feared. And that science has itself now become something of a humanism,
charged with re-educating a public under the sway of an outmoded scientism—an
absolute faith in technological deliverance that only very reluctantly gives way to the
competing absolutism of the impending climatological apocalypse.
Despite this apparent divergence from Arendt’s feared future—its predicted peril
not so much averted as inverted—the discourse tracing the conceptual consequences of
the Anthropocene has nonetheless thus far remained strangely bounded by the terms of
her now half-century old critique—and literally at that, as Chakrabarty’s favorable
discussion of her Sputnik-obsessed preface to The Human Condition as a precursor to his
own recent theses about the Anthropocene, discussed above, readily attests. Humanism
has lost its sheen, to be sure, but the stature of man remains a pressing concern.
Recent thinking about and born out of the confrontation with the changing
relation between the human and the earth has prompted broad attention to an analytic
hitherto more familiar among geographers than humanists: scale.224 This is a
historiographic and methodological debate as much as it is a political or topical one, with
critics who otherwise scarcely share a discourse all circling the same set of concerns—
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concerns with how to think about a world poised for catastrophe, and with how to
represent this world to ourselves in a way that might make us feel a stronger stake in its
fate. The problem this discourse runs up against, as Arendt did before it, is the
moralization of an analytical conundrum that has the unintended and darkly ironic
consequence of rendering the conundrum unresolvable. The question becomes one of
how to represent the world as an object of care and concern, rather than as a limit not to
be breached. But, as McKenzie Wark (2015) has quipped, “The unspeakable secret about
climate change is that nobody really wants to think about it for too long. It’s just too
depressing!” (xvi). Wark insists, as I do, that “a theory for the Anthropocene can be about
other things besides the melancholy paralysis that its contemplation too often produces”
(xx). The discourse of the Anthropocene is too often content to describe the confrontation
with incommensurable or incomprehensible scale. In one case, this encounter is
aestheticized to the point of becoming its own genre, “the posthuman comedy,” which
does a lot to make the scene of climate change analytically available to humanities
scholars, but nonetheless fuses literature and criticism to one another inside of the wild
laugh with which both alike must meet the prospect of their ultimate extinction.225
We might think around the limits staked out by Arendt’s terms, the limits that
have come to characterize a certain strain of scholarly thinking about the human and the
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planet, by returning to her central question, the question of the status of the stature of
man. But we return to this question not to take on her terms, but instead to turn her terms
into objects of analysis. It is my contention that the various problems with the
predominating line of thought about climate and planet in the humanities at present—its
mysticism, its disabling wonder at the horror of the world, its disavowal of historical
materialism, its helpless rejection of all extant modes of thought as inadequate to the
radically new scene of the epoch, its insistence on novelty even as it retreads the most
threadbare historical humanisms so that they might masquerade as contemporary
theorizations—resolve into the larger problem of its tendency to sublimate its analytical
objects into methodological concepts. This is a problem born of a confrontation with the
order of the literal, with how to analytically apprehend the apparent concretion of our
concepts (agency, force, contract, subjectivity, objectivity, animation, entanglement) in
the matter of the earth itself. We might undo this collapse of method and object of
analysis by thinking further about how to read the literal and concrete, without resorting
to wonder, laughter, or depression at the collapse of our conceptual categories into the
geological substrate out of which we are attempting to theorize them.

VII. Our Plundered Planet
One way of reading The Incredible Shrinking Man in the broadest of thematic
strokes would be to say that this is a parable of the nearly absolute diminishment of a
nonetheless indefatigable humanism under the crushing cosmological force of
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scientism—not a bad caricature of the present predicament that humanities scholars
collectively face. In this resonance one can begin to track a midcentury aesthetics of
scientism to a contemporary science of aesthetics: the scientification of the humanities, in
its methods and its objects. Here I want to distinguish between good and bad faith
versions of “zooming out.” One enables more powerful historicisms, while the other tries
to aggrandize the particular by suturing it to a generality of broader social significance.
As Heather Love has noted of the rhetorical yoking of the “critique debates” to climate
change discourse, perhaps the fate of the Earth hangs in the balance of the resolution of
the methodological debates in the humanities—but more likely not. More importantly,
“the most salient context for these debates is not global survival but rather the university,
with its longstanding fractures along disciplinary lines.”226
Both forms of zooming out arise from a question about the shifting locus of
historical and world-making agency. This is an analytical and political question, not an
empirical one, though it is easy to mistake it as such. For Chakrabarty and others, in line
with Arendt, the presaged future is one in which the stature of man is evacuated as
agency travels to another scale: the species. For Latour and others, agency is relocated in
the planet itself. But these two positions amount to one and the same insofar as they are
two different descriptions of the same problem: how to apprehend the “anthropogenic”
aspect of anthropogenic climate change, a change that begins with humans but promptly
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exceeds us.227 This is a crisis of agency lost through diffusion, wherein agency becomes
non-phenomenological—conceptual rather than experiential. We might seize this as an
occasion, a prompt to critical reflection, rather than the death knell of our critical faculties
and methods.
To do so we might dwell a bit longer on the family of man, which rhetorically
forges a link between man and mankind, human beings and species-being. “The family of
man” is bound to index the eponymous 1955 traveling photography exhibition curated by
Edward Steichen and made infamous in academic circles by Roland Barthes’
conscription of it as a paradigmatic example of myth as a naturalization of ideology.228
My own use of the phrase is meant to index the humanistic spin in the period on neoDarwinian devolution anxieties that conjured the image of the human-as-species. But it is
also to point up, through the uneasy reverberations of anachronism emanating from it, the
strange constancy of its deployment in much the same terms in today’s climate change

227

For a critique of conceptions of agency at scale in the discourse of the Anthropocene
with which this essay is sympathetic, but which traffics in an adjacent theoretical
vocabulary, cf. Derek Woods, especially as he argues that “The problem of writing the
Anthropocene is this: how to interpret the data signal that differentiates the present
geologic moment from the Holocene without amplifying the human subject smoothly
across scales [...] or forgetting our addictive dependence on nonhumans. The point of
arguing that the subject of the Anthropocene is nonhuman is not to suggest that biological
humans can have no influence over this geologic epic. The point is to rewrite the epoch’s
causes in order to see what forms agency takes and which mediators entangle it. So long
as the smooth zoom and the human/nature gap dominate writing on the Anthropocene, a
scaled up, abstract notion of the human mystifies the agency of terraforming
assemblages” (140). “Scale Critique for the Anthropocene,” Minnesota Review 83
(2014): 133-42.
228
Roland Barthes, Mythologies, translated by Richard Howard and Annette Lavers
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, [1957] 2012).
239

discourse: as a conflation of history and nature, and a moralization of both by displacing
the agency of apocalypse onto the species itself and off of particular bodies—individual,
at risk, governing, or otherwise. As Barthes writes, “This myth of the human ‘condition’
rests on a very old mystification, which always consists in placing Nature at the bottom
of History. […] Progressive humanism, on the contrary, must always remember to
reverse the terms of this very old imposture, constantly to scour nature, its ‘laws’ and its
‘limits’ in order to discover History there, and at last to establish Nature itself as
historical” (197-8). Chakrabarty’s assertions that the Anthropocene inaugurates a
“profound change in the human condition,” and that “anthropogenic explanations of
climate change spell the collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural
history and human history” resound uncomfortably in light of this formulation, and are
rescued from this strange resonance only indeterminately by their exemplary insistence
on the empirical veracity of this thesis (201). The apparent literalization of a trope of
humanism in the geological record should not be taken for granted, not because this
literalization is not occurring, but rather because we should not be so sure we know how
to read the literal.229
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As Elaine Freedgood and Cannon Schmitt put it in the introduction to their co-edited
special issue of Representations, “the literal is a way of making meaning manifest rather
than a manifest level of meaning,” (11). “Introduction: Denotatively, Technically,
Literally.” Representations 125.1 (2014): 1-14. We have a lot of resources for reading the
material, and for identifying “new materialisms.” The problem, though, arises when the
abstraction of “species” comes on the scene, divorced from its ecological and historical
senses as a supposedly novel occasion for epistemological bewilderment, as if we—
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Among the problems with contemporary humanities discourse around climate
change is its inhabitation of a history the consequences of which it would purport to
explain. However the trouble comes less from the affinities with historical precursors
than from the analytical confusion consolidated around the encounter with the
anthropogenic aspect of anthropogenic climate change. Only the mistaking of the human
primacy in anthropogenic climate change for a question for humanism as conceptual
apparatus would make Arendt seem like the go-to theorist for this next chapter in the
transformation of the “human condition.” But as C.S. Lewis put it, “Surely the analysis of
water should not itself be wet?” (71).230 A more rigorous separation of the question of the
scale of human agency from our extant theoretical frameworks of the human reveals the
necessity of a formalist conceptual framework as the precondition for any analytical
purchase on the human as a newly planetary phenomenon. And that is because the limits
of the earth are themselves nothing but forms, material in consequence to be sure, but
formal in essence. The parametric is a formal concept, and not necessarily a humanistic
one, insofar as finitude on this scale has little to do with human perceptual experience.
Just as Matheson’s shrinking man failed to notice his changing size until his
circumstances were irremediably dire, anthropogenic climate change has, until quite
recently, operated at a scale that eludes human perception. Another way of phrasing the

cultural critics, scholars, not to mention thinking people more generally—have no
experience in making the non-phenomenological appear in its reality before us.
230
C. S. Lewis, Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories (Harcourt, 2002).
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Anthropocene is as the becoming-formal of human kind: the aggrandizement of human
agency to a planetary scale is the formalization of human agency as geological force,
rather than the extension of the human soul to the earth itself.
Let’s take one last pass at the limits of the earth: “Zhdanov made fun of
Alexandrov the philosopher, who spoke of ‘the spherical structure of our planet.’ ‘It was
thought until now,’ Zhdanov said, ‘that form alone could be spherical.’ Zhdanov was
right: one cannot speak about structures in terms of forms, and vice versa. It may well be
that on the plane of ‘life,’ there is but a totality where structures and forms cannot be
separated. But science has no use for the ineffable: it must speak about ‘life’ if it wants to
transform it” (220).231 As the humanities turn once again to “the spherical structure of our
planet” and find embedded there deposits of the human, let us not resort to a cry or a
laugh in the face of the ineffable—if we are to have a brush with science, let us at least
make the most of its mandate to transform life.
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Roland Barthes, Mythologies, translated by Richard Howard and Annette Lavers
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, [1957] 2012).
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APPENDIX
A working bibliography of salacious Kinsey citations
Erotic paperbacks with sexological themes indexing Kinsey and/or advertised with cover
blurbs from Kinsey:
Ernest Gébler, The Love Investigator (Doubelday, 1960)
Irving Wallace, The Chapman Report (Simon & Schuster, 1960)
Victor Menzies & Jean Bernard-Luc with illustrations by Wendy Des Moulins,
The Fig-Leaf (Digit, 1961)
Stuart James, Bucks County Report (Midwood, 1961) [variously printed as Bucks
County Report by Irwin Wallach; later retitled Devil’s Workshop by Stuart James]
Joseph Hilton Smyth, The Sex Probers (Beacon Envoy, 1961)
Arthur Aldon, Lesbos Is for Lonnie (Beacon-Signal, 1963)
Edgar Box (nee Gore Vidal) trilogy:
Death in the Fifth Position (1952)
Death Before Bedtime (1953)
Death Likes It Hot (1954)
Brian Black, The Unfaithful (Softcover Library, 1965)
Victor J. Banis, Small Town Sex… Today! (Medco, 1966)
Clyde Allison, Sexperiment (Corinth, 1966)
Ray Train, Miss Kinsey’s Report (Chevron, 1967)
Robert Kyle, Venus Examined: A Physiological Novel (Fawcett Crest, 1968)
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Don Bellmore, Swap Research (Corinth, 1970)
John Dexter, Esther on the Couch (Greenleaf, 1971)
Dan Greenburg, Scoring: A Sexual Memoir (Dell, 1971)
Barry Malzberg, Confessions of Westchester County (Olympia, 1971)
Paul Warman, “Lay” Therapy (Bee-Line, 1972)
Lambert Wilhelm, Meat (Arena Publications, 1978)
T.C. Boyle, The Inner Circle (Viking, 2004)
Ted Mark, “Man from O.R.G.Y.” series, which includes:
The Man from O.R.G.Y. (Lancer, 1965)
The 9-Month Caper (Lancer, 1965)
Dr. Nyet (Lancer, 1966)
The Real Gone Girls (Lancer, 1966)
My Son, The Double Agent (Lancer Books, 1966)
A Hard Day's Knight (Lancer Books, 1966)
Room at the Topless (Lancer Books, 1967)
I Was a Teeny-Bopper for the CIA (Berkeley Medallion, 1967)
The Square Root of Sex (Berkeley Medallion, 1967)
Back Home at the O.R.G.Y. (Berkeley Medallion, 1968)
Here's Your O.R.G.Y. (Berkeley Medallion, 1970)
Around the World is Not a Trip (Dell, 1973)
Dial "O" for O.R.G.Y. (Dell, 1973)
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Beauty and the Bug (Dell, 1975)
The Girls from O.R.G.Y. (Manor Books, 1975)
The Man from O.R.G.Y.: Thy Neighbor's Orgy (Zebra Books, 1981)
The Tight End (Zebra Books, 1981).

Film adaptations of these novels include the mainstream releases The Chapman Report
(dir. George Cukor, 1962) and The Man from O.R.G.Y. (dir. James Hill, 1970), and the
porn adaptation Miss Kinsey’s Report (dir. Larry Windsor, 1977).
Nominally scholarly publications pitched for erotic intrigue on sexological topics with
Kinsey dedications and/or prefaces:
Norman Lockridge, The Sexual Conduct of Men and Women: A Minority Report
(1948)
Shailer Upton Lawton, Sexual Behavior of Unmarried Women (Sexual Guidance
Publications Inc., 1951)
Jess Stearn, The Sixth Man (Macfadden, 1961)
Edmund Bergler, Homosexuality: Disease or Way of Life? (Collier Books, 1962)
Harold Cross, The Cross Report on Perversion (Softcover Library, 1964)
Lucius Steiner, Sex Behavior of the Homosexual (Viceroy, 1964)
Leland Glover, How Do You Feel About Sex? (1964)
Roger Battle, Sex for 3-4-5 or More, Commonly Known as “The Sandwich
Lovers” (Echelon, 1968)
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Ferenc Sari, Sex Games Adults Play (Newfact Library, 1969)
Arnold Turner, The Erotic Extremists (MT Publishers, 1969)
John Warren Wells, The Wife Swap Report (Dell, 1970)
Leo Guild, Confidential Sex Survey (Holloway House, 1970)
Morton Hunt, Sexual Behavior in the 1970’s (Playboy Press, 1974)
W.D. Sprague (nee Bela Bloch) series on American sexual practices including:
Sex Behavior of the American Secretary (Chariot, 1960)
Sex Behavior of the American Housewife (Tower, 1961)
The Lesbian in Our Society: Detailed Case Histories of the Third Sex
(Tower, 1962)
Sexual Behavior of American Nurses (Lancer, 1963)
Sex and the Secretary (Lancer, 1964)
Patterns of Adultery: A Marriage Counselor’s Casebook (Lancer, 1964)
Sexual Behavior in the Sixties (Lancer, 1965)
The Sex Cheats: A Physician’s Casebook of Psychosexual Aberration
Among the Married (Lancer, 1969).
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